Life, the Law and the Politics of Abandonment: Everyday Geographies of the Enclaves in India and Bangladesh by SHEWLY, HOSNA,JAHAN
Durham E-Theses
Life, the Law and the Politics of Abandonment:
Everyday Geographies of the Enclaves in India and
Bangladesh
SHEWLY, HOSNA,JAHAN
How to cite:
SHEWLY, HOSNA,JAHAN (2012) Life, the Law and the Politics of Abandonment: Everyday Geographies
of the Enclaves in India and Bangladesh, Durham theses, Durham University. Available at Durham
E-Theses Online: http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/5898/
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or
charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-proﬁt purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in Durham E-Theses
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full Durham E-Theses policy for further details.
Academic Support Oﬃce, Durham University, University Oﬃce, Old Elvet, Durham DH1 3HP
e-mail: e-theses.admin@dur.ac.uk Tel: +44 0191 334 6107
http://etheses.dur.ac.uk
2
  
Life, the Law and the Politics of Abandonment: Everyday Geographies 
of the Enclaves in India and Bangladesh 
 
This PhD strives to understand what roles politico-spatial-legality play in shaping everyday life 
in the enclaves located in the northwest borderland curve in the India-Bangladesh border. 
Conceptually and legally, an enclave is a fragmented territory of one sovereign power located 
inside another sovereign territory. Following the decolonisation process in 1947, both India and 
Pakistan/Bangladesh inherited more than 200 enclaves. By investigating an everyday geography 
of the politico-spatial-legality in Indian and Bangladeshi enclaves, the aim of this thesis is to 
understand how the long existence of these enclaves shape their residents’ everyday lives. This 
thesis examines four research questions – i) how do the politico-spatial-legal factors shape 
citizenship in the enclaves? ii) What role(s) do boundaries perform in everyday life in the 
enclaves? iii) What are the (il)legal-political vulnerabilities present in the enclaves? And iv) 
What are the (il)legal survival methods adopted by the enclave residents’? 
The whole research is based on a seven-month ethnographic account in six enclaves and short 
visits (one day in each enclave) to another twenty enclaves during the pilot study in India and 
Bangladesh. The field sites were selected based on enclave size, distance from the border, 
practice of religion and relationship with the concerned states. The ethnography involved 
observing mundane events at different periods of time in different segments of the enclaves and 
nearby borderlands, and participating in local gathering in tea stalls, women’s evening 
socialisation and other social events. 55 in-depth interviews with the enclave residents and 10 
interviews with the state officials were conducted for a detailed understanding of personal 
experiences and negotiations, and state perspectives on the enclave matter respectively.  
The thesis reveals that the enclave residents live in a non citizenship status, and the border is 
experienced in myriad ways in the enclaves constituting politico-juridical, social and gendered 
forms of bare life. On the other hand, the enclave dwellers find ways of attempting to cope with 
such circumstances and try to survive and advance their life through the loopholes of the state-
system. The approach adopted in this thesis to study enclaves through the framework of 
politico-spatial-legality interactions is expected to advance enclave research. In addition, the 
thesis contributes to the academic literatures on citizenship and abandonment, border, bare life 
and rhythms of survival tactics. At policy level, the thesis can help policy makers understand 
ground vulnerabilities and difficult lives in the enclaves as there is very little government work 
available on enclave life.  
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1 
Introduction – A Brief Account of this Research & Cooch 
Behar Enclaves 
 
 
 
 
Fig 1.1: Karim Hossain standing at the edge of his enclave Sheotikursha in Bangladesh 
 
Karim Hossain (28) is standing at the edge of his agricultural land, which is also the edge of 
Indian territory, Sheotikursha, inside Bangladesh. There are a few yards of Bangladesh between 
his land holding and the India-Bangladesh border pillar that entirely disconnect him from his 
home country India. Legally he is an Indian citizen but unable to visit India because of the role 
of international border as a barrier. Such territorial arrangement, a fragmented territory of one 
sovereign power located inside another sovereign territory, is conceptually and legally defined 
as an enclave. This thesis is about Karim Hossain and tens of thousands of enclave dwellers 
who live in such circumstances in the India-Bangladesh borderland. Following the 
decolonisation process in 1947, both India and Pakistan/Bangladesh inherited more than 200 
enclaves, which comprise 80% of the world enclaves (Van Schendel, 2002). Accordingly, 
enclave dwellers’ citizenship was endorsed. Because of an enclave’s trans-territorial location 
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(the boundary pillar marks enclave folk’s spatio-legal identity), their life is intrinsically linked 
with the territorial power of the concerned states. These places are a unique example of the 
everyday life involving two nation-states and their laws. The boundary pillars (marking enclave-
mainland) and enclave maps along with land holding documents are the sine qua non for 
everyday life in the enclaves since decolonization occurred. The aim of this thesis is to 
investigate how these enclaves shape their residents’ everyday lives. 
  
Map 2.1: Enclaves in the India-Bangladesh borderland (Source: Jones, 2009) 
It does so by exploring the everyday geography of enclaves. The everyday geography of the 
enclaves is essentially connected with enclave-host-home countries interactions. Hence, this 
thesis is also an investigation of the mundane interaction of politics, space, and law in the 
enclaves. Here, politics means a synthesis of different scales of political practices linked to the 
enclaves; such as bilateral and national politics over enclave exchange and access to the 
enclaves, local and embodied politics of exclusion. This includes the geography of individual 
enclaves and the geographies of border and borderland. Law functions as rule, power, and to 
some extent as extra-legal power of the involved states.  
This research neither investigates the technical-legal aspect of how this border dispute 
should/could be resolved nor tries to intensively map onto why these enclaves still exist. This is 
not because those aspects are insignificant, rather because the aim here is to go beyond the 
conventional academic work (see Karan, 1966; Robinson, 1959) on state centric biography 
(origin, continuation and elimination) of an enclave, and to understand the politico-spatial-
legality (PSL) from the enclave residents’ mundane experiences. Trans-territoriality situates an 
enclave in a unique geopolitical entity; therefore, quotidian life in the enclaves can offer 
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multiple forms of politics, space, and law interactions. Although this thesis briefly touches on 
the history of the bilateral politics keeping the border disputes alive, for a general understanding 
of the Cooch Behar enclaves, the key focus lies on the impact such politics have the lives of 
people who belong to the enclaves.  
In the last sixty-five years Cooch Behar enclaves’ residents have been victimized by bilateral 
antagonism, initially between India and Pakistan and later between India and Bangladesh. This 
bilateral antagonism not only obstructed enclave exchange initiatives but also severely affected 
the enclave dwellers’ communications with the main territory either side of the border. Each 
country occasionally demanded full access to its own enclaves, but is unwilling to allow 
reciprocal access to the other. As a result, neither country  made a serious attempt to extend 
administration to the enclaves locked in one another’s territory (Karan, 1966; Van Schendel, 
2002). These people neither can enter into their mainland legally nor receive any state services. 
Hence, they are completely dependent on the mercy of their host country in terms of access, 
economic, health and educational services. As Reid (1992) mentions, if an enclave has only a 
single host state, it is totally at the host’s benevolence. Here, and throughout the thesis, the host 
country means the surrounding country, and a home country is the country to which an enclave 
belongs and of which it comprises a part. Overall, the Cooch Behar enclaves are 
unadministered, disconnected from the home state by an international border, and devoid of any 
state facilities from either country (Whyte, 2002; Van Schendel, 2002, Jones, 2009). Thus, 
people in these enclaves are victims of state politics, trapped in the host country’s sovereignty 
mechanisms and law (by law enclave dwellers need a visa to enter the host country) because of 
their geographic position. These are unique examples that deserve academic inquiry 
demonstrating the way mundane life is victimized between two nation-states. 
Human consequence of the long existence of the Cooch Behar enclaves can tell us about 
everyday experiences, negotiations and victimization for more than half a century in a zone 
outside the state system. In this context, sovereignty over the enclaves is not contested, rather 
the home country has not established political and legal authority in these places and keeps the 
enclaves unadministered. A place outside the state system is unique in the contemporary world, 
and deserves comprehensive study. There are some other places including concentration camps, 
detention centres and refugee camps that are considered as places outside the legal system 
(Agamben, 1998; Minca, 2005; Gregory, 2006: Amoore & De Goede, 2008). However, the 
above mentioned extra-legal spaces are examples of excessive sovereign power; on the contrary, 
these enclaves suggest places with no legal sovereign mechanisms in place. Thus, sovereignty 
works in quite reverse way in these enclaves making them distinct examples. In the view of that, 
4 
 
 
this research develops an innovative and critical study of the enclaves in the context of 
postcolonial state formation in the Indian subcontinent.  
This chapter has two key parts. In addition to describing the aim and research questions that 
shape this research, in the first part I will provide a brief narrative of the definition and global 
distribution of the enclaves. In the second part of this chapter I will provide a brief introduction 
to the Cooch Behar enclaves, including general information about the origin and historical 
process of keeping border disputes alive as well as unsuccessful attempts to resolve enclave 
issues. In addition to the unsuccessful attempts to the exchange issues, India-Bangladesh 
relations will be explored to provide a clear picture of foreign policy changes and bilateral 
politics affecting enclave exchange matters. The chapter concludes by outlining the structure of 
the whole thesis. 
1. 1 Aim and Research Questions of the Study  
This thesis aims to investigate an everyday geography of the Cooch Behar enclaves through 
their day-to-day negotiations with the host and home states. Following Rigg’s (2007: 10) 
formulation, an everyday geography of the enclaves will consider ordinary people, everyday 
actions and commonplace events that make up everyday life. In De Certeau’s (1984:12) words 
everyday practices and ordinary languages are, ‘an ensemble of practices in which one is 
implicated and through which the prose of the world is at work’.  This ‘theorizing up’ approach 
(Rigg, 2007: 13) can help to bring out some fascinating insights to supplement existing 
scholarship on PSL interaction. The study will strive to understand law, space and politics by 
exploring the enclave, host country and home country interactions. Put differently, this thesis 
strives to understand what roles law, space and politics play in shaping everyday life in the 
enclaves. In doing so, I argue that everyday negotiations with the concerned states, and the 
trans-territorial setting of the enclaves can provide new insights into the way politics, space and 
law interplay.  
Studying PSL relations, particularly, in the Cooch Behar enclaves is significant for two key 
reasons. Firstly, the geographic locations of these enclaves situate them in-between two legal 
systems. Therefore, the role of law is vital in everyday living. Secondly, it is the bilateral 
politics that determine the existence and elimination of an enclave. Together domestic and 
bilateral politics decide the status of an enclave; integration with the concerned states; and 
connection with the home state. Such decisions are also fashioned and practised by the legal 
system of the country and the geographic location of the enclaves. Therefore, politics, space and 
law have an overlapping influence on every aspect of life in these enclaves. To understand such 
impacts systematically, this thesis considers the enclave-host-home countries interactions.  
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The aim of the study will lead me to address four research questions and each research question 
is divided into sub-questions,    
 
1. How do politico-spatial-legal factors shape citizenship in the enclaves? 
 What kind of citizenship do both the countries offer to their citizens? 
 What are the lived experiences of (non)citizenship in the enclaves? 
 How do the enclave residents respond to the nature of citizenship they experience? 
This research question explores the essential connections between an enclave and its home state 
through the enclave residents’ lived experiences of (non)citizenship. Citizenship is the most 
powerful and distinctive feature of the modern political landscape, which constructs people’s 
political, legal and national identity within the bounded space of the state (Brubaker, 1992). In 
exploring (non)citizenship in the enclaves, I approach it as a politico-legal and geographic 
identity of an individual, which designates citizen-state/government interaction through rights 
and responsibilities. Since there is no administration in the enclaves, I will explore whether 
Indian and Bangladeshi enclave dwellers are living in non-citizenship or they have some forms 
of citizenship in the enclaves. This research question can shed light on the way the legal rights 
of a citizen with his/her own country are experienced in a place, which is unadministered. 
Consequently, (non)citizenship experiences in the enclaves can demonstrate how the legal rights 
of people become tangled by another set of legal norms, those enforced by geographic isolation 
and political decisions. The thesis will also engage in the reactionary acts of the enclaves 
residents against the kind of (non)citizenship they have in the Cooch Behar enclaves. 
2. What role(s) do boundaries perform in everyday life in the enclaves? 
 How does the performativity of the physical boundaries affect everyday life in the 
enclaves? 
 What roles do boundaries play in the enclave-home country connection? 
 What roles do aspatial boundaries play in the context of the enclave? 
Since these enclaves are located in the borderland, enclave residents either face a fenced 
international border or an unguarded but marked enclave-host country border. Borders operate 
within a complex system of meaning of harmonization, disintegration, regulation and 
reorganization (Sidaway, 2007). Therefore, it is the boundary that can best reveal the enclave-
host country interaction. This research question explores the roles of physical/aspatial 
boundaries in the enclave residents everyday negotiations. Trying to cross both the international 
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borders in or through a foreign country (the host country) can cause legal actions against the 
enclave folks. Therefore, the law, border enforcement and illegal infiltration are the key 
concerns here. In addition, the borders are not only maintained by the state agencies. The Host 
country’s citizens also construct a mental/abstract boundary with the enclave residents since 
they belong to a different nation-state. The imaginative construction of ‘otherness’ is another 
concern as Wilson and Donnan (1998: 12) argue that ‘borders are complex and multi-
dimensional cultural phenomena, variously articulated and interpreted across space and time’. 
This research question, thus, aims to look at the cross border movement, border control, social 
practices and state policy to understand the legal, extra-legal and illegal actions of the host 
country in shaping life in the enclave. 
3. What are the (il)legal-political vulnerabilities present in the enclaves? 
 What are the enclave-specific vulnerabilities constructed by the state agencies? 
 What are the socio-political exploitations affecting enclave life? 
 What are the gendered dimensions of vulnerability present in the enclaves? 
This research question strives to understand diverse types of vulnerabilities that the enclaves’ 
residents experience in their daily life. For this, I will examine the Indian and Bangladeshi state 
agencies’ (border guards, administration, judicial system, emergency services etc) role in 
constructing vulnerability, helplessness and despondency in the enclaves. Since these enclaves 
are excluded from the state judicial systems by keeping them unadministered, these people are 
victims of socio-political violence constructed by political elites, gangs and mainland 
neighbours. This research question aims to understand the degrees of such violence and 
exploitation. Besides, some gender-specific violence and discriminations are generally directed 
to women such as sexual violence and different forms of patriarchy (Valentine, 1992; Pain, 
1997; McEwan, 2000, Walby, 1990). The enclave women are more likely to become victims of 
these vulnerabilities. Thus, it is necessary to explore the gender dimensions of vulnerability in 
the enclaves to bring a nuanced understanding of the interconnected but diverse vulnerabilities 
that exist in the enclaves.   
4. What are the (il)legal survival methods adopted by the enclave residents? 
 How do the enclaves residents ‘make do’ using the legal procedures? 
 What are the illegal methods of surviving in the enclaves? 
 What are the hidden geographies of survival through the ambiguity of law? 
The final research question connects with the enclave residents’ attempts of survival and a 
desire for the advancement of life. Although everyday life is exposed to severe vulnerability, 
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people always trying to make their ‘way out’ in the enclaves. This research question explores 
the legal and illegal methods that the enclave residents use to beat the (il)legal obstacles in their 
everyday life. In addition, some enclave residents use the legal ambiguities as routes to their 
survival and advancement of life.  It looks at a range of issues involving everyday tactics (De 
Certeau, 1984) and the temporal rhythms (Harris, 2000) of enclave life to understand what the 
enclave dwellers do for living and how do they manage to get by.  
This thesis aims to contribute to the political geography of enclaves by providing an account of 
the politico-spatial-legality’s roles in shaping life in 80% of the world enclaves located in 
the India-Bangladesh borderlands. The systematic approach adopted in this thesis to study 
enclaves through the framework of PSL interactions is expected to advance enclave research. 
Throughout the thesis, I will show how the PSL approach is significantly important to 
understanding enclave-home-host states relations. In addition, each research question, explored 
in chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7, connects and adds new theoretical insights to the literatures on 
citizenship and abandonment, borders, bare life, and the rhythms of survival tactics. Thus, the 
thesis is not only important for the sake of enclave research but also contributes to political 
geography debates on the above mentioned themes. At the policy level, the thesis can help the 
policy makers understand the ground vulnerabilities and difficult life in the enclaves as there is 
very little government work available on enclave life.  
1.2 Definitions and Global Distribution of the Enclaves 
 
1.2.1 What is an Enclave? 
The term enclave first overtly appeared in the treaty of Madrid of 1526. Vinokurov (2007: 9) 
reveals that ‘the term ‘en-clave’ entered the language of diplomacy rather late in English, in 
1868, coming from French, the lingua franca of diplomacy, with a sense derived from the late 
Latin inclavatus meaning ‘shut in, locked up’ and clavis meaning a ‘key’’. This Latin 
expression of inclavatus, although not in strict definitional or legal term, describes an encircled 
character or a fragment bounded by somewhat dissimilar. To articulate similar meaning, the 
word enclave is employed in disciplines including geology, law, economics, sociology, 
agriculture and land distribution, military science, and navigation (Vinokurov, 2007). A google 
search on enclave brought interesting general applications of the term; such as a fashion retailer 
named enclave claims its distinctiveness in contemporary fashion while a 3D action game 
enclave highlights a dominion of darkness encircling a territory of light. The diverse and 
extensive uses of the word enclave indicate the essence of the term has timeless utility.  
8 
 
 
While the sense of enclave is widely used, the focus on territorial enclaves is limited. The 
Oxford English Dictionary (OED, 1989) defines both enclave and exclave. A portion of 
territory separated from one state to which it politically belongs and entirely surrounded by 
alien dominions is an exclave from the viewpoint of the home country. On the other hand, it is 
an enclave from the viewpoint of the host country; therefore both the terms denote the same 
territory but the only difference is one’s point of view. OED definition is similar to the legal 
definition of an enclave under international law (see United Nations Economic and Social 
Council, 1995). While the OED definition hints about one or multiple host state, the Dictionary 
of Human Geography (DHG) straightforwardly leads to a single surrounding country. Currently, 
there is only one example of multiple surrounding states that is Azerbaijan’s Nakhichevan 
(Whyte, 2002). In addition to the disagreement of the number of host countries, there are 
disagreements over other characteristics of an enclave. Farran (1955)’s definition of a ‘true 
enclave’ is similar to the OED definition of an enclave that was later defined in Robinson’s 
(1959) seminal paper as a ‘normal enclave’. 
Robinson (1959: 283, 285) provided the first geographic definition and classification of an 
enclave: 
 Normal exclave- one country’s territory completely surrounded by another; 
 Quasi-exclave- those exclaves which for one reason or another do not in fact function as 
exclaves today; 
 Pene exclave - parts of the territory of one country that can be approached conveniently, 
in particular by wheeled traffic-only through the territory of another country; 
 Temporary exclave - created where what was one state has been divided by an 
avowedly temporary or provisional line; and 
 Virtual exclave – areas treated as exclaves of a country but they are not an integral part 
of that country in strict the legal sense. 
While Robinson (1959) states that an enclave should be entirely surrounded by another country, 
his classifications included diverse political fragments. Echoing Whyte (2002: 06), I also 
believe that his classifications, although much cited, are not ‘rigorous’ and cause ambiguity to 
distinguish enclave from non-enclave features. Fifteen years later Catudal’s (1974) article 
appeared as a critique of Robinson’s (1959) definition and classification. Catudal (1974: 116) 
precisely defines that for an enclave (exclave) to exist it must be (a) part of one country, (b) 
completely surrounded by the territory of another state’. By providing detailed illustrations of 
the misuses of the term in literatures, Catudal (1974) suggests that only a ‘normal enclave’ 
should be counted as an enclave and the rest of the classifications of an enclave should be 
considered as enclave-like geopolitical outliers despite exhibiting some degrees of enclave 
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characteristics. Catudal’s (1974) clear definition and precise distinctions between enclave and 
other fragmented territories provide a nuanced approach to the conceptualization of the term. 
Amongst the recent literature, Whyte (2002) followed Catudal’s approach and counted only the 
normal enclaves. On the other hand, Vinokurov (2007) extended Robinson’s (1959) method of 
classification with the argument that research on only ‘true enclaves’ can leave a large number 
of cases having similar economic and political features unstudied.  
Cooch Behar enclaves are ‘normal’ or ‘true’ enclaves and surrounded by only one host country; 
therefore there is no dispute with the definitional differences over those issues. The next sub-
section illustrates the global distribution of the enclaves, while chapter two reviews the 
literature on enclaves. For both purposes, I will follow Catudal (1974) and Whyte’s (2002) 
approach to the definition of enclaves. The enclave-like sites and spaces are important and 
deserve equal attention on their own merit but that should be done separately. We need to 
distinguish an enclave from other fragmented territories because these fragmented territories 
have different aspects of international law; and thus have different realities to those in the 
enclaves. I believe a broad generalization including different types of fragmented territory can 
cause ambiguity and can deepen complexity in an already complex subject matter. A simple and 
straightforward definition is necessary for intelligibility of the term enclave. The 
interchangeable use of both the words enclave and exclave can create ambiguity and confusion. 
Significantly, the official documents in India and Bangladesh use the term enclave. Therefore, I 
will retain using the term enclave all the way through the thesis for clarity. Throughout the 
thesis, I will refer to a home state as the state to which an enclave politically and legally 
belongs; and a home state is the state that surrounds an enclave. 
1.2.2 Existing Enclaves of the World 
Today about 223 enclaves, 32 counter/sub enclaves
 
and one counter-counter enclave exist in the 
world (Whyte, 2002). The term counter enclave means an enclave within an enclave. All the 
enclaves are located in West Europe, the former USSR and Asia, but the counter enclaves are 
mostly located in the Cooch Behar and Baarle enclaves (table 1.1). As mentioned, a great 
majority of the world’s enclaves, almost 80 percent, are located in a small section of the India-
Bangladesh borderland. On the contrary, only eight enclaves exist in Central Asia belonging to 
three states Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. In terms of area, however, this region 
contains a maximum share of total enclavearea; such as Sokh is the largest enclave of the world 
with 236 sq. kms in area which alone is larger than the total area of the Cooch Behar enclaves 
(119 sq. kms). Considering the total number of population, Sokh, Vorukh and Dahagram are the 
three most populous enclaves in the world respectively. Although this thesis is about the 
quotidian life in the Cooch Behar enclaves, an understanding of enclaves in the rest of the world 
can hint at the distinct characteristics of the research area.  
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Table 2.1: World Distribution of the Enclaves (Source: Whyte, 2002, Vinokurov, 2007 and other sources) 
 
Enclave name and location 
Number of 
enclaves and 
counter enclaves 
Home state Host State Total Area (km2) 
Situation in the enclaves 
 
West Europe (32 enclaves and 7 counter enclaves) 
Baarle-Nassau 
1 enclave+ 7 cr 
enclaves 
Netherlands Belgium 0.15 Economic and social integration with both the involved states but follow the home 
country’s law.  
Baarle-Hertog 22 enclaves Belgium The Netherlands 2.34 
Vennbahn enclaves at Rotgen/ 
Monschau 
5  Germany Belgium - 
Economically linked with the host country, but politically and legally linked with the home 
country. 
Llivia 912.48 (sq kms)  1 Spain France 12.84 No problem since both the countries are EU members. 
Busingen 1 Germany Switzerland 7.6 
Economic integration with the host country but politically and legally tied up with the 
home country 
Campione d’Italia 1 Italy Switzerland 1.7 Access to the host country’s services and economic connection with both the states. 
Jungholz 1 point connection Austria Germany 7 No problem with access, economic, political or social prosperity. 
Former USSR (13 enclaves)      
San’kovo/Medvezh’e 1 Russia Belarus 4.5 - 
Bashkend 1 Armenia Azerbaijan - - 
Upper Askipara, & Barkhudarly 2 Azerbaijan Armenia 
0.06-0.12  
- 
Kiarky (north of Nakhichevan) 1 Azerbaijan Armenia - 
Saravaksoi/Sarvaki-bolo 1 Tajikistan Uzbekistan 8 
Strict border, checkpoint accesses to the home country, economically impoverished, no 
integration with the host country, occasional isolation when conflict escalates on the 
borders.  
Vorukh, & ‘Kairagach’ 1 Tajikistan Kyrgyzstan 97 
Kalachcha, Sokh 2 Uzbekistan Kyrgyzia 
Kalachacha (<1), Sokh 
(236) 
Dzhangail’, & Shakhimardan/Iordan  2  Uzbekistan Kyrgyzia - 
Barak 1 Kyrgyzia Uzbekistan - 
Asia (178 enclaves and 21 counter enclaves and 1 counter counter enclaves) 
UK’s Dhekelia Sovereign base, 
Dhekelia power station (2), Ormidhia, 
& Xylotymbou 
4 Cyprus UK - - 
Madha 1 Oman UAE 75 - 
Nahwa 
0 enclaves and 1 cr-
enclave 
UAE Oman - - 
Cooch Behar enclaves 
102 enclaves and 3 
cr-enclaves and 1 cr-
cr-enclave 
India Bangladesh 69.7 
Strict border, complete isolation from the home country, no integration with the host 
country, no state facilities and unadministered. 
Cooch Behar enclaves 
71 enclaves and 21 
cr-enclaves 
Bangladesh India 49 
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Contemporary West European (WE) enclaves embody prosperity, solidarity and integration. 
The EU membership and regulations worked as a catalyst for free movement, access and 
economic prosperity in these enclaves; as such the EU regulations resolved French sensitivity 
over Llivia’s access with its home country Spain (Vinokurov, 2007, Whyte, 2004; Hidden 
Europe, 2005). However, the EU integration and concerned states’ constructive conciliation 
brought solutions to various enclave specific challenges. For example, Germany and 
Switzerland negotiated 130 years for Büsingen’s integration with Swiss customs zone resolving 
its economic challenges (Geluwe, 2003). In general, social and economic integration with the 
host country helps these enclaves prosper economically while a legal tie with the home country 
maintains undisputed sovereignty. Campione d’Italia enclave residents use the host country’s 
health system and currency (Hidden Europe, 2005); people in the Baarle enclaves use the home 
country’s service networks, and law but are linked with the host country in other aspects of life 
(Gemeenten Baarle-Nassau, n.d; Smith, n.d). Amongst the world enclaves, the Baarle is the 
most complex enclave zone. The enclaves’ borders in Baarle follow a capricious course leaving 
many roads, houses and firms partly in the Belgian territory and partly in the Dutch. To its 
extreme, it is not rare in Baarle for a couple to share the same bed but in fact to sleep in a 
different country (Baarle-Hertog, n.d; Geluwe, 2003: 2). To reduce legal complicacy, each 
house is deemed to follow the public provisions and law in the country where its front door is 
located.  
However, such productive engagement between the host-home states is almost nonexistent for 
the Central Asian (CA) and Cooch Behar enclaves. The geographic reality in the Cooch Behar 
enclaves is, somewhat, similar to the Baarle enclaves. While Baarle is a unique example of a 
special arrangement, for a municipality to function in between two different state systems, the 
Cooch Behar enclaves are victims of the concerned states politics and restrictions on access to 
either country. Both the enclave complexes, thus, experience completely reverse behaviour from 
the states involved. In a comparative study between Baarle and Cooch Behar, Whyte (2004) 
asserts on the attitude to national sovereignty, and economic similarity’s role in making them 
different from the Cooch Behar enclaves. It is the state of bilateral relations between the 
involved countries that decides that the degree of sovereignty can be compromised to let an 
enclave function normally.  
The 1990s brought gradual integration for the WE enclaves, while the CA enclaves were 
undergoing a siege. The open border was replaced by the militarization of borders from 1999 
following the Uzbek policy, including partial militarisation, strict check posts and barbed wire-
fencing, which severely affected the enclaves in the region (Megoran, 2005; Reeves, 2006; 
Megoran, 2004). The complex hostility surrounding the enclaves is also manifested through 
Uzbek emplacements around Sokh and Shakhi-Marden enclaves, killing people and livestock as 
they strayed into minefields (Megoran, 2002). The geo-strategic locations of the CA enclaves’ 
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and ethnic differences sometimes trigger local tensions, border closures and violence. 
Nevertheless, enclave people exert resistance. If Sokh inhabitants become victims of checkpoint 
closures, they block the road across the enclave, the one used by the host country’s citizens. In 
addition, Barak, the Kyrgyzstani exclave in Uzbekistan, folks launched a protest march to Osh 
as a response to the four year closure of the Uzbek border. The border securitisation, bilateral 
hostility and ethnic differences lead to local conflicts, simultaneously hindering the economic 
prosperity of these enclaves, making it risky to live in the enclaves.  
The above discussions suggest that the enclaves of the world are not only very diverse in terms 
of number, size and population but also diverse in their function and prosperity. The limited 
availability of information regarding some other enclaves limits this analysis within the West 
European, Central Asian and Cooch Behar enclaves. The WE enclaves represent success and 
integration, but the CA enclaves are caught in conflict and hostility; and Cooch Behar enclaves 
symbolise isolation and abandonment. In this context, the CA and Cooch Behar enclaves have 
some similarities in relation to the experiences of borders and surveillances imposed by the 
states. In addition, enclaves in both regions are victims to hostile relations between the home 
and host states. Although CA enclaves face many challenges, their connection with the home 
country is not denied. Significantly, the Cooch Behar enclaves are completely isolated, 
unadministered and exist beyond any state services, which makes them distinct from rest of the 
world’s enclaves. 
1.3 The Cooch Behar Enclave Facts 
 
1.3.1 Cooch Behar Enclaves in a Pre Nation-state Era  
A few interesting stories exist about the formation of these enclaves, including the gambling 
habits of the Kings of Cooch Behar involving betting with small parcels of land that resulted in 
the enclaves (Jones, 2009; Whyte, 2002). The true story reveals that these enclaves are the 
outcome of the war and peace treaties between the rulers in Bengal and Cooch Behar. In ancient 
India, north Bengal was in a strategic location (Map1.2); it worked as a gateway for the 
northeast to rest of the Bengal. All these factors shaped this region as a frontier for centuries 
between the Gangetic Indian states, Hindu and Muslim, the Tibetan Buddhist theocracy and the 
Assamese kingdoms (Whyte, 2002). On the other hand, current Cooch Behar was a Coch 
kingdom during 1510-1515 lying close to north Bengal. The name Cooch Behar first appeared 
in the Shah Jahan Nama in the mid-1600s (Majumdar, 1977). Mughals in Bengal fought a few 
wars with Cooch Behar from 1661 and they conquered one-third of the kingdom. The origin of 
the Cooch Behar enclaves is linked with the peace treaty of 1713. Whyte (2002: 31) provides 
details of the forming of enclaves in that region, 
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The Mughals were unable to dislodge some of the more powerful 
Cooch Behar chieftains from lands in the chaklas of Boda, Patgram and 
Purvabhag… after the treaty of 1713, the lands still held by loyal Cooch 
Behar chiefs within the chaklas remained part of Cooch Behar, though 
detached from that state and enclaved in the newly-Mughal lands. 
Conversely, disbanded Mughal soldiers had occupied lands inside the 
remainder of Cooch Behar, and the Maharaja was unable or unwilling to 
either dislodge them or enforce his sovereignty over those lands, so that 
the soldiers retained their fealty to the Mughal Empire and the lands 
they occupied became Mughal territory, although detached from it and 
enclaved inside Cooch Behar.  
 
 
  
Map 1.3: Cooch Behar through history. 1713- after the final Mughal-Cooch Behar peace treaty 
(Source: Whyte, 2002)  
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The peace treaties in 1711 and 1713 between the kingdom of Cooch Behar and the Mughal 
Empire were marked as an ending of a long series of wars (Mitra, 1953, iii-iv; Banerjee, 1966). 
To safeguard the honour of all concerned, the peace terms did not require withdrawals (Karan, 
1966). They continued as before during the British rule, when the princely states were 
autonomous. The creation and survival of enclaves in pre-partition time had no impact on 
everyday life in the enclaves except on the enclave residents’ tax payment and land registration; 
these were different to the region. In this time, there was one initiative in Bengal in 1932 to 
exchange the enclaves for administrative benefits; however they had to abandon the plan due to 
strong local opposition (Letter 3272, in Hartley, 1940, 140, see Appendix 1-17 in Whyte, 2002; 
Letter 2949-Jur, in Hartley, 1940, 141, Appendix 1-17 in Whyte, 2002). Although the rationale 
behind such opposition is unknown, the enclave people, perhaps, benefited from their enclave 
status in British India.  
1.3.2 Cooch Behar Enclaves in Post-Partition Period: Access  
The decolonisation procedures created ambiguity over the enclaves’ future in post partitioned 
India. The 3rd June Plan in 1947 restricted freedom for the princely states but provided the 
option to choose their destiny with India or Pakistan (Johnson, 1951). Cooch Behar took two 
years to choose the preferred nation-state and signed the ‘Cooch Behar Merger Agreement’ with 
India in August 1949. Since there was no indication of the future of the enclaves in the partition 
procedures, all these enclaves received international status following Cooch Behar’s merger 
with India. Within a period of thirty-six days Radcliffe divided eighty million people and 
175,000 square miles of land, which had been joined together in many ways for about one 
thousand years. Partition fragmented Bengal, where people were living in the same climate, 
soil, language, religion, customs and food. In addition, both were also highly dependent on each 
other economically, such as in the case of Hooghly-Calcutta which was the heart of Bengal as it 
was the only industrial zone of undivided Bengal where East Bengal produced raw material. 
Due to this fact and to a myriad of political pressures, the Radcliffe Commission failed to draw 
a geopolitically sound line, delineated and demarcated in accordance with accepted international 
procedure. The hasty and rather over ambitious partition procedure to demarcate the almost 
4000 km long Bengal border ignored many issues including the enclave matter (Ahmed, 1953; 
Chatterji, 1999; Van Schendel, 2005).  
Immediately after partition, the whole Bengal border experienced clashes, local tensions and 
violence. As Van Schendel (2002: 121) asserts, ‘the new border became crucial site of foreign 
policy both reflecting inter-state dynamic and producing conflicts affected that dynamic’. All 
the bilateral negotiations were dominated by continual border disputes, clashes, national hatred 
and refugee problems leaving the enclave issue unattended. The first initiative to link enclaves 
with the home country was made under the 1950 agreement. This agreement provided access to 
the government officials to enter the enclaves belonging to their side. It was agreed on 
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conditions that (a) the host country should be notified two-weeks prior to any trip, and (b) 
officials would be escorted back and forth by the host country officials. Certain goods could be 
transferred into the enclaves following this process and tax was collected every six months (Van 
Schendel, 2002). However, the agreement was not implemented due to its complicated 
procedure and hostile India-Pakistan relations. It only considered access provisions for the 
officials but limited enclave residents’ mobility outside the enclave; thus it could offer little 
competence for a normal functioning of the enclave even if the agreement was implemented.  
Passport and visa systems were introduced in 1952, which, eventually, isolated the enclaves 
from their home country. According to the rule, a border could only be crossed at certain points 
with proper authorisation. There were only a few border crossing points along the main 
boundary; so that an enclave resident had either to make an illegal crossing into his own country 
near to his enclave, or make a long detour, entailing expenses and time, to one of the few 
crossing points (Whyte, 2002). The laws in both the countries, thus, criminalise any enclave 
residents’ attempt to reach the home country. In effect the enclave residents’ lost their voting 
rights after the introduction of passport/visas and strict border control in 1952 (Roy Pradhan, 
1995, 2010). However, the 1953 passport conference agreement provided an option for special 
‘multiple entry visas’ for the enclave people to travel both to the host and to the home country 
(Ministry of External Affairs, 1994-7). Although this option could be a practical measure 
incorporating the enclave folks into state facilities, it has never been implemented for obscure 
reasons.  
Both India and Pakistan completely ignored the need of the enclave residents and gradually 
isolated them from the state provisions. Similar practices of administrative abandonment 
continued after the independence of Bangladesh. Only the largest Pakistani enclave of 
Dahagram and another contiguous enclave Angorpota, being less than 200 meters from the East 
Pakistan/Bangladesh boundary, were able to function with any degree of normality. These two 
enclaves were always in a good connection with the home country; perhaps the proximity and 
religious sameness (majority Muslim) were the key factors for such good connections. This 
relationship will be discussed in greater depth in chapter 5 (section 5.5). In last sixty-five years, 
neither country was sincerely willing to exercise sovereignty over the enclaves nor did they 
worry about the true human scale of the enclave problem.  
1.3.3 Anomalies over total Population and Number of Cooch Behar Enclaves  
There is no dispute about the total area and boundary of the enclaves. The boundary 
demarcation in the 1930s had clearly defined enclave-host country boundaries, where border 
pillars mark the boundary clearly. However, the number of enclaves situated in each other’s 
territory varies greatly in research papers, newspaper reports and official survey (Table 1.2). 
The 1951 census is the only source of information on these enclaves but itis dated and not easily 
available to all. Therefore, unavailability of adequate statistics caused such variations.  Brendan 
16 
Whyte’s (2002) comprehensive research paper documents 106 Indian exclaves existing in 
Bangladesh and 92 Bangladeshi exclaves survive in India; these total include 3 Indian and 21 
Bangladeshi counter enclaves inside the exclaves of the other country and the one Indian 
counter-counter enclave inside a Bangladeshi counter enclave. On the other hand, the official 
survey conducted by both the governments does not include the counter enclaves and counts 
111 Indian exclaves located in Bangladesh and 51 Bangladeshi exclaves in India (The Hindu, 
30 July 2011). Since neither country ever raised concern over the anomalies of the number of 
enclaves, this will not affect the exchange procedure. The counter-enclaves are unexchangable 
land, as they are not counted in official statistics. The implementation of the exchange 
procedure will leave all land-holdings to the host country, the counter-enclaves, then, will be 
automatically eliminated. 
Table 1.2: Variations in total number of enclaves (compiled from various sources) 
123 of India in Pakistan and 74 of Pakistan in India (Deputy Minister of External Affairs, Mrs 
Lakshmi N. Menon in the Lok Sabha, 29 November, 1958, quoted in Bhasin, 1996, 1515-6) 
114 of India in Pakistan and 54 of Pakistan in India (New York Times, 1965; High Commissioner for 
UK, Karachi, 1965a) 
130 Indian and 93 Pakistani exclaves in 1947 (Karan, 1966); 
130 Indian exclaves of which 8 were merged with Jalpaiguri in 1952 and 3 were counter-enclaves so 
not exchangeable, leaving 119; and 95 Pakistani exclaves, 21 of which were counter-enclaves and 
non-exchangeable, but 3 of these ceased to be counter-enclaves in 1952 (Banerjee, 1966); 
131 Indian exclaves, 119 being exchangeable (Question by Roy Pradhan and reply by Narasimha Rao 
in Lok Sabha, 20 August 1981, quoted in Bhasin, 1996, 802-3) 
119 Indian and 73 Bangladeshi exclaves (Narasimha Rao in Lok Sabha, 30 April 1982, quoted in 
Bhasin, 1996, 815); 
111 Indian and 51 Bangladeshi exclaves (The Daily Star, 1999; The New Nation, 1999.  
Table 1.3: variations in total number of population in the enclaves (adopted from Whyte, 2002)  
150,000 Indian chhitmahalis estimated, 80% Muslim and 20% Scheduled caste or tribe (Roy 
Pradhan, 1995, 4; Lok Sabha, 1996; Namboodiri, 1996a; Maheshwari, 1998) 
200,000 Indians (Bose, 1997) 
At least 50,000 Indians (Tapan Sikdar in both of Calcutta Online, 1998; Mukarji, 1998) 
200,000 Indians (Roy Pradhan in Lok Sabha, 1999; New Nation, 1999a) 
450,000 chhitmahalis total (Daily Star, 1999b) 
500,000 chhitmahalis total (Daily Star, 2001a; Islam 2001) 
1,000,000 Indian chhitmahalis (Centre for Development Activities, 2001b, 3) 
1,500,000 Indian chhitmahalis (Centre for Development Activities, 2001b, 16) 
The total number of people in the enclaves also varies considerably in different statistics. The 
first census on the enclaves was conducted in 1951, which shows 9,470 people living in the 
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enclaves in India and 13,064 people in the enclaves in Bangladesh (Population Census, 1951). 
Since there was no other census conducted in these enclaves until 2011, prediction over the 
number of enclave residents brought astonishing ranges of estimation (table 1.3). The table 
shows huge variation and confusion about the total number of the population.  
According to a joint census conducted sixty years after the previous one 51,000 people live in 
the enclaves in both sides of the border (The Hindu, 2011). These statistics also sound 
unrealistical when laid down in comparison to the general population growth rate in those 
districts in India and Bangladesh (See Whyte, 2002; Jones 2010). Significantly, the total 
population in Dashiarchora, the third largest enclave located in Bangladesh, is 9,510 according 
to a survey conducted by the India Bangladesh Enclave Exchange Co-ordination committee 
(Mustafa, 2010). This indicates that the official census tried to keep political sensitivity low to 
reduce statistics and hide the large number of people who are in demand of new citizenship or 
rehabilitation in the home country if the exchange procedures are implemented. It is perhaps to 
convince the West Bengal state government because they raised the concern that all enclave 
residents in Bangladesh would seek rehabilitation in India (The Hindu, 07 September 2011). 
1.4 Factors behind Cooch Behar Enclaves’ Extensive Existence  
The Cooch Behar enclave problem, perhaps, is the most neglected and enduring international 
dispute in comparison to any other bilateral issues materialised in India and East 
Pakistan/Bangladesh since the partition in 1947. This section expands on why the enclave 
exchange proposals were unsuccessful; and then focuses on the impact of India-Bangladesh 
relations on the enclave exchange question. 
1.4.1 Jinxed Enclave Exchange Proposals 
1.4.1.1 Nehru-Noon Agreement of September 10, 1958 
Negotiations on the enclave exchange commenced from 1953. Although the initial talks were 
stalled on West Bengal’s (WB) demand for compensation on net areal loss, the negotiation 
continued. In 1958 the two prime ministers, Jawaharlal Nehru and Malik Firoz Khan Noon, 
signed an agreement to resolve some border disputes between India and Pakistan. The issues on 
India-East Pakistan border included few disputes over demarcation, exchange of the enclaves 
and Bagge
1
 Tribunal
 
decisions. This agreement settled exchange of the enclaves along with two 
propositions, including no compensation for India’s net loss of area, while enclave dwellers’ 
                                                             
1 The Bagge Tribunal was created immediate after partition while certain land and rivarine boundary disputes arose out of interpretation of the Radcliffe award 
(see Ahmed, 1953). 
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nationality should be ranked with the host country (The Nehru-Noon Agreement of September 
10, 1958). The agreement technically resolved the enclave problem but its implementation 
required ratification followed by a constitutional amendment.  
Both of the prime ministers, however, failed to persuade the politicians at home that the 
agreement was the right resolution to border disputes. Immediately after the agreement was 
signed, martial law emerged in Pakistan, the Parliament was dismissed and the constitution was 
abandoned (Whyte, 2002). These events made it easy for Ayub Khan, the then administrator of 
martial law, to ratify the agreement without any opposition. In contrast, Nehru faced 
unprecedented opposition from the WB state government over the resolution on a segment of 
the border, Berubari, where Radcliffe’s interpretation was flawed. To demarcate the border at 
this point, the agreement decided to divide Berubari Union (lower administrative unit) into two 
equal parts horizontally, the southern part going to Pakistan (map 1.3). The main concern on 
Berubari was that it was one of the several areas where the WB Government had funded for 
resettlement schemes for refugees from East Pakistan. It can be argued that the WB opposition 
was political marked by popular emotions following the damage of partition (Appadorai, 1981). 
In addition to the Berubari opposition, the exchange of the Cooch Behar enclaves’ procedure 
was criticised on the decision to seize Indians’ citizenship by the term that enclave people have 
to embrace host country’s citizenship upon exchange of the enclaves (Bhasin, 2003; Appadorai, 
1981). The concern over India’s net territorial loss was in the anxiety list as well. 
The controversy over whether the Berubari division was a cession of territory took the matter to 
the court. The Supreme Court verdict considered that both the Berubari transfer and enclave 
exchange involved cession of territory; and thus needed a constitutional amendment. Without 
delay, the Government of India drafted two bills (i) the Constitution Ninth Amending Bill to 
deal with the cession of territory, and (ii) the Acquision of Territories Bill to deal with the 
territories acquired by exchange. The bills were passed with an overwhelming majority in 
December1960 (Appadorai, 1981).  However, Central Government’s immediate amendment of 
the constitution allowing a cession of Indian territory, especially to Pakistan, was deplorable to 
many Indians (Bhowmick, 1960).  
While the Indian central government showed genuine interest in the early implementation of the 
agreement, the WB Assembly unanimously adopted a special resolution reiterating its 
opposition to the transfer of Berubari Union to Pakistan (Appadurai, 1981). Significantly, 
however, there was a series of court cases filed against the central government on the Berubari 
issue, delaying the implementation of the agreement for a decade. Such a long delay from the 
Indian side galvanised resentment in Pakistan declaring that they would not exchange the 
enclaves until Berubari was divided (Whyte, 2002).  A decade after the constitutional 
amendment, India managed to resolve all legal hurdles. However, by then, it was Pakistan’s 
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domestic unrest, the declaration of East Pakistan’s independence followed by war that 
postponed the implementation of the long fought 1958 agreement. Some parts of the agreement 
were quietly implemented which did not involve territorial secessions or annexations (Bhasin, 
1996: 1519-20). The Berubari issue hijacked attention away from the key agendas of the 
agreement including exchange of the enclaves. Thus, an agreement that triggered fierce 
domestic political debates and faced several court cases for a decade was never fully 
implemented jeopardising the enclaves’ exchange future.  
 
 
Map 1.3: The Berubari and proposed India-Bangladesh border (Source: Whyte, 2002, highlighted 
the proposed border in red). 
1.4.1.2 The 1974 Land Boundary Agreement (LBA) 
After the independence of Bangladesh in 1971, Bangladesh inherited all the East Pakistan- India 
border disputes. In a very friendly relation, both the countries signed a fresh land boundary 
agreement that addressed all border disputes. The 1974-LBA is the second scheme towards the 
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resolution of all border disputes, the exchange of the enclaves and the Berubari controversy. 
The enclave exchange options appeared more enclave inhabitant friendly in this agreement than 
the 1958 agreement by providing a ‘citizenship choice’ to enclave residents during the time of 
exchange. The 1974-LBA accentuated expeditious exchange of the enclaves (Article 1(12) 
LBA, 1974). A resolution to the Berubari controversy emerged in this agreement. After the 
political row over Berubari, India wanted to exchange southern Berubari with Pakistan in 
exchange for an equal or about an equal quantum of territory but Pakistan did not agree 
(Bhasin, 2003a, emphasis added). After Bangladesh’s independence, Indira Gandhi made a 
similar approach to Bangladesh and Shekh Mujib, the then Bangladeshi Prime Minister, agreed 
to exchange Southern Berubari with the largest and Muslim majority enclaves of Dahagram and 
Angarpota in return (map 1.4). Since the two enclaves were not contiguous to the Bangladeshi 
mainland, India made the offer attractive and acceptable by proposing to lease a 187×85 sq 
metre corridor in perpetuity to access those enclaves, known as the Tin Bigha Corridor 
(Article1(14) LBA, 1974; Bhasin 2003). Therefore, article 1 (12) & (14) of Agreement 1974 has 
endorsed this exchange.  
Like the 1958 agreement, this agreement was subject to ratification. The agreement supposed to 
be implemented by 1974 was delayed by a case filed in Bangladesh challenging the cessation of 
Berubari and strong opposition in the Parliament against the cessation of territory (see Whyte, 
2002). It was almost the same situation that Nehru faced after signing the 1958 agreement. 
However, Bangladesh resolved the disputes very quickly and ratified the agreement in 
November, 1974 and left control over Southern Berubari; however India never ratified the 
agreement. Thiswas due to the assassination of Shekh Mujib in August, 1975 creating hostile 
India-Bangladesh relations. In the changed political circumstances, India declined to ratify the 
agreement and exchange the enclaves until the border demarcation and Adversely Possessed 
Land (APL) issues were entirely resolved (Bhasin, 1996; Sikri, 2010; Whyte, 2002). In contrast, 
India amended its constitution to ratify the 1958 Agreement prior to completion of the 
demarcation. Though the Nehru-Noor Agreement took only two years to be ratified by the 
constitutional amendment, unfortunately, the 1974-LBA agreement has not seen the day. 
Therefore, the delay in ratification is related to bilateral politics and not to legal constraints. The 
issue of unproductive bilateral relations will be discussed in greater depth in next section. 
Although the 1974-LBA provided the impression that all the enclaves would be transferred 
within a few years, regrettably, it took almost 20 years to resolve the Dahagram case alone. 
India took two decades to lease the Tin Bigha Corridor to Bangladesh, which created distrust 
and antagonism between the countries. It eventually came into effect on 26 June, 1992. 
Bangladeshis have access to Angorpota and Dahagram through the corridor on alternate hours 
during the daylight period, subject to mutually agreed modalities, but its sovereignty remains 
with India (Press Breffings, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 26 June, 1992).
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Map 1.4: Dahagram and Tin Bigha corridor (Whyte, 2002) 
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1.4.1.3 The Land Boundary Protocol, 2011 
To break almost four decades of deadlock over border disputes, the third and recent initiative to 
resolve the enclave problem was taken in September 2011. A Land Boundary Protocol (LBP) 
was signed after the technical decision on the undemarcated segments of the border and APL. 
As announced by the official press release, there was high hope on enclave elimination during 
the recent Indian Premier’s visit to Bangladesh in September 2011. However, the visit did not 
eliminate the enclaves but signed a protocol demonstrating the strong will to exchange the 
enclaves without mentioning any specific timeframe (The New Age, 07 September 2011; The 
Hindu, 07 September 2011). Like the 1974-LBA, this protocol is subject to the parliamentary 
approval. Therefore, the exchange procedure is still hanging in uncertainty. Undeniably, this 
agreement is a landmark progress from the previous agreement as it resolved demarcation and 
APL disputes. Thus, it met the Indian prerequisite to exchange the enclaves. Now the protocol 
needs Indian parliamentary approval for the ratification process. Nevertheless, the agreement 
seems a rushed and less enthusiastic effort without any time-line. Neither the protocol nor the 
state officials provide any time scale for the ratification or implementation of this agreement. 
The bilateral political approval of the protocol is accomplished but the material execution is still 
undecided; thus the enclave residents’ fortune still exists in limbo. It is imperative mentioning 
here that the context of the 1958 agreement and this protocol is quite similar, as such Indian 
central government is keen to resolve the problems with Bangladesh but the WB state 
government’s opposition leaves international agreement and enclave exchange in limbo.  
 
 
1.5 India Pakistan/Bangladesh Relations and the Enclave Issue 
A careful look at the evolution of the foreign policies of India and Bangladesh can better 
explain how the bilateral relations affected the enclaves and the rest of the border issues. 
Predominantly, the way in which each has figured in the changing foreign policy framework of 
the other is the fundamental element in India-Bangladesh relations. Since Independence, India’s 
aspiration to become a regional power has shaped its foreign and defence policy. To accomplish 
its desire, India has followed both neo-realist and liberal institutional approaches during 
different regimes. Waltz (1979) defines hard power as a power that enables regional powers to 
influence their neighbours and to protect themselves from unexpected outside interference. Hard 
power policy adopts military intervention, coercive diplomacy and economic sanctions with the 
aim of implementing national interests through ensuing confrontational policies vis-à-vis 
neighbouring countries (Campbell and O’Hanlon, 2006; Cooper, 2004; Wagner, 2005). In 
contrast to this, the liberal institutional approach, or soft power strategies, emphasises the ability 
to persuade or attract others to do what one wants (Nye, 1990). India’s hard power policy 
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constructed tough relations with Bangladesh keeping all key disputes alive including the 
enclave issues. 
The Nehruvian policy of India, designed by India’s first Prime Minister Nehru, denotes India’s 
own interests only and neighbours received less attention. As I. P. Khosla (2005: 25) quotes, 
‘good neighbourliness as such is not an Indian foreign policy goal ... the tendency is to take 
things for granted with the neighbours so that it can pursue the broader foreign policy goals’. In 
effect, Nehru’s South Asia policy was a mix of hard and soft power strategies (Wagner, 2005). 
A hard-line South Asia policy materialised in 1970s when Indira Gandhi became Prime 
Minister, after the death of Nehru. The Indira doctrine claims that the neighbours have to accept 
the reality of the power differential: that they will not and cannot be equal in their dealings with 
India (Munshi, 2006; Khosla, 2005). It followed the hard power strategy to enforce neighbours 
to act, as India wants them. India wanted to act in all its neighbours’ domestic conflicts while an 
outside power interference was considered as a threat to India’s security interests (Hagerty 
1991). These ideas laid the foundations for India’s military interventions in Sri Lanka in 1971 
and 1987 to 1990, and in the Maldives in 1988. Although Indian foreign policy experts like 
Dixit (2004) justify ‘Indira’s Indocentric interest of foreign policy’ as a need of the time, India’s 
hard power strategies of the 1970s and 1980s created a deep-seated mistrust towards India’s 
intentions among the smaller neighbours.  
During the Indira’s regime in India, Bangladesh’s foreign policy went through radical changes. 
As mentioned, Indira Gandhi decisively supported Bangladesh’s independence. Immediately 
after Bangladesh’s independence, both the countries commenced friendly relations with a 
friendship treaty concerning peace and security, 1974-LBA, and two trade agreements. The 
friendship treaty gave India a say in Bangladesh’s foreign and security policy, further 
strengthening India’s dominant role in the region. At the international level, Bangladesh 
expanded its relations with the Soviet Union, a close ally of India during that time. On 15 
August 1975, the assassination of the then President of Bangladesh and the protagonist of the 
Awami League (AL), Shekh Mujibur Rahman, in a military coup created hostile Bangladesh-
India relations. Immediate after the coup, successive governments replaced friendly relations 
from the India-Russia bloc with the US-Pakistan and Islamic world (Lifschultz, 1979). Such 
divergent shifts in Bangladesh’s foreign policy created anxiety in India. On the other hand, to 
balance India's influence and hegemonic role, time and again Bangladesh's policymakers have 
sought to develop ties with powerful countries outside the region, such as the defence tie with 
China.  
India and Bangladesh’s foreign policies had significant impacts on all bilateral disputes, 
particularly on enclave matters. The Nehru doctrine did not always stick to hard policy and 
ratified the 1958-boundary agreement despite massive domestic apprehension. On the contrary, 
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the Indira doctrine did not ratify a similar border agreement she signed with Bangladesh in 
1974. In fact, the provision of ratification was not necessary to implement the 1974-LBA, as 
Bhasin, (2003: ixxix) specifies, 
The Indian Constitution gives full powers to the executive to enter into 
agreements and there is no provision for parliamentary approval either 
for an agreement to come into force or ratification where the same has 
been provided for the agreement.  
 
The reluctance over legitimising an international agreement signifies her foreign policy 
objective to keep disputes alive with the neighbour who had chosen to leave the India-Russia 
block. From the Bangladesh side, more rhetoric took place, rather than making any concrete 
proposal to resolve the disputes. Consequently, bilateral relations were shaped by various 
contentious issues like illegal immigration into India, supporting India’s terrorists, the corridor 
to Dahagram or the question of the Farraka dam in West Bengal, that threatened the industrial 
and agricultural development of Bangladesh (Bhasin, 2003; Ahmed, 2008). All these issues 
overshadowed the enclaves’ exchange matters. While control over newly emerged chars broke 
out in 59 inclusive gunfights between the border guards (Van Schendel, 2005) and the 
controversial Indian annexation and military control over Purbasha island clouded bilateral 
relationship (Hossain, 1981), neither country showed interest in extending sovereignty over the 
enclaves.   
 The 1990s was a remarkable decade for both Indian and Bangladesh’s politics. India’s 
aspiration to become a world power forced it to make a liberal approach to the neighbours’ in 
1990s. The then Prime Minister Gujral emphasised that India should value her small neighbours 
interests and concerns (Gujral, 1998). The idea of the Gujral doctrine, noticeably, echoes a soft 
power strategy by offering economic gains for all players in the region. Such an accommodative 
approach materialised few India-Bangladesh treaties. On the other hand, Bangladesh achieved 
her democracy in 1990. The first elected democratic government in Bangladesh was the right 
wing party, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP). However, India did not apply such 
accommodative policy with Bangladesh at the time because of India’s political party 
preferences, as relations turn to cold if this party forms the government in Bangladesh (Rashid, 
2005; Yasmin, 2004). Although, the corridor and Dahagram issues were partially resolved at 
this time; the Gujral doctrine, however, worked very well with Bangladesh after the left wing 
party, Bangladesh Awami League (AL), was back in power during 1996-2001. The signing of 
the Ganges Water Treaty, and the signing of a peace accord could only happen in this period 
(Yasmin, 2004). Although bilateral relations were friendly, neither side took any scheme 
resolving the enclave exchange matters. However, Dahagram’s alternative hour connection with 
Bangladesh was replaced with twelve hours uninterrupted access. The negligence over the rest 
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of the enclaves’ exchange was, probably, because those enclaves’ residents are not voters and 
unable to contribute in national elections.  
The relationship between the two countries again became unfriendly following the beginning of 
the BNP's term in power in October 2001 while the Bharotio Janata Party (BJP) was in power in 
India. Coincidentally, both of these parties had respectively had anti-Bangladeshi and anti-
Indian agendas during their general elections. Therefore, bilateral relations were again marred 
by border incidents, illegal immigration and heated debate over sheltering militant groups. 
However, Indian allegations of the Bangladesh government’s support for Al-Qaeda prevented a 
minimum level diplomatic correspondence for three years; relations have somewhat improved 
only since the Congress-led government took power in India in 2004 (Sikri, 2006; Singh, 2009). 
Since then, several joint security measures have been approved to curb cross border terrorism, 
insurgency, smuggling and trafficking as common threats to security (The New Age, 27 August, 
2006; The Daily Star, 18 September 2004). It is worth noting that the key agendas in any 
bilateral meetings always find the enclave issues at the bottom of the list; and India had the 
same old stand on the full demarcation of border before ratification of the 1974-LBA leaving 
the enclave exchange future uncertain.  
Almost thirty-five years after, Congress in India and AL in Bangladesh are in power. The same 
combination of the regimes previously signed the 1974-LBA in a friendly neighbourhood 
policy. Such relations are apparent in this time as well; both the head of the states announced in 
early 2010 to resolve all border disputes in a year. Dramatically, the technical committee and 
Joint Boundary Working Group (JBWG) resolved all disputes over undemarcated border within 
a year that was not possible for a decade. This indicates that it was not technical issues rather 
the political will to resolved this dispute.  It is also imperative to note the background of the 
signing of this protocol as an indication of the bilateral ardour on enclave elimination. This 
agreement was signed in a bilateral talk full of tension, bargain and mysterious secrecy. The 
announcement of the enclave exchange, signing of water sharing treaty and Bangladesh-
northeast India transit treaty were the key agendas to be signed during Indian PM’s visit to 
Bangladesh in 2011. This time it was the WB state government that forced the Indian PM at 
thelast minute to pull out from signing the water sharing treaty and dispute over the boundary 
agreement. The first hand press release circulation immediately before the talk between two 
foreign ministers excluded border agreement; however, the meeting ended with a protocol 
without any time frame (Daily Prothom Alo, September, 07, 2011). This protocol can be 
considered as a face saving formula for India as the country pulled out from the key agenda just 
before Indian PM’s visit. As the WB state government is not interested in enclave exchange, the 
ill-fated enclave residents again find themselves as victims of Indian domestic politics.  
The above discussion suggests that these enclaves’ prospects are largely victimised by erratic 
bilateral relations, domestic politics, and frivolous exchange initiatives by both states involved. 
26 
The disagreement between the central and provincial government in India shows inconsistency, 
what Appadorai (1981:192) mentions as the ‘federal element in foreign policy decisions’. In 
many cases, the transfer of an enclave is considered as a loss of territory to an enemy Muslim 
state (Whyte, 2002; Van Schendel, 2005). A complex combination of the above-mentioned 
factors has kept the enclave problem maintained as a live issue for the last sixty-five years. In 
such a complex set of circumstances, it is very difficult to predict when these issues will be 
resolved. Traditionally, it takes years to get a bilateral agreement but implementations of them 
follow a geologically slow process. 
1.6 Thesis Outline and Conclusion 
The final section of this introductory chapter outlines the thesis structure including the themes 
to be analysed in subsequent chapters. This thesis relies on theories and approaches within 
geography, political science and anthropology. However, the basic intellectual context 
nevertheless is political geography. This research focuses on the multi-dimensional interaction 
of PSL in the enclaves through four key themes; citizenship and abandonment, border, 
vulnerability and survival tactics. The overlap between all the themes enables the research to 
draw upon multiple interpretations. For example, (non) citizenship, vulnerability and survival 
methods in the enclaves are intrinsically linked to the India-Bangladesh border or 
citizen/foreigner binary. This thesis is divided into eight chapters; four of them are empirical. 
While the key theoretical chapter connects the themes with the PSL interaction between the 
enclave-home-host states, each subsequent empirical chapter builds upon and takes forward this 
theme of PSL interaction. These chapters are connected with the central arguments, while each 
chapter will provide a separate intervention into the debates regarding the type of citizenship, 
the performativity and social construction of borders, vulnerability of being enclave residents 
and survival tactics. With the above-mentioned themes, this study maps onto the everyday 
geography of enclaves.  
This introductory chapter has explained the aim and research questions in which this thesis 
begun, while Chapter 2 illustrates the theoretical basis of this thesis. This chapter has three key 
considerations; firstly why an enclave study is important in political geography. Secondly, it 
provides an approach to study an enclave systematically; and, finally it expands on how 
everyday research can contribute to the political geography of an enclave, providing an 
understanding of the interaction between the PSL interactions. Using a literature review on the 
state of enclave research in political geography, I will argue the necessity of studying an enclave 
to understand the political geography approaches from the enclaves’ ground reality. This can 
provide an empirically informed theoretical consideration. Unpacking the importance and 
relevance of PSL interaction as an approach for a systematic study of enclave and its 
communication with the involved states, the theoretical connections between each theme within 
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PSL will, then, be extensively illustrated in four empirical chapters. Chapter 3 describes the 
research methodology that constructs the empirical basis of the theoretical argument. This 
chapter provides an account of the research process and how the aim and research questions are 
reconsidered and modified as the research developed over the course of fieldwork. 
The first empirical chapter, chapter 4, explores the dynamics of (non)citizenship in a trans-
territorial setting. The actuality of citizenship in the enclaves will be analysed with the written 
rights of the individuals in India and Bangladesh and how those rights and responsibilities are 
practised in the enclaves. Drawing upon the debates of abandonment (Agamben, 1998), and 
citizenship, this chapter explicitly stresses how legal definition of citizenship is practically 
absent in the enclaves. This chapter explores how trans-territoriality and different levels of legal 
boundaries and bilateral politics constitute a situation of abandonment while there are moments 
of transient citizenship. In addition, enclave residents peform acts of citizenship (Isin & Nielsen, 
2008) as part of their citizenship aspiration. Therefore, this chapter brings a complex ground 
reality of non-citizenship, transient citizenship and citizenship aspirations.  
Chapter 5, then, examines the where of borders in the context of these enclaves. It enables us to 
see how much the border, in any form (physical or symbolic), enhances or restricts the pursuit 
of a decent life in the enclaves. Like Agnew (2008), I consider the border as equivocal in its 
effects on the borderlanders everyday life. Following Passi (1996) as well as performativity of 
the border (Salter, 2008), I am looking at the meaning of boundaries in the construction and 
reproduction of social life and the everyday performance of international border in enclave life. 
With such analysis, this chapter looks into the chaotic and contested bordering process of the 
fifth largest land border in the world.  
Chapter 6 focuses on the vulnerability that is reciprocally constructed by (non)citizenship and 
border enforcement. The discussion exposes the multiple nuanced interpretations of 
vulnerability experienced in the enclaves; such as vulnerability of abandonement crafted by the 
state agencies, socio-political vulnerability and gendered vulnerability. Extending upon 
Agamben (1998), I reflect on the above mentioned vulnerability and argue that these 
vulnerabilities construct a dimension of bare life in the enclaves. With the examples of multiple 
experiences and exposure to vulnerability in the enclaves, this chapter suggests a broader 
interpretation of bare life and vulnerability is needed in this scholarship to understand the 
vulnerability in the enclaves. Unlike the general consideration of bare life as limit case, these 
enclaves show survival and making life workable. Enclave life not only epitomises great 
vulnerability but also symbolises continued existence of life and interest for advancement. The 
last empirical chapter, then, explores the diverse survival tactics that exist in the enclaves.  
The methods of living in these enclaves will be explored in chapter 7, while the rest of the 
chapters outline the ways state and system affect everyday life. This chapter focuses on the 
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enclave residents’ acts of survival and rhythms of life using De Certeau’s (1984) concept of 
tactics and Harris’s (2000) formulation of the rhythms of everyday life. A combination of both 
of the theoretical approaches, I will explore the tactics enclave dwellers employ to survive and 
the rhythms of enclave life can tell how they continue life with the success and failure of the 
tactics on a day-to-day basis. With the diverse examples of adaptation, sneaky encroachment in 
the system, this chapter shows individual, multimodal and heretical actions of ‘making life 
functioning’ in the enclaves. This chapter also demonstrates the involvement of multiple 
agencies’ in the whole process such as the encroacher and their contacts in state-system. To 
understand the complex process of encroachment, this chapter argues that it is necessary to 
consider the function of the multiple agencies alongside the dynamics of the power relations 
between the encroachers and the authority. The eighth chapter summarises the thesis, raises new 
theoretical arguments and explores some of the resulting questions and areas of further study.    
Finally, I would like to end the chapter with a remark from one of my respondents, Kiron 
Bormon (male enclave resident, aged 65; field note 23 March, 2010), ‘I know you are too small 
to pursue the governments to end our sufferings. Can you at least tell them the unknown stories 
of our unbearable life?’2 Although the thesis has theoretical considerations and a disciplinary 
overview, the following chapters endeavour to reveal the hidden geographies (Rajaram & 
Grundy-Warr, 2007) of everyday unbearable enclave life. 
                                                             
2 Throughout the thesis I will use the convention of italicising quotations from my fieldwork notes and interviews. Quotes cited from any published sources will 
not be italicised. 
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2 
Political Geography of an Enclave through the Lens of Politico-
Spatial-Legality 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter aims to (i) review the state of enclave research in political geography and other 
disciplines, (ii) highlight the importance of studying an enclave in the sub-discipline of political 
geography and (iii) propose an approach to systematically studying the international enclaves. 
Under international law, an enclave, as defined in the previous chapter, is a portion of territory 
completely surrounded by another country so that it has no surface communication with the 
home country (United Nations Economic and Social Council, 1995). As the definition 
illustrates, an enclave is a particular type of geopolitical feature in some borderlands. However, 
such a remarkable geopolitical unit, surprisingly, has received only occasional academic 
attention. In political geography, scholars have focused research on territory (Agnew, 2002; 
2003), territorial integrity (Elden, 2005; 2006), territory and territoriality (Cox, 2003), state 
(Flint, 2003, Law, 2003; Painter, 2006), sovereignty (Sidaway, 2000; 2003), law and geography 
relations (Blomley, 1994; Blomley et al, 2001; Holder & Harrison, 2003), boundary and 
borderland (Passi, 1996; Newman, 2006; Sidaway, 2007; Salter, 2008; Megoran, 2012). Yet 
until recently, only a few political geographers paid attention to what an enclave can offer to 
these political geography debates. With this background, this chapter and the whole thesis aim 
to contribute to the political geography of enclaves in general and Cooch Behar enclaves in 
particular in relation to politico-spatial-legality interactions.      
An enclave is a politically created and trans-territorially located legal entity; therefore, any 
systematic study of an enclave needs to consider politics, space and the law’s interlinking 
impact on the enclave. In this chapter, I advance enclave research by proposing a politico-
spatial-legality framework to understand enclave-involved states’ relations on two levels. 
Firstly, involved states’ negotiations, national political decisions and international legal 
arrangements decide the political future and spatio-legal arrangements of an enclave. Secondly, 
everyday enclave life connects individual negotiations, legal rights and physical/abstract 
boundaries between the enclave-host countries depending on local politics and geographic 
location of the enclaves. A combination of both processes constitutes complexities in the 
30 
 
politico-spatial-legal conditions of an enclave. Providing an account of everyday politico-
spatial-legality (PSL) in the context of 80% of the world enclaves—that is, Cooch Behar 
enclaves—this chapter argues that politico-spatial-legality can bring a systematic and rich 
picture of the political geography of enclaves. This chapter sets out the theoretical outline, and 
the rest of the thesis will proceed to an in-depth analysis of the impacts of the PSL interactions 
in everyday enclave-host-home countries interactions in the Cooch Behar enclaves.  
2.2 ‘Enclave’: A Neglected Term in Political Geography Vocabulary 
In a century long history of political geography, the enclave has received only minor attention. 
Although, border and borderland are the key political geography focus, only a handful of studies 
have deeply explored enclaves. Here, I concentrate on the state of enclave research in political 
geography and other disciplines. As clarified in the previous chapter (section 1.2), I define an 
enclave is a territory of one country which should be enclosed by another country. Other 
political fragments that exhibit degrees of enclave characteristics will be considered as enclave-
like outliers following Catudal’s (1974; 1978) terminology. Therefore, the true enclave (Farran, 
1955; Vinokurov, 2007) or normal enclave (Robinson, 1959) will be considered as an enclave. 
And, the pene, quasi, virtual, temporary, paired, and semi enclaves, and enclaved and semi 
enclaved states (see Robinson, 1959; Vinokurov, 2007) will be considered as enclave-like 
outliers. Such ranges of classification can cause ambiguity. In this context, I am in favour of a 
clear definition and straightforward application of the term as Catudal (1974) and Whyte (2002) 
advocate. Enclave research sharply falls into two distinct periods, and a barren decade of 
enclave research during 1980s with no publications at all (Vinokurov, 2007). Origin of the 
enclaves has diverse reasons; such as the West European enclaves were found in the feudal 
system of the early Middle Ages (Smith, n.d; Geluwe, 2003). Many of the enclaves came into 
existence during the decolonisation and new boundary formation process after World War II, 
which provided some academic interest in enclaves specifically in political geography and law. 
Although the Cooch Behar enclaves have a feudal origin, these enclaves became international 
following the decolonisation of India in 1947 (see chapter 1, section 1.3). Almost 120 states 
have emerged since World War II as a result of decolonisation (95 states), federal disintegration 
(20 states) and secessionism (2 states) (Christopher, 1999). In addition, federal disintegration 
occurred mostly after the split in Russia that brought into existence the Central Asian enclaves 
(see Megoran, 2002; Vinokurov, 2007). On the other hand, the Llivia enclave emerged from 
errors during boundary delineation (Vinokurov, 2007: 89).  
Early literatures on the enclaves, or enclave-like geographies such as Berlin, Germany generally 
focus on their origin and survival located in Europe (Whittlesely, 1933; Robinson, 1953; 1959). 
These involved research on individual case studies, definitions and classifications of enclaves. 
Amongst these literatures, Whittlesely’s (1933) brief paper on Spanish quasi-exclave Val 
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d’Aran looks at its origin and continued survival. From a theoretical aspect, Robinson (1959) 
developed the first classification of enclaves based on different degrees of isolation from the 
home country, functionality and legality. Although Melamid’s (1968) short article is not 
theoretically innovative, this paper illustrated the geographical distribution of enclave and 
enclave-like outliers across Europe and Asia. However, Melamid’s (1968) geographic 
distribution excluded the Cooch Behar enclaves. A decade later, Catudal’s (1974) paper and 
later his book (1979) advanced enclave research in two specific ways. Firstly, it precisely 
distinguished the enclave from enclave-like outliers based on the enclave’s legal definition; this 
was an important effort to provide clarity and definitional precision in enclave research. 
Secondly, it is an attempt to date to systematically study the world’s enclaves. Unlike scholars 
at that time, Catudal’s (1979) book is based on field research in the Dutch Baarle-Nassau, 
Belgian Baarle-Hertog, Spanish Llivia, Italian Campione and German Buesingen; although his 
brief account on the Cooch Behar enclaves is largely borrowed from Karan’s (1966) short 
article. Despite Catudal (1979) mentioning enclaves in different regions, his central focus is 
limited to European enclaves. Enclaves have also been studied from a legal aspect, such as 
Raton (1958) concentrated on various modes of disenclavisation, legality and status of enclaves 
in Europe (Vinokurov, 2007). Raton’s (1958) analysis concerns on the legal issue and 
sovereignty matters between enclave-home and host states (Vinokurov, 2007); therefore, Raton 
(1958) contributed to enclave literature by exploring the practical aspects of functionality of an 
enclave.  
Whether an enclave or a corridor can cause problems or provide a solution to disputes at the 
time of boundary making is briefly highlighted in Reid’s (1992) book Canada remapped: how 
the partition of Quebec will shape the nation. Drawing on partition, enclave and corridor 
formations in parts of Europe, Reid analysed the potential outcome of post-confederation 
Quebec. If Quebec is partitioned, there will be small enclaves in West Quebec, the Gaspé and 
the Eastern Townships (Reid, 1992:117). Refreshingly, Reid (1992: 119) finds that enclave is 
not a problem as he suggests, ‘Most Canadians and Quebecers do not realise that enclaves exist, 
and function well, on the North American continent and around the world’. In the 2000s, 
enclave research received more attention and the mode of analysis included enclave residents’ 
perspectives alongside the administrative view of origin and survival.  The magazine Hidden 
Europe (2005) points out various legal complexities and consequential arrangements between 
the home and host states of the European enclaves. It concludes by arguing that many enclaves 
survive because the countries involved have amiable relationships. Although academic writing 
is rarely in English, the West European enclaves have their own websites updating enclave 
specific events. On the other hand, the Central Asian enclaves are much younger considering 
other enclaves’ origins; they appeared in the regional maps in the 1990s. However, the enclave 
issue only appears as part of border literature on Central Asia (see Megoran, 2002; 2005; 
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Reeves, 2006) or in the newspaper reports. Megoran (2002) reflected on enclave issues as part 
of nationalism in post-Soviet Fergana valley conflicts. A theory of Enclave by Evgeny 
Vinokurov (2007) is a good effort to deal with all the enclaves around the globe in terms of 
providing a definition, classification and pursuing commonalties amongst the enclaves and 
enclave-like outliers. Vinokurov’s classification of the enclave is largely borrowed from 
Robinson’s (1959) classification but endeavoured to include marine enclaves and ‘enclaved 
sovereign states’. The book is rich in its bibliography, strong in literature review including 
multi-lingual literatures and insightful in its exploration of various enclave-like outliers. I will 
critically address a number of his formulations in a later part (section 2.5) of this chapter. 
Academic curiosity over enclaves is on the rise in recent times but the trend is to define various 
geopolitical outliers as enclaves; such as Gibraltar, Gaza, Kaliningrad and so on
3
. One 
interesting example is the special issue of Geopolitics on enclaves in 2010 included case studies 
of Gaza, ethnic enclavisation in Kosovo, Gibraltar and Kaliningrad, but which did not include 
any enclave. Boundaries and Borderlands: Political Oddities at the Edge of the Nation-States 
provides rich examples of complex realities at the border zone with the examples of corridors, 
enclaves and enclave-like outliers and disputes over borders. The volume is rich in content and 
individual case studies but there are shortcomings in the book. The introductory or concluding 
chapter of this edited book could profitably compare and contrast how differently border 
contestations, corridor or enclave constitute life and places on margin. In addition, designating 
enclaves, corridors and other complex geographies of bordering as the ‘oddest looking borders’ 
(Diener & Hagen, 2010: 190) implies that borders are naturally neat and problem-free except in 
these few places. As McConnell (2011: 112) aptly puts it, ‘the value-laden term ‘oddity’ can be 
(mis)read as demeaning and trivialising the everyday lives and politics that are enacted in these 
spaces’.  
2.2.1 Literatures on enclave-like geopolitical outliers 
Interestingly, diverse theoretical and empirical in-depth research is done more on enclave-like 
geopolitical outliers than enclaves. West Berlin was a popular enclave from academic curiosity. 
For instance, Robinson (1953) describes the West Berlin exclave from origin, political and 
economic aspects; Timm (1998) explores the social biotope behind the Berlin wall; and 
Hoerning (1992) looks into the discrimination of the mobility from mainland to West Berlin. 
These studies reflect the geopolitical importance of Berlin at that time. Recent literatures 
                                                             
3 In this thesis I excluded these fragmented territories from the definition of enclave for the following reasons: Gibraltar is neither entirely surrounded by Spain 
nor is it landlocked; rather it is one of the fourteen British Overseas Territories. Foreign and Commonwealth Office defines Gibraltar as British Overseas 
Territories. For detail see www.fco.gov.uk. Similarly, Kaliningrad is not completely surrounded by a foreign territory. Significantly, the relation of an enclave to 
its state is of a legal nature; however Russia lacks de jure sovereignty over Kaliningrad (Krickus, 2004; Diener & Hagen, 2010). 
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provide diverse dimensions linking wider social and political theories such as identity 
transformation, enclavisation without forming enclaves and subjective experience of 
geopolitical construction of space. Stefan Berger (2010) explores the transformation of 
collective identity from German to Russian over time through the Russian political and 
economic processes in Kaliningrad. In contrast, Gold (2010) explores the Gibraltarian identity 
formation with a clear detachment from the neighbouring larger territory of Spain. A historical 
account of the ups and down of the geopolitical importance of the Gibraltar and the long twists 
between Britain and Spain over shared sovereignty never led to Spain controlling Gibraltar. 
Furthermore, Gibraltarians are culturally more linked to Britain because of the ‘habit of a 
British attachment’ (Gold, 2010: 380). Fascinatingly, Kaliningrad and Gibraltar offer 
contrasting processes of identity formation. Providing rationales to think of ‘Gaza’ as a self-
governed enclave, Hasson (2010) makes an impressive contribution in scrutinizing many 
meanings of ‘Gaza strip’ to the different factions of Palestinian and Israeli communities. The 
heart of this article is to explore how do the Israelis and Palestinians perceive and conceptualise 
the opposing view of victim and enemy in Gaza. A huge amount of work has so far been done 
on Gaza but this is the only piece of work considering the enclave circumstances at Gaza.  
An alternative new perspective of enclavisation is examined by Dahlman & William (2010), 
who illuminate how the enclavisation of Serbian settlement in Kosovo is providing geopolitical 
challenges to the state formation in Kosovo. It is a cluster of ethnic Serbian minorities close to 
the Serbia-Kosovo border. However, they powerfully produce a Serbian sub-state with the 
sponsorship of Serbia; and extensively use Serbian language, follow a parallel Serbian 
administration and change street names to post-socialist heroes and produce. Hence, these 
enclaves are clearly central to the conflicting geopolitical interest of Serbia and Kosovo. 
Dahlman & William (2010: 414) exemplify explicit forms and functions of the enclavisation, 
‘as a set of practices by which ethnicity and territory are mobilised to constitute de facto 
sovereign territories that respond to ethnopolitical movement’.  
In this section, I separately discussed literature on enclave and enclave-like outliers to avoid 
ambiguity and complicated classification; however my aim is not to imply that an enclave is 
more important than an enclave-like outlier. Although academically unexplored, there are 
opportunities to compare enclave and enclave-like features since they have different political 
and legal realities. The renewed interest on the enclave-like outlier reveals that these sites and 
spaces can offer new insights on diverse identity formation, geopolitical place making, and 
securitisation and sovereignty paradoxes. Enclave research can also advance following this 
trend. Understanding the Cooch Behar enclaves from perspective of nationalism (Van Schendal, 
2002), sovereignty (Jones, 2009) and statelessness (Jones, 2010), as will be discussed in the 
next section, is a welcoming move; however, such initiatives are absent in other enclaves’ 
contexts. As Sidaway (2011) calls for an in-depth research on border/bordering within wider 
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social and political theory to understand the changing configuration of social, political and the 
border, I believe this emphasis applies to enclave research as well. 
2.3 Cooch Behar Enclaves in Literature 
The Cooch Behar enclaves’ issues are not only ignored by the involved states but also in the 
academic literature. For example, a French lawyer, Farran (1955) mentions the Portuguese 
enclaves in India, but surprisingly, disregarded the existence of Cooch Behar enclaves. This is 
one of the early literatures written from an international law perspective and sheds light on the 
legal impediments surrounding international enclaves’ functioning. His empirical information 
concisely touched on many enclaves and enclave-like features at that time across the globe. He 
only mentioned, ‘there were also enclaves of British India surrounded by native states’ (Farran, 
1955: 294). Cooch Behar enclaves became international five years before the paper was 
published, however. Similarly, Robinson’s (1959) article picked up brief illustrations of 
enclaves scattered around the globe except the Cooch Behar enclaves. However, he had the 
wrong conception about the geographic distribution of the world’s normal enclaves; as he 
mentions, ‘Normal exclaves are not common. They occur in four places, all are in Europe’ 
(Robinson 1959: 283). Conversely, more than 200 Cooch Behar normal enclaves in Asia came 
into existence during the eighteenth century. Karan’s (1966) short paper, published in The 
Professional Geographer, introduced the Cooch Behar enclaves to western readers. Karan 
(1966: 23), in his brief paper, argues that these enclaves as a territorial arrangement affect 
bilateral relations between India and Pakistan. He rightly suggested that a resolution of the 
enclave problem is unattainable until the basic attitudes within India and Pakistan are changed. 
Banerjee (1966), Banerji (1969) and Van Schendel (2002) provide almost the only specific 
information on the Cooch Behar enclaves across the span of literature (Whyte, 2002: 13). The 
literatures on the Cooch Behar enclaves generally fall in the traditional trend to explore origin 
and survival of these enclaves (see Majumder, 1965; Karan, 1966; Whyte, 2002).  
Another approach, more instrumental, considers merely how these enclaves cause border 
management problems, with such sites being used for the flourishing of criminal activities, 
smuggled items, or hideouts (Krishan, 2001; Chowdhury, 2003; Jamwal, 2004). Some work has 
been done by Bangladeshi and India researchers with particular focus on mentioning border 
management problems from their respective sides.  A few other authors consider these enclaves 
as the hide out for the criminals, terrorists and a problem for border management. For example, 
a study by Jamwal (2004), who is a Border Security Force (BSF) official, highlights various 
dimensions of management of the India-Bangladesh border, including initiatives from the 
Indian side such as border fencing and catching illegal immigrants. The paper highlights the 
domestic factors in Bangladesh affecting Indian security.  
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As part of problems securing the border Jamwal (2004: 25) considers,  
Enclaves become convenient points for smuggling, avoiding customs 
and excise duties, importing of contraband, and are a point of entry for 
illegal aliens. Enclaves pose a problem of a peculiar nature. Since 
police cannot enter the enclaves, the local heads act as per their whims 
without attracting any retribution from either country. People from 
Indian enclaves in Bangladesh have already migrated to India — 
either due to sale of their land or to escape persecution. Bangladeshi 
criminals are taking shelter in these enclaves. 
Jamwal offers only an imaginative nationalistic assessment of India’s border management 
problems in relation to enclaves, ignoring the reality on ground. However, my fieldwork in the 
Indian enclaves found the majority enclave residents are not the original enclave inhabitants but 
rather came to Cooch Behar by exchanging land with those original enclave residents. 
Chowdhury (2002) also briefly illustrates how Bangladeshi border guards face problems 
managing borders because of the continual existence of the enclaves. They neither mention nor 
analyse what issues and concerns are involved with everyday enclave life. Quite contrary to 
Jamwal’s (2004), account, Amar Roy Pradhan (1995), the Indian Federal MP for Cooch Behar 
from 1977–1997, articulates the ground realities of vulnerability in the Indian enclaves in 
Bangladesh. To raise Delhi’s attention to implement the 1974-Land Boundary Agreement, Roy 
Pradhan (1995) created a pamphlet documenting the incidents of robbery, violence and 
extortion against the Indian citizens in Bangladesh. Although from a nationalistic perspective, 
local researchers (Das, 1992; Chaki, 2007; 2009) in Cooch Behar irregularly contribute in the 
local magazines about the problems Indian enclave residents face in Bangladesh. In this context, 
the local researchers are more interested in the Dahagram and Aangorpota (D&A) enclaves and 
Tin Bigha Corridor matters than the other enclave issues.  
Dahagram enclave’s complex geographic reality, political struggles over the Tin Bigha Corridor 
attracted research interests on this enclave (see Cons, 2012; in press). Cons (2012) draws on the 
notion of belonging to understand the political struggles between 1974–1992 for the opening of 
the Tin Bigha Corridor. He convincingly shows the histories of Dahagram and the role of local 
communal politics and struggle over territory by the Muslim enclave dwellers to secure and 
actualize political membership of Bangladesh. In another paper, Cons (in press) explores 
‘community-making’ and boundary production between different groups in Dahagram enclave 
in pre and post corridor periods. In both the papers, Cons (2012; in press) claims that 
understanding Dahagram through the concepts of statelessness is inadequate to explain the 
political struggles to claim belonging in nation-state and intra-community boundary formations. 
He mentions ‘broad categories such as “statelessness” and “exception,” which tend to flatten the 
experience of life in borderlands’ (Cons, in press: 12) rather argues, ‘I make a case for 
complicating, which is not to say denying, narratives of exclusion that have become central to 
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studies of those living at the margins of state and nation’ (Cons in press: 02). While he 
acknowledges the narratives of exclusion, Cons’ (2012) account obscures the role(s) of 
exclusion in community-making and boundary productions between different groups in 
Dahagram enclaves. 
Some other literatures briefly touched on the enclave factors as part of discussion on central-
federal government decision-making conflicts or border problems. Some important legal 
matters and Indian constitutional aspects appeared in Appadorai’s (1981) book The domestic 
roots of India’s foreign policy, 1947–1972, and in Bhasin’s (2003a) introductory chapter in 
India-Bangladesh relations: documents 1971–2002. Neither of these books are centrally focused 
on enclave matters but Appadorai (1981) clearly portrays the context and consequences of the 
Nehru-Noor Agreement. And, Bhasin (2003a) critically reflects on the stages of the enclave 
exchange—signing the agreement, ratification and constitutional amendment—and argues that 
over emphasis on the ratification is not the key part of the implementation of exchange rather it 
is the constitutional amendment.  
In comprehensive empirical and archival research on Cooch Behar enclaves, Brendan Whyte’s 
(2002) work traced the origins of these enclaves, mapping the enclaves’ accurate locations and 
explores why they still exist. His study reveals how the wider hostilities between India and 
Pakistan, and later India and Bangladesh, found an easy target in the enclaves, which came to be 
seen as a physical embodiment of the more abstract concept of territorial integrity. Whyte’s 
(2002) research paper wonderfully does what it intended to do but falls short in articulating a 
rich picture of everyday life in the enclaves. In another paper, Whyte (2002a) compares the 
Baarle and the Cooch Behar enclaves from the viewpoint of governance, nationalism, national 
laws, incentives and economy. Vinokurov (2007) describes the Cooch Behar enclaves as part of 
pursuing commonalties amongst the world enclaves; however his account on Cooch Behar 
enclaves relied heavily on Whyte’s (2002) empirical evidence and adds little on enclave life. 
Although Whyte’s (2002) research provides a glimpse of enclave life, none of these literatures 
explicitly consider everyday survival and vulnerability when residents live in-between two 
nation-states.  
Van Schendel’s (2002) unique piece on statelessness of the Indian and Bangladeshi enclaves 
articulates the enclave residents’ perspective. Van Schendel’s piece is unique because this 
article shows how social life in the enclaves evolved while earlier literature on enclaves are 
highly statist.Through this he challenges dominant discourses of the nation-state and connects 
identity and nationalism in the space where the nation-state’s territorial contiguity is in question. 
Rabbani (2005) examines the socio-economic perspectives of these enclaves. This MA 
dissertation is rich in empirical materials illustrating economic deprivations, land disputes, 
unavailability of education and social exploitations in the enclaves in Bangladesh. However, 
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Rabbani’s (2005) account is overly descriptive and lacks in-depth analysis. Jones (2009) 
conceptualises ‘displaced sovereignty’ with the examples of these enclaves. Displaced 
sovereignty, as he aptly defines, challenges two criteria of the traditional definition of 
sovereignty such as the existence of the enclaves undermining the conception of the 
‘unambiguous connection’ of a sovereign territory. And, the movement of the enclave dwellers 
in the host country displaces the notion of the sovereign authority over a territory and its people. 
Like Van Schendel (2002), Jones (2009) portrays enclaves’ residents’ non-citizenship and 
imagined nationalism. However, the consequences of non-citizenship and everyday political, 
legal and social vulnerabilities are not explicitly present in Jones’ account and the research is 
based on the enclaves in only the Bangladesh side. In another paper, Jones (2010) articulates the 
everyday statelessness in these enclaves. It is a rather more generalised account of everyday in 
enclaves that is based on interviews in the Indian enclaves in Bangladesh.  
In this context, by exploring everyday human impact in-between two nation-states, this thesis 
contributes to India-Bangladesh enclave literatures through a systematic study of the enclave 
dwellers day-to-day negotiations with the host and home country and through understanding the 
politico-spatial-legality’s impact on enclave residents based on in-depth ethnographic field data. 
Significantly, this thesis brings to ground realities of enclave life based on the enclaves’ 
dwellers everyday experiences in both Indian and Bangladeshi enclaves. So far, only Van 
Schendel (2002) and Whyte’s (2002) research counted enclaves on both sides of the border. 
Since their origin, the survival and everyday life of enclaves are intrinsically linked to both the 
involved countries; therefore a nuanced understanding of enclave life needs an in-depth 
understanding of enclaves in India and Bangladesh.   
2.4 Why Study Enclaves in Political Geography?  
Minghi (1969) very briefly touched upon the importance of studying enclaves as part of 
boundary research in political geography. He identified enclaves as a specialized type of 
boundary zone characterised by an unusually high degree of cross-boundary circulatory 
pressure (Minghi 1969: 155). However, enclaves not only characterise cross-boundary 
circulatory pressure, they mark the political limits or political authority. On the other hand, 
Vinokurov (2007) identifies two major reasons to study enclaves: from the enclave dwellers 
perspective and from the host and home country’s perspective. The first aspect might look into 
the enclavity in terms of access, governance and isolation. The second aspect might be the 
enclave’s influence in bilateral relations or the bilateral relations’ influence on the enclave. 
Alternatively, an approach connecting these two aspects, the enclavity and the enclave factor in 
bilateral relations of the involved countries, can also offer stimulating insights of the enclave. 
Prescott (1978: 192) emphasises, ‘the principal interests in boundaries of any political 
geographer relates to the way in which a boundary or frontier influences both the landscape of 
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which it is a part and the development of the policies of the states on either side.’ He did not 
mention enclaves but such a statement is applicable to enclaves. Variations in political systems 
amongst the countries where enclaves are situated and where they belong are often accompanied 
by variations in regulations concerning economic, political and security aspects of life. All these 
aspects link a state’s functions with the boundary functions and can influence the cultural 
landscape. Hence, a connection and contradiction amongst geographical locations, political 
factors, and enclave dwellers political actions create diverse scenarios that are perceptible from 
existing case study literatures on enclaves. Enclaves can be a thorn in the side of bilateral 
relations between neighbouring countries and vice versa as has happened for the Central Asian 
or the Cooch Behar enclaves. Similarly, enclaves and their actors engage in forms of 
international relations (Taylor, 1995). Consequently, multiple actors from different levels of 
political organisations create complex interactions with space and social relations in the 
enclaves, which provide important contexts for the study of enclaves. As Minghi (1969: 156) 
invites ‘more attention to the normal situation in boundary research’, I would add that more 
attention on the normal situation in ‘unique class of spatial-political object’ of borderlands like 
enclaves could supplement political geography.  
Research on enclaves can offer new and alternative research avenues and insights to various 
approaches in political geography. Traditionally the state is one of the key research areas in 
political geography (Flint, 2003; Low, 2003; Robinson, 2003). Various forms and functions of 
the states are important political realities that attract political geographers (Häkli, 2003) as well 
as there is a tradition to assess and sketch out how and why territories link states to their 
populations through authority, legitimacy and surveillance (Robinson, 2003). In this line of 
argument, Murray Low vigorously claims, ‘whatever else political geographers write about; 
states have to have a certain ‘de-centered centrality’ in their concerns’ (Low 2003: 625). 
Research on enclaves can contribute to the conceptualisation of forms and functions of the 
states, as the existence of an enclave constitutes a non-contiguous notion of a state and the state 
functions in fragmentation. Gottmann’s (1973) argument explores the significance of territory 
through territorial sovereignty that depends on the technology, opportunity and access to land.  
Enclaves can bring new and alternative insights from the viewpoint of territory and territorial 
sovereignty to think about why some countries have an interest in governing their enclaves and 
not others. This can provide an important contribution towards the significance of territory.  
A critical gaze of sovereignty in the enclaves can also enrich the political geography of state and 
sovereignty research; as such Jones (2009) conceptualises displaced sovereignty from the 
perspective of Cooch Behar enclaves. The conventional view of sovereignty in modern political 
theory considers absolute political authority exercised by a state over a given territory (Agnew, 
2005). There are alternative conceptualisations of sovereignty from the perspective of graduated 
(Ong, 1999), tacit (McConnell, 2009), multiple and overlapping sovereignty (Grundy-Warr & 
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Yin, 2002). In addition, Sidaway (2003: 174) reflects beyond the binary of more/less 
sovereignty or presence/absence of differentiated sovereign power, it is essential to have 
‘contextual understanding of different regimes, apparatus, expressions and representations of 
sovereignty’. Different expressions of sovereignty can be understood from an enclave’s 
perspective; enclaves located in different regions (Western European, Central Asian or Cooch 
Behar) exhibit different types of sovereignty practices under different regimes. An enclave can 
be studied to understand the boundary making and decolonisation practices and postcolonial 
conflicts and disputes over border and enclaves. Minghi (1963: 420) highlighted the importance 
of studying this frontier landscape and considers enclave study as by definition ‘studies of the 
effects of boundary’.  
The ‘politico-geographic’ aspect of the enclave’s everyday life bridges formal state politics with 
the very local politics within and around enclaves. Formal politics in the form of statecraft, 
regulation and maintenance of boundary certainly affect an enclave’s everyday practices. On the 
other hand, everyday mundane practices of the enclaves might involve contested social and 
physical boundaries and defiance to state regulations. Therefore, informal politics involve 
politics inside the enclave, interaction and contradiction with enclave-neighbouring mainland 
people, and inter-enclave connections. In this context, everyday and individual practices cannot 
be considered as disconnected occurrences from broader social and political relations 
(Bernazzoli & Flint, 2010). Hence, social relations and state institutions are not separate entities 
but are intrinsically connected with each other (Painter, 2005). My approach also extends 
political geography into everyday orders and connects formal politics with local politics through 
the everyday survival of the enclave residents in Bangladesh and India.  
This thesis offers insights on the importance of studying enclaves in political geography with 
the empirically informed theoretical considerations of the Cooch Behar enclaves. As a whole, 
the thesis presents a case study of everyday geography of the 80% the world enclaves, and will 
show how multiple interactions of PSL shaping life in the zones of abandonment constituted by 
the involved states. Drawing on Agamben (1998), I argue that these enclaves are an abandoned 
zone. As illustrated (chapter 1, section 1.3.2), the Cooch Behar enclaves are unadministered 
because of the complications over access and lack of interest to administer them. Neither 
country even included the enclaves in their population censuses and land survey records. 
Practically, the home country does not exercise territorial sovereignty in the enclaves (This 
theme will be illustrated in depth in chapter 4 and chapter 6.) Without any administration and 
policing, these enclaves belong beyond the normal judicial system of a state; the Cooch Behar 
enclaves, thus, experience abandonment in Agamben’s (1998) terms. As Agamben (1998; 2005) 
shows, life is implicated in sovereign power, law and politics, and these enclaves are abandoned 
through a complex process of PSL interactions. In this chapter, I will not go for a detailed 
analysis of Agamben’s formulations, as the empirical chapters will engage with Agamben 
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(1998; 2000; 2005). Based on the above discussions, I believe understanding enclaves through 
political geographic approaches can enrich both in relation to each other. I echo Sidaway’s 
(2008: 51) call for more work on the alternative political geographies coming from different 
parts of the world, as ‘political geography is richest when reworked, resituated, redeployed and 
re-imagined’.       
The enclaves have been viewed as special (Minghi, 1969), temporary (Ratan, 1958), anomalous 
(Gold, 2000), unimportant (Melamid, 1968; Catudal, 1974) or an oddity (Diener & Hagen, 
2010). Some of the enclaves have disappeared from the world political map but several new 
ones have emerged. To be sure, we can think of enclaves as permanent entities that might attract 
more academic interest.  Similar to Vinokurov’s (2007: 05) emphasis to consider enclaves as an 
‘independent class of spatial-political objects’, I view the enclave as a unique politico-
geographic landscape that deserves more attention. In the following chapters, I will focus on 
abandonment from citizenship rights (chapter 4), a border guard’s power to decide the state of 
exception (chapter 5) and the construction of forms of bare life (chapter 6). The thesis portrays 
non-citizenship, different geographies of border, vulnerability and rhythms of survival tactics in 
the zones of abandonment. Thus each empirical chapter individually contributes to the wider 
political theories of citizenship, borders and vulnerability and rhythms of tactics.  
2.5 Politico-Spatial-Legality: A Framework to Study Enclaves 
Enclave literatures follow dissimilar approaches to explore their case studies. Early literatures 
on enclaves either studied origin and survival from legal norms and administrative problems 
(Scherrer, 1973; Ratan, 1958 cited in Vinokurov, 2007: 05, 66-68) or systematically studied 
enclaves based on the origin, survival, administration and economy of the enclaves (Catudal, 
1974). On the other hand, Berger (2010) calls for enclave research from a variety of different 
perspectives. By contrast, Vinokurov (2007) ambitiously attempts to find common criteria 
between the world enclaves’ despite huge diversities of size, location, and circumstances. It is 
an important effort to provide a general framework to a systematic study of the enclave. All the 
research on the enclave essentially considers the enclave-home-host state triangle to understand 
enclave matters.  
Vinokurov (2007) queries common characteristics within the fields of economy and politics to 
understand the enclave-host-home country triangle. His attempt is insightful and brings diverse 
enclave-specific issues and enclave-like outliers economic and political reality. However, 
thinking through the triangle’s connections and contradictions only through the lens of political 
and economic aspects is problematic for the following reasons. Firstly, an enclave is inherently 
a geopolitical entity that functions through legal links with concerned nation-states; an approach 
ignoring spatiality and the law’s role essentially brings an incomplete picture. Secondly, 
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economic issues do not determine the enclave-host-home county triangle’s interaction rather 
enclaves’ economy is determined by the political will of the involved states, legal arrangements 
and spatial reality. Thirdly, Vinokurov’s account does not count the everyday experiences in the 
enclaves and their day-to-day politics of negotiation with involved states. An international 
enclave is politically constructed, geographically located and legally linked with the involved 
states. Therefore, any approach to understand enclaves ignoring any of these crucial factors 
cannot bring a comprehensive picture. This is because the creation, survival and 
disenclavisation processes of an enclave are intrinsically political; enclaves are geographical 
features that play a vital role in enclave related matters; and an enclave has a legal status. I 
believe each and every enclave has a distinctive character that can be articulated through 
detailed studies of each case from different dimensions under the broad spectrum of politics, 
geography and legality. Here I explain what I mean by politics, geography and law.  
Politics does not only link territorial sovereignty, institutional political authority and 
geopolitical relationships (Cox, 2002; Flint, 2003; Robinson, 2003; Law, 2003) but is also 
connected with embodied politics from the level of individual as feminist political geographers 
have argued (see Dowler & Sharp, 2001; Kofman, 2003). In relation to the enclave, politics 
entails bilateral relations, national politics and local and embodied politics. For a deeper and 
more comprehensive way of understanding politics in the context of enclaves, it is necessary to 
include different scales of political practices for the creation, continuation and access or 
dienclavisation procedures. Besides state-centered institutional politics, Painter & Jeffrey 
(2009) point out aptly that de-centering the state and paying more attention to politics in any 
scale of social life or everyday situation should be a significant concern rather than 
concentrating only on formal politics. Therefore, we need a synthesis between bilateral and state 
politics with the local politics in the enclaves. This deals with the associations between formal 
and informal politics as a process that is conjured by geographically and historically positioned 
social and institutional practices.  
Different scales of politics are intrinsically linked with scales of geography. Scales appear 
differently in political geography debates; such as national, international and sub-national 
(Taylor, 2006); region, place or locality (Passi, 2006); or micro scale and body level (Kofman, 
2003). Besides these multi-layered realms of scale, Richard Howitt (2006) argues that scale is 
socially and politically constructed. While this research considers geography from national, 
local and individual scales, the location of enclave and border is another factor of geography. 
Boundary forms a territorial shape either physically or symbolically (Passi, 2006) and the 
borderland is the space where trans-boundary contacts, cooperation, conflict and contestation 
take place (Gallusser, 1995; Pratt and Brown, 2000; Newman, 2006); therefore the geography of 
the border and borderland is another inseparable part of enclave life. 
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It is the law that controls and directs life while people are in-between two nation-states. Every 
action is implicated in the law. Laws both formal and informal are critical manifestations of 
state power and the specificities of law as a site of power needs to be acknowledged (Blomley, 
2008: 156). Law distinguishes enclave people from the host country’s citizens. However, law is 
not a discrete phenomenon. It has spatial manifestations and political utilisation as Soja 
proposes to move beyond thinking about law and geography separately, and opt for a mode that 
draws upon both (Soja, 1996, cited in Kedar, 2003: 407). Likewise, Blomley (2008: 163) calls 
for a critical focus on disaggregation of law; its diversity and spatial diversity contribute 
towards the ‘reach and effects of law’. In this consideration, three different aspects of the law 
will be explored in this thesis. Firstly, every day legal actions that shape life as well as everyday 
legal rights. Secondly, legal practices between the legal and illegal. In other words, I will 
explore the ambiguity of law in practice. Margit Cohn (2001: 471) elaborates on ‘fuzzy legality’ 
by exploring the legal practices that sit between legal and illegal or are ambiguous. Everyday 
mundane statecraft and survival tactics by the enclave residents encounter countless legal 
procedures that are neither illegal nor legal. In addition, a complex function exists between 
body, law and space within the contradictory binary of unauthorised/limited legal status, 
physically present/legally absent, and quasi-citizenship/deportation (Coutin, 2010). These 
complex functions of the binaries are practical expressions of the ambiguity of the law. Thirdly, 
extra-legal actions by the involved states will be another consideration. State actions sometimes 
represent extra-legality, as Agamben (1998) formulates in discussions of sovereign power and 
spaces of exception. And, finally, everyday legal and (il)legal actions by the enclave dwellers 
will be considered as well.  
2.5.1Multiple Interactions of Politico-Spatial-Legality 
Critical scholarship of the PSL in the enclaves can shed light on their multiple interactions 
constituting a set of practices that shapes enclave life across the globe. I argue that the politico-
spatial-legality is not only an appropriate approach to studying the ‘unadminstered’ enclaves but 
can also be a general framework for enclave research. This thesis shows that the political 
geography of law precisely articulates the interplay between enclave, host country and home 
country. This interplay is central to understand any aspect of enclave life. The PSL framework 
can focus on three specific aspects of an enclave: (i) the technical and political feature of the 
origin, survival and elimination or biography of an enclave; (ii) the experiential aspect of the 
people living in the enclaves; and (iii) politico-spatio-legal forms in relation to territory. All 
three aspects are interlinked; however this thesis adopts the second aspect. Through this I will 
demonstrate how a PSL framework inherently connects rights and citizenship with home 
country, border and regulations with host country, vulnerability and contingent survival 
involving both the countries. Research on enclaves can think through either or all aspects of the 
PSL framework depending on the specific enclave’s reality.    
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Different modalities of PSL interactions create three different types of enclave lives. Positive 
politics and negotiated spatio-legal authority constructs successfully functioning and 
economically thriving enclaves in West Europe. However, the economic connection with the 
host country did not erode the home country’s control over this enclave. An example of this is 
the Swiss-German treaty over Büsingen which took care to specify this enclave as a casino-free 
zone (European Small Enclaves, n.d). In contrast, Campione d’Italia is a place that lives from its 
Casino. Campione, an enclave also located in Switzerland, has a similar story like Büsingen. 
Here, Italian police drive Swiss cars and enclave residents can access the Swiss health system 
and currency (Hidden Europe, 2005). The local authorities of Baarle-Nassau and Baarle-Hertog 
operate by means of two different sets of national law. Inhabitants in these enclaves are the 
consumer of their home country’s telephone nets through the streets the electricity wires run 
double (Smith, n.d). In addition, there is a great deal of social, cultural and economic tie with 
host country including many mixed (Belgian-Dutch) organizations (Gemeenten Baarle-Nassau, 
n.d). Therefore, Baarle is a unique example of a special arrangement for a municipality to 
function in between two different state systems. The differences in national law and 
nationalities create problems such as difference in maximum speed limit, judicial procedure and 
so on. The West European enclaves are now part of the regional process of integration, 
reflecting political will, long negotiations and special legal arrangements for enclave dwellers’ 
economic and social life while legal territorial sovereignty remains uninterrupted.   
On the other hand, difficult bilateral relations, the spatial location of enclaves, and strict legality 
issues construct complicated enclave conditions in Central Asia. As mentioned in the previous 
chapter (section 1.2.2), the Central Asian enclaves are victims of the partially militarised border, 
check posts and border fences as the host and home states have anxiety-filled relationships. 
Thus, bilateral politics, strict border, ID card and checkpoint provision constitute partial 
enclosure in these enclaves. All these politico-spatial-legal actions affect the economic 
prospects of these enclaves. For example, the Shakhimarden enclave lost its tourist attraction 
because of strict surveillance (Khamidov, 2009). All these involve power, multiple politics and 
legal actions across the border. A completely different picture of enclave life is evident in the 
Cooch Behar enclaves when neither involved states are keen to exchange the enclaves nor 
interested in governing them. Everyday life is trapped in politico-spatial-legality’s power, as I 
will illustrate throughout the thesis. Therefore, different modalities of PSL interactions 
constitute effectively functioning West European enclaves; somewhat functioning but partially 
isolated central Asian enclaves, and non-functioning and completely isolated Cooch Behar 
enclaves.  
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2.6 The Importance of the Everyday in Enclave Study 
The existing political geography work highlights the richness of the everyday to explore 
political geographical milieus (see Dowler & Sharp, 2001; Megoran, 2006). Pound (1972: vii; 
cited in Kofman, 2003: 623) strongly emphasises the significance of everyday study, as he 
mentions, ‘People act politically everyday of their lives, and their actions are no less susceptible 
of political analysis than those of the decision-makers in the nation’s capital’. Surprisingly, an 
everyday focus has never had precedence in political geography debates until recent times. Still 
there is a significant absence of the everyday in political geography literatures in general and 
enclave research in particular. The everyday life of the enclaves appeared only in Jones’ (2010) 
account on the India-Bangladesh enclaves as described earlier in this chapter. Scholars have 
focused on everyday of the nation-state (Hyndman, 2001; Mountz, 2003; 2010; Painter, 2006; 
Bernazzoli & Flint, 2009); nationalism and geopolitical representations of borders (Megoran, 
2006); algorithmic technologies and everyday geographies of securitisation in post-9/11 era 
(Amoore, 2009); everyday politics, democracy and the environment (Hagene, 2010). Feminist 
political geographers have been stressing political geography as personal, political and local as 
part of rather than discrete from geopolitical analysis (Dowler & Sharp, 2001; Kofman, 2003; 
Hyndman, 2004). The overwhelming focus on the state and the continual focus of Anglo critical 
geopolitics on the elite discourse has contributed to the relative absence of everyday study in 
political geography (Kofman, 2003).  
Recent works shows how the everyday can foreground the mundane activities of statecraft 
shaping ordinary citizens’ lives in different guises (Painter, 2006); or how everyday study can 
successfully test the hypothesis of whether the US is becoming a ‘garrison state’ with dominant 
military culture and policies taken by the elite (Bernazzoli & Flint, 2010: 164). The political is 
no longer equated with the formal domain (Kofman, 2003), but rather links formal politics with 
local politics (Painter & Jeffrey, 2009). Everyday, thus, provides a nuanced understanding of 
the multifaceted nature of actions, quotidian languages and everyday structuring of social 
practices. An examination of the local-level dealings reveals ways that politics-geography and 
the law shape, create and define interactions between different social, religious and cultural 
groups in the enclaves. Painter & Jeffrey (2009) identify politics as everywhere and every 
sphere, from household matters, professional, educational and religious issues, to recreational, 
sexual, artistic or academic activities. Hence, informal politics contain day-to-day life. The heart 
of their argument is that local politics is not distinctive from but is linked with formal politics 
and can assist understanding formal politics. Here, I intend to connect the impact or influence of 
state politics, in terms of both the countries’ government policies on the enclave, with local 
politics within and surrounding the enclaves. Such conceptualisation brings the intense impact 
of politico-spatial-legality on social life.  
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Mountz (2003: 626) conceptualises ‘the state as an everyday social construction’ through the 
work of immigration officers’ daily nation-building exercises by their operational construction 
of identity by deciding who belongs within or outside nation-state. Likewise, everyday life in 
the enclaves and their mundane negotiations and encounters with the two spatio-legal systems, 
such as health service, education, tax, border guards and so on, shows how law as rights is 
negotiated or compromised within the law as power. In addition, law functions as a political 
weapon (see Blaine & Kettler, 1971) or agenda for the involved states on many occasions. For 
example, citizenship rights of the Cooch Behar enclaves’ dwellers are almost nonexistent by 
many other legal complexities such as visa and border crossing, absence of any legal status to 
enter into the host country, absence of legal identifications such as birth certificates, national ID 
cards and so on. The power of law is manifested with the actions to stop the enclave dwellers 
building houses in the host country and imprisonment of the enclave dwellers as illegal 
immigrants when they are caught inside the host country (see chapter 5). On the other hand, the 
host country uses the enclave territory for a different purpose. These actions are also illegitimate 
but there is no question about the legality in this context (see chapter 6). The home country’s 
legal connections and authority with the enclaves and enclave residents become occasionally 
important when both the involved states are in strained relationships (see chapter 4). Therefore, 
the everyday geographies of enclaves can reveal how politico-spatial ‘othering’ is constituted by 
legal, illegal or extra-legal actions, and how those factors decide and control enclave dwellers’ 
mobilities.  
Conceptualising everyday geographies of the politico-spatial-legality in the enclaves frames the 
analysis of enclaves in three ways. Firstly, the everyday can provide a clear understanding of 
actual practices. It can provide a nuanced understanding of process, politics, and legality as they 
occur and are practiced on ground. As Megoran (2006) argues, everyday lived experiences can 
underline the contradiction between elite and popular political geographical imagination. 
Secondly, by focusing on the spatialised meaning of everyday law (Blomley, 2008), a study of 
enclaves can effectively tell much about hidden geographies like the Cooch Behar enclaves. By 
interrogating political processes, institutional activities, legal practices and spatial influences on 
the daily routine of the enclave, the everyday can bring new insight into the unknown 
geography of the Cooch Behar enclaves. Thirdly, enclave research generally focuses on broad 
generalisations based on secondary sources or interviews, which are unable to explicitly 
understand the experiential aspects of the complexities of enclave life and the unevenness of the 
politico-spatial-legality’s impact on enclave dwellers. On the other hand, an everyday study can 
uniquely explore those aspects of enclave life experienced in day-to-day life.  
46 
 
2.7 Everyday Politico-Spatial-Legality in Cooch Behar Enclaves 
Now I move on to the PSL interplay in Cooch Behar enclaves that is constituted by three types 
of actions by all the actors involved:  (i) PSL between the enclave and home country; (ii) PSL in 
host state-enclave contradictions; and (iii) PSL in relation to the enclave residents’ everyday 
activity. The diagram below charts enclave life and the above mentioned PSL interactions from 
a theoretical perspective. The politics, geo-strategic insignificance and legal issues keep the 
enclave issue alive. The enclave dwellers everyday citizenship and survival are connected with 
the border, vulnerability, legal issues and political situations between the involved states.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 2.1: The enclave-host-home countries interactions in a diagrammatic form 
 
 
 
Fig 2.1: The enclave-host-home countries interactions in a diagrammatic form 
2.7.1PSL between the Enclave-Home Country 
Legal norms link enclaves as a part of the home state’s territory and enclave dwellers are its 
citizens. Laws are part of the basic institutional framework within which people order their lives 
and legal matters often ritual for the protection of citizens and their rights (Prescott, 1978). As 
the connection between the host country and enclave dwellers are legally linked with 
citizenship; it is vital to look at how such legal ties with the host country through citizenship are 
experienced in the enclaves. In fact, citizenship is not only a legal but also political and spatial 
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identity (Painter & Philo 1995; Carr, Brown, & Herbert; 2009). How, then, does a home 
country’s political system operate in the enclave in a disconnected situation? What roles do the 
home state play to secure their citizens? Furthermore, what is the political identity of enclave 
residents in an un-administered enclave? Legally, the territory belongs to the home country but 
practically it is unadministered what I argue is an abandonment. In this situation it foregrounds 
the connection between the legal and the spatial in the world so tightly as to be seen identical 
(Blomley and Delaney, 2001). Similarly, this study also investigates how politico-spatial-legal 
factors shape citizenship in the enclaves as shown in the diagram above (see figure 2.1).  
The interpretation, creation and application of law involve a variety of actors who can be seen 
performing and producing different degrees of law (Scherr, 2002). These actors such as judges, 
police, public officials and citizens are involved in considerable spatial interpretation (Martin et 
al, 2010; Atkins, Hassan and Dunn, 2006). Given the abandoned nature of these enclaves, what 
kind of citizenship is possible for them? What are vulnerabilities such situations cause for the 
enclave residents? Exploring the legal norms and practices shaping everyday life in the enclave, 
and how everyday conceptions of authority and law is experienced; this thesis tries to 
understand enclave-home country relationships in everyday enclave life. These relationships 
will be explored in two ways. Drawing on the citizenship debates (Painter and Philo, 1995; 
Shapiro, 2000; Nyers, 2006; Isin and Nielsen, 2008) and abandonment (Agamben, 1998), I will 
show how the enclave-home country connections are generally abandoned. And, Agamben’s 
(1998) formulation of bare life will be used to understand the vulnerabilities caused by the non-
existence of the enclave-home country interaction. 
2.7.2 PSL between the Enclave-Host Country 
PSL can also be explored through the enclave-host country relationship. Legal norms by the 
host country define enclaves as foreign land; hence enclave dwellers are designated as 
foreigners. The question of legality and illegality for the enclave dwellers emerge because of the 
presence of an international boundary, which ultimately constructs a binary of us/them amongst 
the enclave-mainland people. It is the international border that keeps the enclave residents away 
from the home country; and the enclave-host country borders are maintained through the 
citizen/foreigner binary.  It is obvious that the law enforcement of the host country attempts to 
keep enclave dwellers in their place by explicit and informal control over movement and 
settlement as part of territorial sovereignty. The mechanisms of control include formal and 
informal restrictions by the host state. Formal restriction involves checkpoints, searches on the 
bus and train for national identity cards, strict measures to check ID for all types of activities 
ranging from hospital to bank accounts. In this context, bodies are often read by the law 
enforcement officials to guess the legal status of individual (Nah, 2007: 35). All these actions 
inscribe boundaries of citizen/illegal migrant are enacted through governing the mobility into 
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domains that regulate the daily life significantly (Amoore, 2006). State boundaries are also 
constitutive of social actions and production of boundaries in everyday life (Paasi, 1996; 1997). 
Informal restriction is based on the social construction of boundary between enclave-mainland 
people. Mainland people living close to the enclave might have self-designated-boundaries 
(Davis, 1992). The self-designated-boundaries by the host country’s citizens as ‘us 
citizen’/them foreigner fashion local politics in the enclave neighbourhood. These local politics 
and constructions of ‘other’ are also representative of state politics. The connection between 
formal and informal politics in the enclave is made through PSL interaction.  
The law appears as a conceptual framework or tool of power, which fails to respond to 
politically and geographically unusual realities. Such restrictions can influence state sponsored 
or private violence, private discrimination, political and social ghettos. Citizens and strangers 
are controlled through an imposed set of interiority and exteriorities (Goldberg, 2001). The rule 
of law is deemed superior, given its ability to regulate violence through routine violence with 
the active or tacit acquiescence of legal texts, institutions and officials (Blomley, 2003). Such 
violence through the rule of law constructs fear, uncertainty, vulnerability and precarious life in 
the enclave. Hence, the enclave is created as a zone of ‘confinement’ (Coutin, 2010). Law is 
also used in the enclaves as a political weapon by the host country’s local state institutions in 
the form of extraterritoriality, which is categorically illegal. Extraterritoriality occurs, ‘when 
domestic law extends beyond sovereign borders’ (Raustialia, 2009: 5 quoted in Coutin, 2010: 
203). Extraterritoriality is experienced in several ways. For example, opium cultivation is illegal 
in both India and Bangladesh and states destroy enclave-based opium plants as a host country; 
however, they never enter into their own enclaves for the same reason (see chapter 6).  
These enclaves are the space contained by lawlessness but surrounded by hostile regulations for 
everyday survival. Conversely, the everyday life of the enclave dwellers is shaped by the host 
country’s legal norms to separate citizen and foreigner. Enclave dwellers are also subject to law. 
Hence, social life is legally saturated and the power of the law can constitute social life in 
diverse ways (Blomley, 2003: 27). Considering all these actions by the host states, it is 
necessary to explore the vulnerabilities caused by these measures. Hence, the everyday creation 
of vulnerability and lawlessness by the legal regulations of the host country construct rightless 
enclave residents who are subject to law. Thus, the enclave residents are ‘excluded as included’ 
as Agamben conceptualises (Hagmann & Korf, 2012: 212).  The enclave residents are excluded 
from legal rights while they included in the host country’s law as illegal immigrant.  Therefore, 
the enclave-home country interactions occur through the maintenance of different layers of 
borders, actions of extra-territoriality and keeping the enclave dwellers as subject to law.   
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2.7.3 PSL Everyday Survival in the Enclaves 
The third action involves enclave dwellers mobility and economic and political activities for 
survival using (il)legal means. As mentioned earlier, this involves enclave residents’ 
illuminating tactics to use legal norms as an advantage; illegal activities in response to the 
hostile regulations against them (see figure 2.1). Obviously, an enclave’s everyday politics is 
nothing but survival involving tactics to find a way out to avoid legal matters that hinder their 
life. The rhythms of every day survival tactics in the enclaves can reveal a clear picture of the 
diverse motives and methods of constructing everyday survival in the enclaves. Rhythm (Harris, 
2000) helps to reveal what people do for survival and how they cope with difficult situations, 
learn from previous errors and face challenges. Thus, rhythm offers the rhythm of everyday 
individual survival techniques that encroach on the host country that includes personal 
connection, opportunity, and corruption and so on. In addition, ‘Rhythms imply repetitions and 
can be defined as movements and differences within repetition’ (Lefebvre, 2004: 90). Survival 
techniques vary depending on the geographic location of the enclave and mobility across the 
border. Geographic location, tactic and permanent settlement will be discussed in the fourth 
section, and the advancement of life through cross border (India-Bangladesh) mobility will be 
explored.  
Given the circumstance, I would argue that the enclave is a space where the formal and local 
politics interact and contradict through the legal-illegal dichotomy and such dichotomy shapes 
everyday life in the enclaves. A study on such connections and contradictions provides a 
stimulating model of political geography of the politico-spatial-legality matters among enclave 
residents-host-home country. The enclave is an example of the crossing point of two or more 
political systems, which bind them with the legal norms of each political system. Everyday 
practices across boundaries involve legal/illegal matters within this triangulation, which has so 
far been ignored in the existing literatures. Hence, it links politics, law and boundary in all 
forms to explore day-to-day life in the enclave.  
2.8 Conclusion 
The total enclave population throughout the world numbers nearly three million (Vinokurov, 
2007). The total area is just a point in terms of the total landmass of the world. Such a tiny 
presence of enclaves in terms of size and population does not mean that an enclave is an 
insignificant entity, however. It may be small but its importance lies with the functionality of 
the enclave in-between two nation-states. Showing the trend of irregular or little in-depth 
research on the enclave, this chapter highlights the importance of more study on enclaves in 
political geography. Sidaway (2005) emphasises political geography needs more research to 
examine the complex relations within and across political spaces; more in-depth research on an 
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enclave can provide invigorating examples of such complex realities. This chapter argues that 
research on enclaves following the core political geography themes can bring illuminating 
insights in the theorisation of the nation-state, territory or sovereignty; thus both enclave 
research and political geography can enrich one another. 
The chapter makes three contributions in enclave research. Firstly, it argues that the everyday is 
indispensable to understand how the enclave-home-host country interaction works on the 
ground and this argument will be articulated in all empirical chapters of this thesis. Secondly, 
specifying the research on the enclave and enclave-like outliers, this chapter argues that we 
should not define all outliers as enclaves that can only bring ambiguity into enclave research. 
For the purpose of the clarity of the term enclave and definitional precision, defining any 
geopolitical outlier as an enclave is misleading. In this context, political geography runs short of 
vocabulary to define these very significant and diverse political geographic outliers. As Whyte 
notes, ‘a comprehensive and systematic typology or coding system is necessary for proper 
comparison of enclaves and other fragments without confusion’ (2002: 197). And finally, I 
sketched politico-spatial-legality as a framework to study enclaves. Without this framework I 
believe research on enclaves cannot develop a nuanced understanding of enclave life that 
accounts for politics, geography and law’s multiple roles in enclave-home-host country 
interactions. The theoretical approach articulated in this chapter will be explored in-depth in the 
rest of the chapters to understand how the politico-spatial-legality is dominant in enclave life in 
dynamic ways. The next chapter reflects on the methodological issues of the field research.   
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Methodological Reflections  
3.1 Introduction 
Enclave study, as a part of borderland research, can tell us much about politico-spatial-legal 
interactions because an enclave forms a clear link with the host and home countries. Mason 
(2002: 27) suggests engaging directly with how and why particular methods and sources might 
yield data to answer research questions. This study intends to elicit everyday human experiences 
in the enclaves through the voices from below, daily relations and experiences of the locals. A 
rich picture of enclave life can be gained through studying them in their natural settings by 
employing ethnographic research. As Herbert (2000: 548) argues, ‘ethnography uniquely 
explores lived experiences in all its richness and complexity’. Previous geographic research on 
these geopolitically volatile enclaves involved archival research and interviews (Whyte, 2002, 
Jones, 2009), which fails to adequately identify their day-to-day life and governance that would 
be possible through an ethnographic study. Excluded from previous studies is an engagement 
with a feel for daily life, the experience of a lack of citizenship from below, systems of 
governance and border security on the ground. Empirical studies that employ only interviews 
overall depend on interviewees’ remarks, while ethnography offers, as Herbert (2000: 557) 
mentions, ‘the opportunity to observe what they do as well as what they say’. Therefore, these 
studies fall short by not being able to adequately understand the local hierarchy, power 
dynamics, and internal conflict that are imperative to study a non-state space like these 
enclaves.  
Ethnography sheds light on the importance of locally embedded political actors and actions in 
the context of broader political processes (Megoran, 2006) and seeks to trace causal chains, 
check analytic reasoning and pinpoint behavioural outcomes (Volo & Schatz, 2004). Therefore, 
a fuller understanding of the spatiality and legality of political process affecting the enclave life 
needs ethnographic participant observation. This cannot be done through discourse analysis 
despite its exclusive use in political geography, politics and International Relations literatures to 
study politics (Megoran, 2006; Sturm, 2008; Debrix, 2008). A cogent understanding of the 
ground politics in the enclaves is unachievable through discourse analysis because of its 
predominant focuses on elite-geopolitics. Some research employs discourse analysis of 
newspaper and other medias to comprehend how global politics affect the local (see Debrix, 
2008); still these are secondary resources and represent only few locals on major issues. 
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Discourse analysis is, thus, powerless to explore everyday politics in hidden geographies like 
the Cooch Behar enclaves, which receive derisory media attention. Like discourse analysis, 
Participatory Research Appraisal (PRA) is also less apposite to answer the research questions. 
PRA is well received in social geography and development research for its potency to create 
active and collective participation by the local people (Chambers, 1994; 1997; 2008; Mohan, 
1999; Kesby, 2000; Pain & Francis, 2003; Pain, 2004; Tolia-Kelly, 2004). In a non-cohesive 
community where people distrust each other, the research strategy of group engagement and 
active participation is only capable of exploring general issues in the enclaves. Such limited 
participation obscures individual experiences and performances actualised in the enclaves.  
Here, I expand on how this methodology enhances our understanding of the enclaves. 
Ethnography can produce more grounded truth-claims than the scholars who do not engage in 
immersion (Schatz, 2009). Such long and deep immersion is a prerequisite for an exploratory 
research concerned to reveal both public and individual versions of truths of enclave life. 
Ethnographic knowledge is about somewhere and from somewhere (Gupta & Ferguson, 1997 
emphasis original); participation in, and observation of, the enclave society provides the 
opportunity to understand temporal, spatial, political actions from an individual scale. Most 
importantly, ethnography can help us to understand how enclave life functions in between two 
nation-states. As Mountz (2010: XVII) reflects ethnography articulates ‘daily life as one register 
of state power’. What has emerged is a fuller understanding of the various webs of relations, 
which the enclaves are involved in or excluded from. A critical overview of visible and invisible 
connectivities has also emerged through using this methodological approach, in particular, 
understanding practical day-to-day interactions with the involved states’ legal procedures. In 
Herbert’s (2000: 550 emphasis original) words, ‘ethnography is a uniquely useful method for 
uncovering the process and meaning that undergird socio-spatial life’. These are individual 
responses, tactics and vulnerabilities that need a longer time to explore, constructing mutual 
trust, and understanding the reality. Therefore, ethnography would be the best to focus on the 
contradictions between state elite and everyday political geographical imaginations emphasizing 
how they shaped and reshaped enclave dwellers everyday lives and survival in the last six 
decades. The aim of this chapter is to provide an account of the methodological transformations 
before and during my fieldwork based on the context and field-site reality.  In Rose’s (1997) 
words, researcher-researched-research dynamics shaped the whole research process where 
research context took the key role. This chapter takes a narrative approach to set out the detail 
of the fieldwork plans, applied research methods, positionality and reconsideration of the 
research questions and theoretical approaches based on the field data.  
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3.2  Pre-fieldwork Dilemmas: Sensitivity of the Topic, Visa & Legal 
Matters  
At the heart of this thesis, there are questions of legality, borders, citizenship and politics. These 
concerns have affected the ‘doing’ of the research itself. My own citizenship, politics and 
positioning have been negotiated throughout the process of conducting research. As the topic is 
politically sensitive to both the states, nationality of the researcher is always crucial to get 
official approval for a border research. Therefore, border research by native researchers 
generally considers one side of the border since the other side is suspicious about the research 
motive (Rabbani, 2006; Chatterji, 1999). In addition, sporadic gun battles between the border 
guards sometimes make it risky to conduct research (Saha, 2007, Whyte, 2002, Schendel, 
2005). Being Bangladeshi no visa was required to work in Bangladesh but my nationality 
created a concern for the prospect of a fieldwork in India. That the researcher’s biography and 
positionality play a role in doing and writing the research are vigorously addressed in the 
literatures (England, 1994; Rose, 1997; Delamont, 1992). However, a researcher’s political 
identity, visa dilemma and possibilities of doing overseas fieldwork are poorly addressed issues 
in the academic literature.  
The question of the ‘right visa’ for conducting fieldwork in India brought the legality and ethics 
matters to the fore. A research visa was apparently unattainable since previous researchers 
worked with a tourist visa (Whyte, 2002) or ended with working only in Bangladesh (Cons, 
2007; Jones, 2009; Rabbani, 2006). Brendan Whyte received an Indian tourist visa despite his 
quest for a research visa delaying his fieldwork by six months. He reflects upon the difficulties 
he endured in terms of accessing documents, ‘Academic comment on government policy on 
boundary issues is also a sensitive matter, especially in India, where questioning the frontiers … 
is a criminal offence' (Whyte, 2002: 34). My methodological aim was to conduct fieldwork in 
both India and Bangladesh since the origin, experience and future of the enclaves are linked 
with both of these countries.  
Being South Asian and learning from other researchers about visa-dilemmas
4
, I was acquainted 
with the idea that South Asia works well with personnel connections rather than the legal 
approach. My enthusiastic plan for a tourist visa failed to convince my supervisors and 
postgraduate director. The practical concerns of the researcher’s personal safety and probable 
imprisonment in the worst case scenario (conducting fieldwork with tourist visa is illegal) and 
                                                             
4 Researchers conducted fieldwork in India on Bengal border/enclaves and other political issues were contacted from the beginning of my PhD to develop a wider 
network of contacts what Crang and Cook (2007) define as the ‘first step in any ethnography’. Details of visa difficulties are generally unavailable in the journals, 
not dedicated to methodology, but email correspondences with the researchers who faced visa dilemmas helped immensely understanding visa and research 
realities on the ground.   
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consequential fiasco of the whole project left me with two options to consider. Plan- (a) 
applying for a research visa or plan- (b) ethnography only in Bangladesh and archival work in 
India with a tourist visa. Plan-a appeared less sensible because of six month long visa process 
and inevitable fate of refusal. Consequentially, the entire fieldwork would not only be 
significantly delayed but also had the potential to jeopardise the archival research in India. This 
visa-related delay could endanger the fieldwork yet again by being affected by the heavy 
monsoon and flood. Then, I decided to opt for plan-b. Academically, the project undoubtedly 
lost merits with this compromise of doing ethnography only in the Bangladesh side. However, 
the project can still offer new insights in the political geography of citizenship, borders and 
vulnerability as the lived experiences in unadministered spaces located in Bangladesh is also 
understudied.  
3.3  Fieldwork Routes and Gate-keeping  
The fieldwork began with a brief archival research in Dhaka that failed to provide many 
documents needed at that time as many of the archival documents were stolen, some were very 
fragile and some were restricted to use. For example, the file containing parliamentary debates 
on enclave exchange issues during 1974-75 was missing. On the other hand, historical 
documents on the enclaves in pre-partition time were available but some of them were 
damaged. However, old news clippings in newspaper archives and Bhasin’s (1996, 2003) books 
based on collections of the parliamentary debates on the border in India and Bangladesh helped 
give an understanding of the geopolitical atmosphere over enclave issues. With this background 
knowledge of the national politics on enclave matters my ethnographic journey to India began 
to comprehend grassroots politics in those places. The Fieldwork followed the traditional 
method of snowballing to constitute networks of contacts as it is very effective way to increase 
the number of potential contacts (Weiss, 1994; Small, 2009; Spreen 1992; Thomson, 1997), and 
it is very useful approach accessing ‘hidden and hard to reach population’ (Atkinson & Flint, 
2001: 03). Pre-fieldwork communications with the Bangladesh Institute of International and 
Strategic Studies, Institute of Defence Studies (Delhi), and Centre for Studies in International 
Relations and Development (Kolkata) helped me to confirm some interviews with government 
officials in Kolkata in Kolkata and in Delhi with the former high Commissioner to Bangladesh 
and home Ministry officials. Following the chain of contacts, I, then, came across the British 
Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) and BBC-Bangla services at Kolkata. Both the servises’ 
correspondents have done extra-ordinary gate keeping for me in both the countries. Following 
the discussions with the BBC correspondents, and interviews with the political leaders and 
Home Ministry officials, I got opportunities to visit the enclaves through BBC contact, political 
party connections, and Indian Home Ministry references.  
 55 
It was crucial to carefully consider the presentation of self through affiliation in a place where 
people are vulnerable and suspicious. This can confuse/ruin or can improve the communication 
process in the field sites since the local people ‘glean clues’ to sketch the researcher’s purpose 
of study (Batterbury, 1997). Introduction with the enclave residents through a political party 
would involve presenting oneself as ‘party biased’, which could distance the researcher from the 
majority of enclave folks who are victims of politics. Similarly, the Border Security Force 
(BSF) connection could cause wariness about the researcher’s motive, as they might consider 
me as a BSF secret agent. On the other hand, the BBC is an international news media work 
beyond India or Bangladesh’s political influence, sympathetic to the enclave dwellers hard life, 
and most importantly it has more acceptability than the political leaders and border guards. 
Therefore this can provide a degree of openness and less suspicion towards the researcher. 
Considering all three options and their possible impact on the whole project, I decided to make 
contact through the BBC. A series of chance and ‘opportunity sampling’ thus opened the 
prospect to do detailed ethnographic work in the enclaves as I wished to do at the beginning.   
BBC-Bangla introduced me to Gautam Sarkar, who has settled in Cooch Behar, a journalist by 
profession with many years work experience in the enclaves. Gautam’s kind offer to accompany 
me for two weeks was significant in getting initial access within the enclave community. He 
was interested to witness the differences between ‘journalistic fieldwork’ and academic 
fieldwork. ‘One day in an enclave’ was my preference to have an introductory understanding 
about enclave life. Prior to the visit, the enclave residents were informed. Many enclave 
residents gathered in one place to meet us that facilitated informal group discussion regarding 
the issues affecting their everyday life. Seeing the number of people gathered to see Gautam and 
me, I realised he has already gained majority of the enclave residents’ trust. Journalists like 
Gautam are their only connection to the world and the enclave residents always update the 
journalists if any major attack or incident occurs in the enclaves. This positive introduction 
helped gain preliminary access, getting my face familiar and knowing the field site realities. 
However, gaining trust in the study sites was complicated; it involved nationality, religion and 
other factors, which will be discussed in greater depth in the positionality section.  
I conducted a pilot in ten enclaves and two counter enclaves (see table 3.3, and section 3.4 for a 
detailed description of the pilot study). My visa was valid until 07 November 2009, and there 
was a concern that another Indian visa application might be unsuccessful. For a clear and 
comprehensive understanding of everyday politico-spatial-legality shaping enclave life, which 
is the central focus of this PhD, ethnography in both the Indian and Bangladeshi enclaves was 
essential. Considering the visa difficulties and looking at the aim of this research, I decided to 
make my previously planned archival work very brief and opted for a two-week long period of 
ethnographic research in two enclaves. There was a hope for another month-long ethnography 
in India depending on the visa accessibility. Before leaving for Delhi, I promised to go back to 
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Cooch Behar within three months and agreed to raise their everyday difficulties with the Home 
Ministry authorities during the interview. The enclave residents wanted to let the world know 
about their hard life. Three interviews with the concerned authorities were done on the basis of 
the anonymity of the person and his/her organisational affiliation. There were difficulties in 
dealing with people’s expectations. While the enclave residents’ implied that a quick resolution 
of enclave problems were possible by informing the high officials about the everyday 
challenges of enclave life, the government officials were less interested to learn about those 
grounded realities. 
I came back to Bangladesh and went to the pre-selected major site where most of the enclaves 
are located. The success of the journalist gate-keeping effect in the Indian side inspired me to 
follow a similar path in the Bangladesh side. This approach proved unfeasible in acquiring 
access to Indian enclaves as local journalists (Pargram, Lalmonirhat) have very shallow 
acquaintance with any enclaves except the Tin Bigha Corridor and adjacent Dahagram and 
Angorpota (D & A) enclaves. This signifies the remoteness of the vast majority of enclaves 
from the local media. The over optimism of uncomplicated access with the enclave community 
through media sources was diminished and this experience taught me the necessity of place-
specific consideration of gate-keeping. A search for an alternative link/gate-keeper was 
obstructed by the accommodation debacle as no landlord agreed to rent-out a flat/room to a lone 
female researcher. The local hotel was not suitable/safe and staying in the hotel is socially 
unacceptable for a woman in a rural setting. My first attempt to see the D & A was seen as 
suspicious and the border guards questioned my intentions, although a journalist who visited D 
& A many times accompanied me. Being frustrated with the circumstances, and the upsetting 
experiences of personal insecurity, and unease with the excessively hot food, I went back to 
Dhaka.  
A lesson was learned and I tried to establish multiple contacts in the study site to avoid 
dependency on one network. Correspondence with local administration in that region and the 
BDR official in charge provided me with temporary accommodation in the government 
guesthouse in Patgram until another arrangement was possible. Bangladeshi administration 
cannot authorise research work in Indian enclaves on legal grounds. However, I got verbal 
permission to work in the borderland and D &A enclaves. References from BDR district 
headquarters changed BDR guards’ attitude and they were happy to cooperate with this but D & 
A enclave residents seem to be less friendly. The introduction with the primary school head 
master in Dahagram worked well at getting positively connected with the enclave community. 
Following his contacts, tea-stall discussions and corridor gate discussions provided me a way in 
to establishing contact with the people and D & A reality. Besides my ethnography on these 
enclaves, I started doing my pilot in the Patgram area and sometimes my respondents in D & A 
provided contacts in other enclaves (see table 3.1).  
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As Scheper-Hughes’ (2004) ethnography on the organ trade followed the body to understand 
the connections and stakeholders, my ethnographic research followed the ‘story and network 
method’ throughout the fieldwork. One enclave led me to another and the stories and names I 
heard in the Indian side worked as a valuable reference point to do a pilot study and gain access. 
For example, Kanti Barman, who wanted an access corridor to India, became more amiable 
when he heard that I knew his story from Molay Chaki, a local researcher at Cooch Behar. By 
virtue of cellular technology and proximity to the border, I maintained communication with my 
respondents in India since both Indian and Bangladeshi cellular networks were available in the 
Bangladeshi field sites. This link not only updated me with the Indian situation but also 
provided new contacts in Bangladesh. Such contacts helped to discover one enclave, Bashkata, 
whereby enclave residents wanted an access corridor to India. During my participant 
observation in Dahagram, I heard stories of this enclave from one BDR5
 
soldier who had been 
previously posted to that border.  
A few months after I began my fieldwork, I was contacted by Gulam Mostafa in Kuriram, who 
invited me to see the enclaves in Kurigram and arranged a ‘discussion meeting’. Constructing a 
self-governed enclave with its own constitution, administration, security force and judiciary 
system, the Dasharchora people define it as a country. Impressed with the amazing way of 
making an autonomous enclave, I decided to live in that enclave for a month. Another tourist 
visa in India was approved by the end of February 2010. Significantly, political circumstances 
of the enclaves’ future changed during this time. Both the governments declared an enclave 
exchange procedure. The news, surprisingly, did not raise any attention in any of my study sites. 
Additionally, people in the Bangladeshi enclaves started protesting, they put on demonstrations 
and rallies for citizenship in the host country. It was an interesting change to consider. 
On the way back from India, the study sites in Bangladesh were revisited to get final updates 
and bid farewell to the respondents. The remaining few days were spent on interviewing 
bureaucrats, retired army officials, and security analysts in Bangladesh. The fieldwork routes 
followed storylines and employed local, national or cross-border networks. It experienced 
success and disappointments in finding neutral and community acceptable gatekeepers. 
Admittedly, this route was not pre-planned and decided spontaneously; therefore the outcome 
was unpredictable and followed the ‘chance’ to know enclaves. Positively, this exploratory 
journey from enclave to enclave provided the opportunity to discover diverse types of enclave 
life and distinct and innovative survival tactics based on the location of each enclave, personal 
                                                             
5 Bangladesh Rifles (BDR) is now called Border Guard Bangladesh (BGB) after an exercise to revamp the force after the Feb 25-26 carnage at the frontier force's 
Pilkhana headquarters in the capital in 2009. However, none of my respondents used this new official name. For clarity I will retain using the BDR. 
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politics and knowledge about administrative loopholes. Hence, I learned a glimpse of the lived 
experiences in the enclaves.  
Table 3.3: Time Line: Fieldwork Routes 
Period 
Place 
Visited 
Days 
worked 
Work Done 
1-6 October, 
2009 
Dhaka 06 
Archival work at the Bangladesh Institute of International 
and Strategic Studies and the Bangladesh National Library 
and Archives; time spent contacting relevant people in India. 
7 October-5 
November 
2009 
Kolkata 04 
An interview with a political leader who was actively 
involved with the Tin Bigha movement; discussions with the 
BBC correspondents about visiting the enclaves; and two 
days archival work at the West Bengal State Archives. 
Cooch 
Behar 
23 
Pilot study in 10 Bangladeshi enclaves and two counter-
enclaves; two enclaves, Mashaldanga and Poaturkuthi, were 
selected for a two-week long ethnography after analyzing 
the pilot data. 
Delhi 03 
Two interviews with anonymous border officials and an 
interview with a former diplomat who was posted in 
Bangladesh for a long time. And one day’s archival work at 
the Nehru Memorial Library. 
9 November, - 
19 December 
Patgram, 40 
Pilot study in Patgram began along with ethnography in the 
Dahagram and Angorpota enclaves. 
20 December- 
10 February, 
2010  
Patgram 20 
After analyzing pilot data, three Indian enclaves were 
selected and ethnographic work in the Bashkata and 
Lotamari enclaves were conducted. To avoid the risk of 
detachment, I was moving back and forth between the 
enclaves. 
10-28 
February, 
2010  
Kurigram 18 
Ethnography conducted in Dashiarchora enclave and visiting 
some other enclaves in Kurigram. 
1-29 March, 
2010 
Cooch 
Behar 
29 
Ethnographic work conducted in Poaturkuthi and 
Moshaldanga enclaves; other enclaves were also visited. A 
two-day trip to Kuchlibari. 
31 March-04 
April  
Patgram, 05 
Revisited D & A, Bashkata and Lotamar enclaves in 
Patgram.  
05-15 April Kurigram 10  Revisited Dashiarchora enclave. 
15-20 April, 
2010 
Dhaka 05 
Three interviews with the academic researcher, foreign 
ministry official and former border official. 
 
3.4  Pilot Study 
The importance of a pilot was comprehended while designing the fieldwork. I was unsure about 
the number of enclaves that should be studied given the time frame for PhD fieldwork and on 
what grounds they would be selected. Pre-selection of the number of study-areas was 
impractical at the research design stage because of the lack of information on current socio-
economic situations of people in habiting the enclaves. These under-researched areas only 
occasionally receive media attention and are excluded from any government routine surveys on 
contemporary conditions in the enclaves. Previous academic papers also provide a very brief 
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account of the fieldwork (see Van Schendel, 2002; Jones, 2009; Cons, 2007). Therefore, a pilot 
was indispensable to determine the field-sites and to comprehend the ground reality in the 
enclaves. Pilots in social research typically test feasibility of the research or pre-test a particular 
research instrument or assess degrees of observer bias (Baker, 1994; Tejlingen et al., 2001; 
Hammersley, 1997; Sampson, 2004). In addition to these uses, a pilot can determine the 
appropriate research sites to best answer the research questions. I will come back to the 
advantages and disadvantages of doing a pilot at the end of this section. Now the discussion 
moves onto the detail of my pilot study. 
As mentioned the fieldwork begun on the Indian side. Whyte’s (2002) detailed map on the 
precise location and size of all enclaves provided an excellent basis to do initial categorization 
of the enclaves. Most importantly, this map helped to detect official names of some enclaves 
which have different local names. Cooch Behar district is divided into 12 administrative blocks 
but the enclaves are scattered in six blocks. The initial groundwork was done based on the 
official list of the distribution of the enclaves in the administrative units (table3.2 and map 3.1).  
Two weeks in each side of the border did not allow for a comprehensive pilot; therefore, I tried 
to choose an area that contained the maximum number of enclaves and that had diverse 
circumstances. Dinhata was considered as the primary field site as it contains the maximum 
number of enclaves. However, enclaves located in other blocks were visited on occasions. 
Hotels are only available in Cooch Behar town; therefore, I had no choice but to commute to the 
enclaves every day during the pilot study; however I lived in Poaturkuthi enclave while doing 
the ethnography. 
Table-3.2 The enclaves’ administrative distribution based on government information 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Based on Indian and Bangladeshi newspaper reports, discussions with the local researchers, 
activists in Cooch Behar, and my gatekeeper Goutam Sarkar’s knowledge on the enclaves, ten 
enclaves were visited. A pilot in Bangladesh followed the same procedure as in India. Indian 
enclaves in Bangladesh are located in three separate districts (see table 3.1). Among the 
Geographic distribution of the 
enclaves in Cooch Behar 
Geographic distribution of 
the enclaves in Bangladesh 
Blocks 
(administrative 
unit) containing 
enclaves 
No of the enclaves District Enclave 
Dinhata I and II 
34 (two enclaves 
are located between 
Dinhata and 
Tufanganj) 
Panchagarh 34 
Sitalkuchi 09 Nilphamary 04 
Mekhliganj 27 Lalmonirhat 53 
Tufanganj 04 Kurigram 13 
Haldibari 18   
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districts, Lalmonirhat had the highest number of enclaves (table 3.2). I chose Patgram thana in 
Lalmonirhat as my study area where 40 enclaves exist. Additionally, D & A enclaves are 
connected with Patgram, Bangladesh through a corridor. Therefore, I could conduct the 
majority of fieldwork based at one station and could save time by avoiding inter-district travel. 
Most importantly, it takes time to be acquainted with the place and its people so having one 
station is extremely useful in this context. I collected data and spoke to the people who research 
on enclaves during my fieldwork in India. Based on Indian and Bangladeshi newspaper reports, 
magazine articles, information/views from local journalists in Cooch Behar and Patgram, I 
designed my initial pilot in Patgram. On many occasions border guards and enclave dwellers of 
one enclave provided information or remarkable incidents about other enclaves. It was not 
always the case; some enclaves are completely isolated and do not have any connection with 
any the other enclave of the region. Specifically some, tiny enclaves are agricultural fields and 
nobody lives there. On the other hand, some enclaves have some connections with home 
country. The enclaves visited during pilot are in the next section. 
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Map: 3.1: Fieldwork study sites in shaded boxes  
 62 
 
Table 3.3: Brief descriptions of the enclaves visited during pilot study 
Indian Side Bangladeshi Side (Patgram) 
Enclave Description Enclave Description 
Korola 
Muslim majority, very close to the border, and it has ‘enclave 
welfare fund’. However, internal conflict is high over control of 
welfare fund. 
23-Darkamari 
One person owns half of this enclave who came here by exchanging his land 
in Cooch Behar with the original enclave residents in 1948. 
Gobrachora 
Well inside Indian mainland but incredibly vulnerable, 
economically impoverished, high risk of robbery and local 
Indians intimidate the enclave residents.  
25-Darkamari 
All Muslims and entirely disconnected from home country. A few wealthy 
enclave residents own land in the enclave but live in Bangladesh and enjoy 
full Bangladeshi citizenship. 
Batrigach  
This enclave is severely exposed to riverbank erosion and 
flooding. 
13, Kharkharia, 14 Lotamari and 15 Kharkharia 
Three contagious enclaves, majority Muslim migrated from India, and few   
Bangladeshi landless. Fascinatingly, people living in these enclaves are 
involved in local political dynamics of Bangladesh. 
Kismat Batrigach  
 
It is a flood affected, mixed religion enclave; no community 
cohesion, close to BSF check post, and agonized by mainland 
Indians. It is a large enclave and got almost 400 families there. 
120 Lotamari 
All Muslim, very close to border and enclave folks are closely linked with 
nearby Indian village. Few people who have house in Bangladesh are 
Bangladeshi voter card. Mostly original enclave residents but few came from 
India and other parts of Bangladesh. BDR camp exists by the enclave. 
Dakshin- Mashaldanga   
Religion plays a vital role for the conflicting relations within the 
enclave community. Muslims have good connection with 
Bangladesh and Hindus with India. 
119-Bashkata 
Mixed religion and close to the border. Almost one-third people living here 
want a corridor to get connected with India.. Some Muslim enclave folks 
managed Bangladeshi voter card. 
Madhdha- Mashaldanga, and 
Purba-Mashaldanga  
Both the enclaves exhibit reverse characteristics. Purba-
Mashaldanga is a Hindu majority enclave and has very good 
connection with India. On the other hand Madhdha Mashaldanga 
is a Muslim majority enclave. It is also an appropriate example 
of how a host country invades home country’s territorial 
sovereignty. Indian road is constructed and electricity poles and 
water pipe lines are erected through this enclave. 
16-Bhotbari 
Few managed Bangladeshi voter card. Majority are poor. Most of them came 
to this enclave from Cooch Behar by exchanging their land with the original 
enclave residents.  
Counter enclave Madankura, 
and counter enclave inside 
Madhdha-Mashaldanga 
 
Enclave residents have all facilities like any other Indian 
citizens. They can access electricity and other services. 
112-Bashkata 
No original people live here and it is a agricultural land. All the people I met 
here came from Bangladesh.  
Bakalirchora 
Entire enclave population was swapped with the indigenous 
Bangladeshi ‘Orao’ community. They moved out from 
Bangladesh only because of the wedding dilemma. Because of 
their small numbers, sometimes, they had to marry relatives 
17- Panishala 
Indian Muslims exchanged land and started to settle down. Some people 
living here try to belong within the bend of two states.  
Nolgram Almost 90% enclave residents managed Indian ID.    
Poaturkuthi 
A mixed religion enclave, people are poor, very few people 
managed Indian ID cards, and communal tension exists here. 
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3.4.1 Selection of the Field-sites 
The pilot suggested that many enclaves contain distinct characteristics depending on their 
location, religious orientation, and connection with home/host country and so on. While the 
enclaves are geographically distributed in two separate countries and characteristically diverse 
in different locations, a single site ethnography following the traditional anthropological 
approach is inadequate to explore spatially scattered lived experiences. Katz (1994) argues for a 
displacement of field site to locate and tease apart some of the differences between and within 
field sites. Later Marcus (1998), who popularised the multi-site ethnography in anthropology, 
argues in a similar vein that this approach follows structure, network or relations to sketch 
interconnection between sites. Multi-site ethnography is used to draw connections between local 
and global (Davies, 2009) or to explore post-socialist transition (Hörschelmann & Stenning, 
2008). For this study, multi-site ethnography is an opportunity to explore diverse experiences of 
enclave life shaped by the space and wider political environment.  
Looking at the pilot data in India my initial plan was to consider Poaturkuti and Moshaldanga 
complex as key research sites (see table 3.3). Due to Poaturkuthi’s central location amongst the 
enclaves visited during pilot, long distance from international border and Muslim majority, I 
decided to work in this enclave. In contrast, another site, Moshaldanga complex, is located close 
to the border and has connections with the home country, is a victim of the local politics, and a 
mixed religion enclave. A combination of research in both sites can provide revealing examples 
of the location, religion, border, community and connection with the host/home state shape the 
everyday geography of the enclaves. Therefore, four Bangladeshi enclaves in India were 
selected as field sites. In addition, D & A enclaves were preselected study sites because of their 
unique characteristics of daytime connection with the home country through a corridor. As 
mentioned, I began my two week long period of ethnography in Poaturputhi and Mashaldanga 
enclaves immediately after the pilot in Indian side.  
Although enclaves located in Patgram, Bangledesh side are similar in their characteristics, I 
decided to work in 119-Bashkata and 120-Lotamari. Bashkata enclave folks have conflicting 
desires of nationhood depending on their religion and it is a few yards away from the border. On 
the other hand, where Lotamari is situated is a similar distance from the border but all residents 
are Muslim and rarely connected to the home country. I went back and forth to these enclaves 
for a month, which provided a deep understanding of border, (non)citizenship and vulnerability 
and religions role shaping them. However, fieldwork in Lotamari was jeopardised in the third 
week by a border incident that will be discussed in the positionality section of this chapter. As 
mentioned, Dashiarchora is an exceptional enclave because of its self-governing nature. A 
month long ethnography in this enclave provided an opportunity to understand citizenship in a 
self-governed enclave and the role of border negotiating both the concerned states.  
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The entire fieldwork involved six months hanging around in six field sites and a month long 
pilot study which involved moving between sites. Multi-site ethnography scholar Hannerz 
(2003) critiques this approach for not being able to provide deep hanging interaction as time and 
effort are stretched between the sites. I tried to keep this interruption to a minimum through the 
on and off method of moving sites. Furthermore, I was continuously connected with most of my 
field sites in both sides of the border through cellular technology. Almost 50 percent and more 
of enclave residents have a cell phone and many of them use both Indian and Bangladeshi ‘sim 
cards’ to stay in touch with their friends and family across the international border.  
3.4.2 Benefits of the Pilot Study 
In addition to the selection of the field sites, the pilot study was significantly helpful for the 
following reasons. Firstly, it provided a general understanding of the enclave life and helped in 
establishing access within the community that is crucial for an ethnographic immersion. 
According to Sampson (2004: 399), a pilot is ‘an introduction to an unknown world’. Such an 
interaction enabled me to get an insight into the psychological and behavioral pattern of the 
villagers. Secondly, a pilot study is useful to examine the practical consideration about the 
manageability of the number of field sites and rationality of doing multi-site ethnography. 
Thirdly, this provided an opportunity to consider the practicality of the proposed research 
methods. For example, pre-fieldwork research design considered using focus groups as a 
possible method alongside the participant observation as this method can provide prompts to 
talk and several layers of argument. However, the method proved unsuitable in this context 
while enclave folks declined to reveal individual economic and political strategy in group 
discussion and many others did not turn up to avoid local politics. Thus the pilot revealed local 
politics and problems helping to decide methodological strategy (Teijlingen et al., 2001). This 
also signifies the limitation of a participatory approach in a non-state space on sensitive issues. 
However, the ethnography turned a ‘site’ into ‘field’ through a legitimate knowledge production 
by the familiarity that an ethnographer gains in the ways of life of a group of people (Gupta & 
Ferguson, 1997: 37). In this research, the pilot study provided initial access to the path by 
gaining knowledge of the community and place under study.  On the other hand, a pilot could 
endanger the whole fieldwork if the community distrusted the purpose of the study and me. A 
pilot study, thus, can help to crystallize a well and sensibly designed ethnography although it 
does not guarantee absolute success of fieldwork. 
3.5 Positionality and Representation 
Generally, positionality refers to the personal, physical or social characteristics of the researcher 
such as class, gender, age, race, ethnicity, nationality and so on (Herod, 1999; England, 1994). 
My own identity and background worked in a complex way during the fieldwork. Obtaining 
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access to the community, interviews with the political elites and with home ministry officials 
was uncertain until they are completely convinced with the intention of the researcher. My 
nationality was a real issue at the beginning of fieldwork in the Indian field site, Cooch Behar, 
where one of my contacts, who became my gatekeeper later, was concerned about the research 
motive. He asked, “Will you explore how Bangladeshis are suffering in India?” The suspicion 
of a nationalistic research made my potential gatekeeper suspicious. In such circumstance, my 
affiliation and research grant from a British university; and research on understanding the 
‘enclave life’ across the border persuaded my contacts to work as gatekeepers.  
My identity as a researcher based in a third country placed me in a convenient position that felt 
more neutral. This approach convinced my gatekeepers, who introduced me with the 
community in a strategic way by saying “She is a Bangladeshi by birth but lives in the UK. She 
came to see life in the enclaves in India and Bangladesh as part of her study in a British 
university”. A positive introduction by the community’s trustworthy people bridged the 
nationality gap to some extent. My respondents felt a degree of comfortability and less pressure 
on uttering their desired views about both or either country. Some other people were pleased to 
see a Bangladeshi come to learn about their way of life. Having an educational home in the UK 
did not convince all of my respondents. One person angrily refused an interview saying, ‘It is 
the British who created the mess and made us stateless. Now they have sent you to see how do 
we survive?’ (Fieldnote, 28 October 2009) I was not prepared for this encounter and the impact 
of positionality was learned ‘on the spot’ (McDowell, 1992; Rose, 1997); I realized that there is 
no neutral position acceptable to all.  
I was not perceived as an insider in Bangladesh despite my Bangladeshi citizenship. I was rather 
considered as a spy either from India or Bangladesh who wanted to explore the illicit economies 
in the borderland. In this context, it is not the researcher’s identity rather the politico-economic 
reality of the research site that was constructed through such representation. An unexpected 
incident that involved the death of one Bangladeshi by an Indian border guard complicated my 
ethnography in Lotamari enclave. The man who was killed had been living close to this enclave 
and the incident occurred during the second week of my participant observation. People began 
to perceive me in a suspicious manner. They thought I was a border guard spy. Consequently, 
all of the men started avoiding me; however women remained friendly. As I failed to convince 
them that the incident and my presence in the enclave was only a coincidence, I had to stop 
working in that enclave. It was an unexpected puzzle beyond my control but a product of the 
constructed imagined positionality within their minds.  
Indian-subcontinent has a history of Hindu-Muslim communal tensions. Such tensions are also 
visible in the enclaves spaces (see Whyte, 2002; Schendel, 2002; Cons, 2012). Being a South 
Asian Muslim, I am familiar with this religious feud, which sometimes involves restricting any 
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Muslim entering in Hindu upper caste people’s house and sometimes vice versa depending on 
who forms the majority. Religion clearly made the key insider/outsider boundary that I tried to 
mediate during the field research. During my pilot in India, I needed an upper caste Hindu 
gatekeeper all along to gain access. Gautam accompanied me during interaction and interview 
with them, which immensely helped gaining access and credibility within the upper caste Hindu 
enclave residents. Besides, most of the Hindu enclave residents are scheduled castes who have 
less reservation talking to a Muslim researcher. The Muslim folks I worked with often referred 
to me as ‘one of us’. On the contrary, my religious identity did the reverse to the Hindu minority 
enclave dwellers in Bangladesh. My research in the Indian side made them curious to know the 
situation on the other side of the border, and most importantly reference from their Indian 
contacts helped me gaining some degree of access. Some people avoided the risk of sharing 
religion’s role in shaping their life but some others were outspoken for various reasons. It is 
unfair to claim that I gained their trust, rather they judged me harmless. A schoolmaster in D & 
A came forward sharing his desired nationality and frustrations of being ‘obligatory 
Bangladeshi’ since the opening of the time corridor.  In his eye view I am a Muslim minority in 
the UK who can understand a Hindu minority’s disappointments. ‘Experiencial sameness 
endows the researcher with greater understanding of the researched’s reality’ (Mohammad, 
2001: 104). In this particular context, the researched granted that moral authority.   
Interviews with political elites, journalists, researchers, and bureaucrats brought different power 
relations. My national, institutional and geographic identity worked in a complicated way. Since 
it is an unresolved bilateral issue, any question that goes against their government was 
considered as pro-other country.Besides, there is a lot to do with researcher’s biography 
(England, 1994). An interview with a former diplomat became unfriendly when she learned 
where I did my undergraduate degree. In her view, that university is the grooming place for 
radical Islamists. I had another unusual encounter while interviewing a university professor. He 
was very cooperative, and sharing his views and activist role on the corridor and enclave 
matters. At some point of the discussion he asked what part of Bangladesh I am from. Unease 
was visible in his face when he heard I am from Dhaka.  He replied me, ‘I do not like people 
from Dhaka or Kolkata, they are the most arrogant people on earth’. The interview actually 
ended there. Every aspect of the researcher’s identity might affect the interview and the 
fieldwork process. Sometimes participant’s personal reservations construct positionality which 
is unavoidable and unpredictable.  
Like Nagar (1997), I was experiencing that the community being researched was also curious 
about the researcher. They were aiming at more uncovering my personal information; such as 
my parents occupations, siblings profession, earnings, marital and social status. Many wanted to 
know whether my husband is a white British. People were very much interested to know about 
life in the UK. How do people live in the UK? Do they grow rice? Do they have floods or 
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disasters? Such discussions eased the gap between the researcher and community. Besides, 
these poor rural people are generally neglected by the educated upper class, therefore a generous 
behaviour impresses them so much. I found some of my respondents deliberately showed me 
their illicit economy, route, network and people involved in it. I was asking one of them why do 
you let me know all this? He replied, ‘A spy will not spend so many months in this area. 
Besides, you live in London and if you write about me, nobody here in Bangladesh will know 
this and no risk to be caught’ (Fieldnote, Dahagram, 31 March, 2010). Such a conclusion does 
not indicate insider or outsiderness but instead suggests that people make an individual 
judgment about the researcher’s ability of doing harm if personal experience is shared.  
Access during my fieldwork followed three phases. Initial access was through the gatekeeper 
during my pilot, and this was the most important phase. This provided opportunities to see 
people, talk to them and get their modified version of life. People living in this part of world are 
not familiar with the term researcher and they consider all journalists come for a day and go 
back. My interest to stay there and desire to understand their everyday life provided access to 
learn their mundane life. And finally, long term stay in the study area created a sense of kinship 
and some people regarded me as harmless. Some people kindly expressed their interest to 
explain enclave life as they consider I am working so hard to pass my exam and they should 
help me with this. The community in general considered me equivalent to a harmless foreign 
journalist. Slowly and gradually, I gained access to learn a considerable part of their life while I 
believe full access to anybody’s life is unattainable.  
The positionality and its likely impact on research process and production of knowledge are 
debated in the social science research. Many argue that positionality as an ‘insider’ makes a 
researcher more privileged to conduct research than someone outsider (Chavez, 2008); 
however, none can become an absolute insider or outsider (Nast, 1994:57).  In my case, my 
positionality switched from insider to outsider and many times it was neither. A researcher’s 
positionality is not absolutely fixed within the insider/outsider binary rather it shifts by the 
researcher and the researched through their mutual construction (Herod, 1999; Nagar, 1997; 
Mullings, 1999). Positionality also varied depending on the people interacted and field-site’s 
reality as happened at the Latamari enclave. Since I am working on an unresolved politically 
sensitive issue, many times my respondents were expecting me to take their side. I was not in a 
position to be judgmental but was sympathetic to their circumstances.  
  
 68 
3.6 Fieldwork Methods, Data Interpretation and Reflexivity 
3.6.1 Methods & Data Collection  
To understand the everyday experiences of citizenship, border, vulnerability and methods of 
survival in the enclaves, participant observation was the key method. Participant observation is 
the key ethnographic method that leads an ethnographer to understand the complex reality of 
social agency in marginalised groups (Humphrey & Mandel, 2002), the performative nature of 
human behaviour and border enforcement (Mountz, 2008) and a deeper understanding of the 
everyday lived experiences (Crang & Cook, 2007). Therefore, the complexities of the everyday 
ground realities between the enclave-host-home country interplay could not be effectively 
explored leaving participant observation aside. Other methods such as interview or focused 
group discussions are unable to participate, observe and adequately understand the everyday 
politico-spatial-legal environment across the enclaves that enclave dwellers are part of, rather 
these methods depend on what the selected respondents say. As (Watson & Till (2010: 129) 
argues, ‘interviews cannot report upon what they ‘do’ for ‘doings’ are often unconscious or 
unarticulated practices’. I believe in such circumstances these methods are not the best 
independently but they are useful alongside the participant observation. In this research I did in-
depth interviews alongside the participant observation while focus group discussion was not 
useful as people are unwilling to disclose their personal negotiations in front of others.  
Following Sara Delamont’s (2004) argument, careful consideration was paid to ‘sample’ the 
setting systematically by focusing upon different types of participant at different times of the 
day and in diverse possible observational sites. Participant observation was done in different 
segments of the enclave, enclave-host state border, enclave-fenced India-Bangladesh border, 
busy places in the enclaves and tea/coffee shops. Participant observation from these locations 
and different aged people did not only provide understanding of their daily activities but was 
also useful to explore mobility and social practices across the border. I have participated in 
women’s evening socialisation, which helped to gain knowledge about women’s everyday life. I 
lived in Poaturkuthi and Dashiarchora enclaves for an in-depth understanding of the rhythm of 
enclave life. This not only helped to understand some early morning actions such as getting 
iron-free drinking water from the host country but also helped to know the people who spend 
the day working in the host country. Considering internal power relations (see section 3.7), 
security issues, closeness to the border, and BSF scrutiny, I did not stay in other study sites. 
However, I worked longer time in those enclaves to understand their daily rhythms. Time 
remarkably controls the activities and movements in the D & A enclaves whose border shifts 
twice a day. Participation in and observation of the corridor opening and closing times provide 
rich and detailed narratives the corridor related politics, memories and struggles. For example, 
the closed corridor gate reminds people about their previous tactics to reach Bangladesh. In 
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addition, participant observation was rewarding to get border guards’ views and experiences in 
the Bangladesh side. They were frank about their daily routines at the Tin Bigha Corridor 
checkposts; however refused any interview. In practice, participant observation is often one 
element in a broader ethnographic approach, involving the use of other research methods 
(Mason 2002; Megoran, 2006; Atkinson et al, 2001). Participant observation provided me many 
interesting issues of the legal matters, internal conflict, victimization and coping strategies. It 
provided the general idea about enclaves and clues to different stories and incidents. A clear and 
detailed idea of the personal experiences and secret negotiations required in-depth interviews. 
As Atkinson and Silverman (1997) argue, the face-to-face interview enables a ‘special’ into 
subjectivity, voice and experience. Participant observation provided the context to do interview 
and selecting interviewees.  
Interview respondents were selected based on their individual negations, connections with the 
host and home countries, vulnerabilities, and experiences of border. In this context some 
newspaper reports and stories, those I heard during pilot study and participant observation, 
helped choosing respondents. The interviews were not dominated by my predetermined agenda 
rather it followed to ask broad opening questions, with the answer becoming my main source 
for my next question and our discussion in the rest of my interview. Focusing on events and 
situations that have taken place in an interviewee’s life can bring out illuminating issues rather 
than simply asking them only their views.  For many instances, I came to learn many crucial 
matters of their life that I did not plan to look at and questions I had not thought to ask (Hubbell, 
2003; Knapp, 1997). In addition, the same questions were not asked in each interaction but I 
covered the same broad themes in different interviews. As Rapley (2004: 18) mentions, ‘this is 
the central rationale of qualitative interviewing – that it enables the researcher to gather 
contrasting and complementary talk on the same theme or issue’. All Interview sites and 
interview times were decided by the participants which relaxed the participants and eased the 
interviewer-interviewee power relations to some extent and provided me opportunities to 
comprehend the field-site and people more explicitly. A few respondent preferred an interview 
outside the enclaves to avoid local political dynamics; thus an interview does not only involve 
the interviewer and interviewee in a power relation, it involves other power relations as well. 
Thus, the selection of the interview site itself produce a ‘micro-geography’ of the spatial 
relations and meaning (Elwood & Martin, 2000). Similar to Oberhauser’s experience (1997), 
the interview and participant observation benefited each other.  
To understand state responses to the enclaves, I interviewed the local government officials and 
border guards who are more practically involved with the enclave matters than the high officials 
sitting at the capital. I conducted semi-structured interview with them and was careful about the 
sensitivity of the questions. I followed Rapley’s (2004: 20) strategy - that is, after interviews I 
took notes on the encounter, noting both pre- and post-tape talk alongside my reactions and 
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observations about the interview itself. Political elites, government officials and border guards 
did not allow recording the interview but I took notes. In fact, it was not an open interaction but 
rather was like a statement or speech and they declined answering any follow up question. On 
the other hand, some other government officials and border guards were frank in informal 
discussions on the basis of anonymity but did not come forward for any interview. I preferred 
both taking field notes and taping audio records. Field notes are a detailed catalogue of events 
including my own role in and experience of the setting and interactions, which was updated 
regularly. I used triangulation and crosschecking methods to increase the trustworthiness and 
credibility of data. Besides, there was a tendency to exacerbate the real story; therefore I 
crosschecked them with other relevant people.  
Table 3.4: Interviews reached during the fieldwork 
Interview Location 
Respondents 
reached Refusal 
Male Female 
Interviews reached in India= 36 
Cooch Behar 
Moshaldanga 05 02 02 
Poaturkuthi 06 04 01 
Dahagram & 
Angorpota 
enclaves  
05 02  
Kuchlibari 
(Indian 
mainland 
protested 
against the 
opening of the 
corridor 
03 -  
Cooch Behar  town  04 - 01 
Delhi  03 01  
Kolkata  01 -  
Interviews reached in Bangladesh= 34 
Patgram 
Bashkata 08 02 01 
Lotamari 03 03 04 
Patgram 
Upazila centre 
03 -  
Vote Bari 01 -  
113-Lotamari 01 -  
Kurigram Dashiarchora 07 03 02 
Dhaka  03 - 01 
3.6.2 Reflexivity, Data Interpretation & Emerged Themes   
Data interpretation and analysis began with an attempt to order the data through the research 
diary notes, interview checklists and research questions of the field for a rough direction 
regarding the themes coming out from the field data. During the time of interview, I was not 
allowed to record the whole conversation. Thus, bits of interview are in my diary and I kept 
notes about the tone, expressions and some detailed information during the interview. A 
combination of reading those notes and listening to the interview helps to articulate the said and 
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unsaid matters relevant to the interview. Thus, it helps to guide what was being said and with 
the meaning and intent of each statement (Crang & Cook, 2007: 137). I followed an open 
coding procedure to extract categories found in the materials that helped to avoid biasn to 
certain categories and as Crang & Cook (1997) say to ‘avoid imposing some outside set of 
categories’. Then, I arranged the categories that emerged through a triangulation of the three 
parties involved- host state, home state and enclave. Thus, citizenship, border, vulnerability and 
survival tactics themes broadly emerged from the materials gathered from the field. Each theme 
will form a chapter in the rest of the thesis and will be linked with the wider theoretical 
considerations. Thus, ethnography makes connections between micrological observations and 
broader interpretations and theorisations (Hörschelmann & Stenning, 2008: 05).  
The field data revealed different key themes than those I had before the fieldwork. The issue of 
legality linked to geography and politics emerged as key issue for enclave life from the field 
data while pre-fieldwork research questions considered citizenship as the issue regarding these 
enclaves. It was something like Arendt’s remark on participatory research as ‘pearl fishing: one 
dives in not knowing quite what one will come up with’ (Arendth, citied in Dowler, 2001: 157). 
Similar to Dowler’s (2001) realization of ethnography’s strength in conflict setting, I felt a 
preconceived notion of place transforms and dismantles by the ethnographic methodology in the 
context of sensitive and under-researched border zone. Such transformation of conception is 
possible through an ethnography that can uniquely reveal the lived experiences.    
3.7 Difficulties, Limitations and Ethical Issues 
This section focuses on the empirical and methodological difficulties, limitations, and some 
ethical issues emerged during the research process.  
3.7.1 Difficulties and Limitations 
There were empirical difficulties such as local politics and respondent selection, coyness of 
women voicing experience, over attention hindering fieldwork, gate-keeping complicacy and so 
on. Although people are vulnerable and marginal in the enclaves, they still live in an internal 
hierarchical relationship. As Jenneke & Jos (1977) encountered in the 70s, during their study on 
power relations in rural Bangladesh, village leaders claim that they could talk about the village 
much better than the peasants. I encountered the same difficulties many times; for example an 
enclave elite was describing enclave life on behalf of the whole enclave in a group discussion of 
20/30 people.  Once, a man tried to share his own story the enclave elite furiously stopped him 
by saying, ‘Do you know how to speak? I know everything of this enclave and it is only me who 
can make an apt description!’ Other people were quiet. I did not counter the enclave elite but 
assured the interrupter that his story will be heard. Discussion with the elites cause unease in 
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general enclave folks mind; on the other hand, avoiding the enclave elites cause relatively 
unfriendly environment in the enclave by the elite allies. Making a position to have a balanced 
and friendly relationship with both the groups was very challenging in a place where a climate 
of suspicion and internal conflict dominate the socio-political environment. Internal politics of 
the research site can profoundly complicate positionality, or in Mulling’s (1999) phrase 
construct ‘positional space’.  
Some of these elites are citizens of both the countries but describe appealing stories of enclave 
life to the journalists. One of them proudly informed me that two foreign journalists like me 
interviewed him. These ‘celebrity respondents’ sometimes did not understand why I should 
need to talk others when he described everything. Quite surprisingly, people who never suffered 
extreme enclave life are vocal about these issues while many others who are victims of violence 
failed to vocalise their suffering in detail. Besides, women are so marginalized that many of 
them told me, ‘ask my husband, I don’t know what to tell’. Teen-aged girls were more 
forwarding than those who are in their 30-40s. Women those places are so powerless and never 
allowed to take decision for them, therefore expressing self was tough for them. However, 
everyday discussions and participation eased the barrier but still their participation was 
remarkably low compared to the male enclave residents. Since women in general are not 
involved in household decision-making process, it is difficult for them generating an opinion on 
any issue. Silence can cause unwillingness sharing private voices or a refusal to answer 
questions (Oinas, 1999); however, socially embedded powerlessness created speaking 
unconsciousness for the enclave women. 
Gatekeeping immensely helped gaining access and credibility within the community, however 
there were complications too. There are dangers of remaining largely dependent on the goodwill 
of gatekeepers when a gatekeeper chooses respondents or attempts to control who you speak to 
(Saghera & Thapar-Bjorket, 2008; Heath et al, 2004). My gatekeeper dependency was only for 
an introduction to the local people while the participant observation and interview procedures 
were generally done independently. However, some issues emerged with the gatekeepers when 
they interrupted interviews and discussion by irrelevant opinions. Such actions destroyed two 
interviews and I rescheduled those interviews later.In addition, another journalist gatekeeper 
demanded copies some interviews and images from Bangladeshi enclaves in India so that he 
could make news claiming he visited those enclaves. It was difficult convincing these people of 
the research ethics in an under-researched area.  
The worst clash happened on the Indian side during my second trip. The general secretary of an 
activist organisation IBEECC was one of my gatekeepers and I was closely following the events 
he ran on the Indian side. He asked support for doing a census on these enclaves to gain 
administrative attention what I agreed to do on the basis of complete anonymity.  Surprisingly I 
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found my name in the local and national newspapers, ‘A Bangladeshi research scholar from the 
UK’s Durham University, H.J. Sheuli, had demonstrated to the committee members how to 
enumerate the data for the census.’ (The telegraph, Calcutta, The Uttarbanga Sambad, March 
25, 2010). This caused a dubious situation for me that risked some interviews with Indian 
officials in Cooch Behar. The issue clouded my friendly relations with the gatekeeper. I 
declined a previously agreed interview as the interviewee had misused my opinion. The issue of 
positionality was reversed. I left India the next day considering the worst possible scenario of 
imprisonment or harassment doing research and getting involved with an activist movements on 
a tourist visa. I learned the researcher- gatekeeper relationship is unstable and friendship 
between researcher and respondent can not only improve the research but also complicate it, 
what Dowler (2001) describes as a ‘loss of detachment’.  
Over attention caused difficulties continuing my participant observation. Children and other 
curious people were following me around and I had to hide somewhere for while and then 
started working again (see fig.3.1). Methodological strategy such as dry season- biasn provided 
a partial view of the enclaves (Chambers, 1997). I preferred to work in winter to avoid the 
floods; such practical consideration limited my understanding of enclave life only to the dry 
season.  I decided the administrative site of the field site based on the number of enclaves and 
accessibility, and then did my pilot to choose the number of enclaves to be studied. Selection of 
the study district was based on the maximum number of enclaves and then pilot study led to 
some sites being ignored and unstudied. My preference to work only in Patgram did not provide 
the opportunity to study most interesting characteristics of the Dashiarchora enclave. This also 
indicates I may have missed some other fascinating insights of enclaves.  
 
 
Fig 3.1: The curious rally to see what I am doing. 
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3.7.2 Ethical Issues and Risk Considerations 
This study is conducted in accordance with the ethical principles set by the Geography 
Department, Durham University. All respondents are anonymous here and in some cases the 
name of the enclave is kept anonymous if the respondent so wished. The interviews were 
transcribed carefully to avoid any mediation while translating from Bengali to English and the 
transcripts were crosschecked by two bilingual colleagues. However, two issues were not 
strictly maintained according to the university ethics rules. Firstly, the ethics form demands 
written consent of the respondents which was not possible in such rural setting. People 
generally think signing a form is a massive important issue which makes them suspicious about 
the intention of the researcher as experienced Zaman and Nahar (2011). Therefore, only verbal 
consent was taken from the respondents.  
Secondly, I worked to some extent in disguise in one of my study areas in India. I always 
introduced myself and told my respondents the purpose and aim of this project to my interview 
participants. But I admit that I did omit information about my nationality in Kuchlibari, India. I 
explained everything but my nationality, they did not ask my nationality either and two local 
journalists accompanied me. Bangladesh and two Bangladeshi enclaves in India surround 
Kuchlibari. This village is connected with mainland India only through the time corridor. Heavy 
presence of the Indian border guard, continual surveillance through the patrol van in the village, 
and intense anti-Bangladeshi sentiment amongst the residents here made me concerned about 
conducting interviews. Researcher’s nationality status directly affects interview environment 
and communication if the interviewer and interviewee’s nation-states are in contentious 
relationship (Hubbell, 2003; Williams, 1964; Michalowski, 1996). Their view was needed to 
articulate the time-corridor and Dahagram-Angorpota’s connection with Bangladesh. My 
intention here is to explore how both sides think about each other and how did they feel when 
the time-corridor was open since two people were killed when they protested against the 
corridor.  
3.8 Some Important Considerations  
There are some important issues of this thesis that need clarification. Firstly, the most terrific 
examples of vulnerability presented in this thesis came from the enclaves located on the Indian 
side. This is neither because of any nationalistic bias nor because of the Bangladesh 
government’s sympathetic leverage to the Indian enclaves, rather it is Indian government’s strict 
measures against cross border movement and illegal infiltration. The Indian government have 
taken several initiatives to stop illegal immigration from Bangladesh; such as border fencing 
and round the clock border patrolling. In addition, the Indian government enacted laws and 
punishment procedures if caught under the Foreigner’s Act. Undeniably, the enclave residents 
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in Indian side are profoundly victimised by these procedures. Since Bangladesh disregards 
Bangladeshi citizens’ sufferings in India, I argue, the accountability equally lies with both the 
governments.  
Secondly, Dahagram & A enclaves are connected with the home country Bangladesh through an 
access corridor as discussed before. These enclaves have a different reality than the rest of the 
enclaves in the region. They are part of the Bangladeshi administration, connected with the 
home country, and unexchangable. Therefore, the general articulation of citizenship experiences 
in the enclaves, vulnerability and survival tactics will not include these two enclaves. These are 
not excluded from the enclave category because their connection with home country depends on 
day light and access to the home country was not trouble free. Although they do not rank as 
unadministered like other enclaves of the region, these two enclaves represent the shifting 
border through day time connection and night-time captivity.  
And finally, the pilot study in the counter-enclaves and discussions with the counter-enclave 
dwellers reveal that these enclave dwellers are slightly disadvantaged because of their 
geographic location; however they do not live in a non-citizenship status like the enclave 
residents on both sides of the border. They are generally treated as the citizens in the host 
country. Therefore, the counter-enclave matters are excluded in the empirical chapters.  
3.9 Conclusion 
Looking back to the methodological strategies adopted during the fieldwork, I feel the research 
needed a year long ethnography which could mediate the ‘locational biasness’ of this fieldwork 
and be able to provide a more detailed and deeper understanding of the enclave life located in 
Panchagarh, Bangladesh and Mekhliganj, India. Financial unaffordability and the three-years 
time frame of the PhD restricted such long fieldwork plan. That said, I would like to flag up 
some methodological lessons learned through this fieldwork. 
Firstly, gatekeeper, researcher and researched dynamics can significantly influence the whole 
research process. Based on the experiences of doing ethnography with and without a gate-
keeper, I believe gate-keeping, to some extent, is the sine qua non of gaining initial acceptance 
in a place where  people do not have any word synonymous to ‘research’; and people are 
extremely suspicious about a new-comer. However, it choosing the right gatekeeper and 
defining gate-keepers’ role(s) in the specific research context requires caution. Significantly, 
making friendship with gatekeepers while doing fieldwork can develop over expectation and 
conflict that can negatively affect the research. Secondly, positionality is not only created by 
researchers’ diverse identity or actions in the field but also created by the socio political realities 
in the field site. Most importantly, unanticipated incidents in the field site beyond researcher’s 
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involvement can position a researcher in an awkward situation and re-position her/him 
unwanted in the field site. Fieldwork does not always happen in opportune moment- time, space 
and shattering events are powerful positionality deciding factors.  
And, finally and most importantly, mental and methodological flexibility are crucial when doing 
ethnography on a sensitive matter in an unstable border zone where people are unaware of 
research. It needs continuous scrutiny over the continuously evolving issues over 
methodological choices, access options, gatekeeping dilemmas and balancing local politics. 
Methodological, theoretical and methodological flexibilities are essential alongside the 
flexibility to represent the study sites faithfully. I would like to conclude by saying that 
ethnographic approach enabled me to understand diverse but interlinked complex worlds, which 
my geographic imagination could not think of before entering into the field. Although I am from 
the global South my understanding of the everyday life in not-state places was limited and it 
was possible to enter into their world because of their willingness to educate me.  
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4 
From Citizenship to Abandonment: The Politics-Space-Law Nexus  
4.1 Introduction 
The cruel twist of my fate is that I am a Bangladeshi enclave resident, 
who for generations, has been placed in India. My inherited land 
record says it is a Bangladeshi territory and, by birth, I am 
Bangladeshi. I have never seen any Bangladeshi official coming to see 
this enclave or us in my 65 years of age. To live, I have to enter India 
but Indians call me foreigner and detention in jail is an obvious fate if 
any Indian police catch me. Once I could manage to go to mainland 
Bangladesh endangering my life to the Indian border security force’s 
hand but returned with huge frustrations, while Bangladeshis 
suspected me of being an Indian trespasser. We are nobody to them. I 
am an alien and stateless.  
(Ranbir Mandal, male enclave resident, aged 65, interviewed in a 
Bangladeshi enclave on 25 October 2009). 
Ranbir Mandal’s life story is not a unique experience. Rather it is a generic account of six 
decades of the protracted miseries of tens of thousands of enclave residents in India and 
Bangladesh. His story illustrates that the state abandoned citizens because of the enclaves’ trans-
territorial setting. In everyday life, negotiating territory means embodying a non-citizenship 
status. These residents enter the surrounding country for their economic survival and become 
victims of the sovereignty mechanisms (different forms of power/control and authority by the 
state) and law of the host state by being identified as ‘illegal intruders’. The story also suggests 
the exclusion of these scattered pieces of territories from the state apparatus leading to 
insecurity and vulnerably for the people embedded in those places. Therefore, the nexus of 
geographic isolation, legal actions and political procedures excluded Ranbir Mandal from his de 
jure and de facto citizenship.   
Citizenship is generally described as participation in and membership of a political unit or state 
along with rights and responsibilities (Delanty, 1997; Lister, 1998). However, citizenship in 
these enclaves is neither a status nor an advantage. Citizenship is officially authorised by the 
home state but never been actualised in these places. Consequently, the enclave dwellers are 
excluded from political participation, basic human rights and public services. In this context, 
everyday experience in the enclaves can be equated to non-citizenship, what I consider as 
abandonment in Agamben’s (1998) term; However there is an occasional connection with the 
state through a vague thread of citizenship in emergency depending on the involvement of both 
states. Rarely, some lucky enclave residents get their home country’s support during an extreme 
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tragedy such as natural hazard or risk to life like violent attacks. Arguably, such temporary 
shelter from the state can also be considered as humanitarian responses to refugees rather than 
the state’s responsibility to the citizens. (Non)citizenship experiences in this trans-territorial trap 
can provide a distinct relationship between citizenship and abandonment shaped by political, 
spatial and legal factors. (Non)citizenship in the enclaves is distinct for two reasons; firstly 
geography, in the form of trans-territoriality, makes citizenship inaccessible in the enclaves; and 
secondly, both legal and substantive rights of citizenship are missing because of other legal 
measures (visa, border control, ID card) and political abandonment.  
This chapter answers the first research question of the thesis by exploring the enclave-home 
country connection through the lens of citizenship and abandonment. It explores multiple 
overlapping interactions of PSL shaping and reshaping (non)citizenship in the enclaves by 
focusing on geography and law’s role in unmaking citizenship; politico-legal actions by the 
involved states establishing temporary emergency citizenship; and enclave folks’ political 
actions and citizenship aspirations using legal/illegal routes.  Here, spatio-legal issues do not 
obscure politics from the process of unmaking citizenship; rather they highlight stronger 
relationships between geography and law in constructing abandonment. Here, unmaking 
citizenship means the home country endorses enclave residents citizenship but never actualised 
it. Similarly, political and legal actions strongly contribute toward transient emergency 
citizenship. In doing so, the chapter aims at contributing to differential citizenship in practice 
debates by providing an account of the lived experience of (non)citizenship as the state-citizen 
connections are generally non-existent. This is because the home state abandons its citizens. On 
the other hand, very short-lived state-citizen connections are occasionally visible for some 
enclave dwellers. In other words, there are moments of citizenship in the general experience of 
abandonment. Citizenship as a framework of analysis falls short of describing Ranbir Mandal, 
and thousands of other enclave dwellers’ experience. Using Agamben’s (1998) 
conceptualisation of abandonment alongside citizenship is a useful framework to understand 
such complex experiences of abandonment, temporary emergency citizenship and citizenship 
aspirations. With the examples of the everyday lived experiences abandonment, temporary 
citizenship and citizenship aspirations in the enclaves, this chapter also calls for more work on 
the everyday practices and lived experiences of (non)citizenship in different places across the 
globe.   
This chapter begins with a concise discussion on the debates surrounding differential citizenship 
in practice. This discussion then moves onto the legal definition of citizen and citizenship 
provisions in India and Bangladesh and their impact on the enclaves. Section 4.4 illustrates the 
day-to-day experiences of abandonment without any citizenship rights in enclaves. It shows 
how spatio-legal factors constitute daily abandonment. Citizenship in emergency will be 
examined in section 4.5 to highlight how political relations between the concerned states offer 
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certain provisional citizenship rights to the enclaves. Section 4.6 deals with the enclaves’ 
residents citizenship aspirations by taking the legal/illegal routes. The conclusion, then, 
summarises the chapter.  
4.2 Differential Citizenship in Practice 
Citizenship debates critically engage citizenship as a concept and citizenship in practice. The 
meaning of citizenship is contested (Miller, 2000; Heater, 1999) and it is one of those slippery 
terms that means different things to different people (Lister, 1998). The conceptual aspects of 
citizenship explore whether it is a set of rights provided by the state (Marshall, 1950) or 
responsibilities to the state (Walzer, 1989; Etzioni, 1995). According to liberal perspective 
citizenship is both a status and a set of rights; as Oldfield (1990) uncovers that the rights based 
approach represents citizenship as a status and civic republican tradition portrays it as a practice. 
Such conceptual investigation is inadequate for understanding diverse citizenship practices and 
experiences across the globe. The citizenship in practice debates bring a wide range of 
citizenship practices in relation to the legal and illegal migrants and securitisation in Europe and 
North America (Benhabib, 2002; Muller, 2004; Walter, 2002; Walter, 2006; Coutin, 2010; 
Nyers, 2006; 2008); citizenship and indigenous rights (Yashar, 1998; Paterson & Sanders, 1998; 
Siddle, 2003; Davies, 2003; Castree, 2004; Walker, 2006); and transnationalism and citizenship 
in Europe (Delanty, 1997; Bader, 1997; Mitchell, 1997; Painter, 2002; Fox, 2005; Basniak, 
2003).  For the purpose of this chapter, I will focus on the debates on differential citizenship in 
practices. The ideal notion that citizenship grants equality amongst citizens of a political 
community is proved fallacious in practice as Derek Heater (1991:82) warns us ‘beneath this 
ideal lies a tangle of reservations and contradictions’. In this context, differential citizenship 
debates turn a critical gaze on the contradictions that create the enormous gaps between the 
ideal proposition of citizenship in theory and in practice. This scholarship shows varying 
degrees of exclusionary (unequal allocation of citizenship rights) and reductionist (lessening or 
revoking citizenship rights) forms of citizenship experienced in different times and spaces. 
Drawing on these debates, I argue that the experiences of enclave residents go beyond exclusion 
or reduction of rights because of the abandonment of citizenship. I show a dimension of (non) 
citizenship constructed by active and interrelated functioning of PSL.  
Scholarship on exclusionary citizenship highlights unequal rights in a multiplicity of identity 
lines. This includes, for example, issues as different as racialized residential urban segregation 
in the US violating the ‘equal opportunity to all citizens’ notion (Young, 1999) and the local 
legal complexities hindering national political schemes to promote lesbian and gay equality in 
the UK (Cooper, 2006). While Ruth Lister (1998) focuses on this critical gaze of social division 
and urban marginality, Delvin and Pothier (2006) vigorously put forward the concept of a 
‘regime of dis-citizenship’ for persons in disability when their equal citizenship rights are 
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partially manifested in institutional, social and economic hierarchy. The inequality of 
citizenship also exists in the realm of gendered relations, as feminists argue the voting right or 
some welfare provisions for women are insufficient for equality in citizenship (Einhorn, 1993; 
Staeheli, 1994; McEwan, 2005). Yet Carr, Brown, and Herbert (2009) remind us that the dual 
tendency of law produces spatially sorted urban exclusion to undesirable others and inclusion 
and protection of desirable elites. Using three case studies from Seattle, the authors show how 
the homeless, teens of colour, and prostitutes are excluded as urban ‘undesirables’ while the law 
protects the ‘properly-owning classes’.   
Above-mentioned case studies reveal a complex politico-legal and institutional maze 
constructing urban marginalisation and unequal citizenship because of people’s social class, 
race, gender, spatial identity, sexual orientation or disability. While these papers bring diverse 
case studies of exclusionary nature of citizenship, they make one common focus - the 
paradoxical use of law in a variety of identity lines. Such legal exclusions occur in everyday 
practices when these people enter in the public spaces. As Painter and Philo (1995: 116) 
powerfully put it: ‘these various human groups, to varying degrees in the intensity of their 
feelings so being compromised, unwanted and excluded, are nonetheless turned into less-than-
full-and-equal citizens of the places and societies in which they find themselves’. Such 
segregation creates claims on cities and also produces the political spaces of struggles (Holston 
&Appadurai, 1999; Holston, 1999; McFarlane, 2004). The exclusionary citizenship debates, 
however, fall short in providing insight on the abandonment of citizenship rights.  
The reductionist nature of citizenship debates concentrates on the politics of stripping 
citizenship rights in varied degrees (Benhabib, 2002; Nyers, 2006; Walter, 2002; Walter, 2006). 
Thus, citizenship is not a permanent status once granted. With the example of Yaser Esam 
Hamdi’s (so-called second American Taliban) release from detention in exchange for his 
volunteering to renounce American citizenship, Nyers (2006) shows that the acts of sovereignty 
enact and strip accidental birthright citizenship. Considering such temporary nature of 
membership in a state, he alludes that the distinction and hierarchy between essential and 
accidental birthright citizenship in relation to their dispensability. In Salter’s (2008: 377) words, 
“there are bureaucratic fig leaves which conceal the raw power of the sovereign to ‘denaturalise’ 
citizens”.  Besides, the irregular political practices by the state (irregular form of unmaking 
citizenship) take part in making and unmaking citizenship (Nyers, 2011). He makes a 
compelling analysis of irregular methods such as, blocking a citizen’s return to the country of 
citizenship or removing rights in the country where the citizen belongs. Neither dispensable nor 
irregular citizenship is a formal revocation of citizenship rather these are politico-legal acts to 
force birthright citizens to sacrifice their citizenship or the irregularisation of regular citizens. 
Yet, on another level, there are examples of a reinforcement of policies and laws to denaturalise 
birth right citizens in a heightened risk society context (Macklin, 2007; Rygiel, 2008). All these 
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examples are of a reductionist nature of citizenship leading to a spectrum of impermanent 
racialised citizenship on political grounds. However, a reverse example is reflected in Kawar’s 
(2010) piece. The paper shows native citizens are recast as aliens in the shadow of liberal law to 
provide the geopolitical interest of Israeli territorial expansionism in Jerusalem. Suffice to say 
that the reductionist nature of citizenship is an active and spectacular political project for 
formal/latent invalidation of some people’s right to citizenship.   
Unlike forceful political decisions to withdraw nonessential citizenship rights, the story of 
Ranbir Mandal epitomises that his citizenship rights were politically ignored while the state kept 
the enclave ungoverned. Such characteristics make it distinct from the reductionist category of 
citizenship. Ranbir Mandal’s experince also suggests it is not an exclusionary nature of 
citizenship. The non-existence of any citizenship rights for the enclave residents indicates the 
absence of citizenship rather than exclusion from some rights. In practice, the enclave dwellers’ 
citizenship is officially endorsed, rights are recognised but entitlements are not enforced. In this 
way, the enclave dwellers are abandoned. In the critical spaces beyond exclusionary and 
reductionist kinds of citizenship, the enclaves show a situation of abandonment while there are 
moments of citizenship. Although both the concepts exhibit completely reverse aspects of life, 
there is a relationship between them in the enclaves’ context what I am exploring in the 
following paragraphs. On a daily basis, the enclave dwellers experience non-citizenship; the 
formal and substantive citizenship does not apply in practice. Therefore, citizenship as a 
framework of analysis is not helpful to explain such experiences or dynamics of PSL interplay. 
Rather abandonment, in Agamben’s (1998) terms, is helpful to understand their day-to-day non-
citizenship.  
Agamben (1998) defines abandonment as an active relational process which eliminates a 
citizen’s political, legal and economic values. The process of abandonment keeps the territories 
out of the legal system and constructs bodies outside the protection of law. Although 
Agamben’s initial articulation of abandonment was in relation to the World War II 
concentration camps, the contemporary relevance of the technology of abandonment includes 
enemy combatants or refusal to extend legal rights to immigrants (Pratt; 2005; Agamben, 2005). 
In the context of the enclaves’, the home country acts as a sovereign power and abandons the 
enclave dwellers from all citizenship rights; however they are not legally excluded from the 
home country. Agamben specifies that the abandoned person remains in a relationship with the 
sovereign power in a form of included through exclusion. The enclave dwellers remain excluded 
through inclusion in relation to the home country, which will be deeply explored in the sixth 
chapter.  
While citizenship as a framework is not useful for exploring everyday non-citizenship, there are 
moments of citizenship in the form of emergency citizenship. There are certain circumstances, 
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linked to time and politics, when a transient form of citizenship opens an important facet of life 
to some enclave dwellers. Echoing Shapiro (2000), I consider that there is a critical relationship 
between the politics of citizenship and temporalities. Depending on the involved states’ political 
relationships, some enclave dwellers citizenship experiences change temporally. While this 
situates some people in a privileged position through construction of the politico-temporal 
subjectivity, other enclaves and enclave dwellers live in abandonment. In this consideration, the 
enclave dwellers live in different but overlapping temporal traces (Shapiro, 2000). It is worth 
noting that these are the splinter of political, social or legal rights. Occasional existence of few 
state services such as subsidised goods or right to vote is far degradation from exclusionary 
citizenship. While both the involved states gradually construct non-citizenship through 
abandonment and occasionally offer emergency citizenship, there are aspirations of citizenship 
in the enclaves.  
The enclave dwellers also try to change their non-citizenship in a reverse direction - from 
abandonment to citizenship. Recently, the enclave dwellers are raising their voices against non-
citizenship. They want early exchange of the enclaves so that they can merge with the host 
country.  Through acts such as raising the host country’s flag in the enclaves, taking the host 
country’s streets as a space for claiming citizenship and conducting hunger strikes for an early 
exchange of the enclaves, the enclave dwellers perform citizenship as Isin and Nielsen (2008) 
put forward in the book Acts of Citizenship. Isin (2008) interprets the act of citizenship is the 
way people endorse themselves in opposition to the alienating relationships in which they are 
caught. The central focus of the acts of citizenship is on the moments and acts that turn a 
subject, irrespective whether citizen or stranger, into a citizenship-claimant. The acts of 
citizenship follow three key principles; such as subject becomes activist citizen through scenes 
created; acts produce actors and acts of citizenship may not be founded in law (Isin, 2008: 38-
39). Citizenship aspirations in the enclaves are linked to all three characteristics of the acts of 
citizenship, which I will describe in this chapter.  In Painter and Philo’s words (1995: 117) 
spatial tactics such as occupying tiny spaces perhaps only for fleeting moment of time is a quite 
other kind of citizenship- ‘a citizenship of non-citizens’ can be fostered. To understand 
citizenship, the citizenship claims alongside the ‘despair over citizenship’s exclusions are 
necessary (Nyers, 2010). Such investigation provides an understanding of why and how 
citizenship struggles are produced and continued, as Holston and Appadurai (1999: 189) argue, 
through the lived space not only of citizenship’s uncertainties but also of its emergent forms. 
Considering emergency citizenship and act of citizenship (Isin, 2008) aspirations, the 
framework of citizenship is not dispensable all together. Certainly, the dimensions of 
abandonment, transient emergency citizenship and citizenship aspirations bring a complex 
theoretical puzzle, but such a complex puzzle operates in the lived experiences of the enclave 
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dwellers. All together, this reveals a multifaceted yet enduring relationship between 
abandonment and citizenship as will be illustrated in the following sections.  
4.3 Citizenship Provisions in India and Bangladesh 
This section focuses on the legal definition of citizenship and constitutional citizenship rights in 
India and Bangladesh to understand citizenship provisions in both the countries and their impact 
on the enclaves. The Indian Constitution endorses single citizenship provision by declaring 
‘none can hold Indian citizenship in conjunction with any other nationality or citizenship’(see 
section 09, Indian Citizenship Act, 1955). As a consequence, Indian enclave residents in 
Bangladesh will automatically lose Indian citizenship if they have the host country’s citizenship. 
Besides, legal definition of Indian citizenship is complex and is a combination of jus sanguinis 
(citizenship by inheritance) and jus soli (citizenship of land) (see Indian Citizenship Act, 1955; 
Indian Citizenship (Amendment) Act 2003). Yet it is related with additional factors being 
‘domiciled’ within the country (Gooneswkere, 1996); such as parent’s nationality and legal 
status in India, which complicate citizenship issues in the enclaves. Under the current law, 
someone born in India can be an Indian citizen if she/he was born before 1
st
 July, 1987; 
someone born between 1st July, 1987- 2
nd
 December, 2003 should have either of the parents as 
an Indian citizen; someone born since 3
rd
 December, 2003 should have either of the parents as 
Indian but other parents must not be an illegal immigrant (Indian Citizenship Act, 1955; Indian 
Citizenship (Amendment) Act 2003). According to this law, if any Indian enclave resident 
marries a Bangladeshi citizen and lives in the enclave, their children cannot be Indian citizens 
since one parent is an illegal immigrant. Similarly, Bangladeshi enclave residents marrying a 
mainland Indian citizen means their children are ineligible for Indian citizenship. In both 
instances, marital connection between the enclaves’ folks and the host country citizens risk their 
future generation’s citizenship and nationality. Citizenship law by birth in Bangladesh is 
primarily concerned with the person’s nativity in Bangladesh’s territory on or before 
independence and allows dual citizenship since 1980; therefore, legal definition of citizenship 
does not affect Bangladeshi enclave dwellers. 
The Indian and Bangladeshi constitutions enshrine citizenship rights to all but do not make it 
accessible in the enclaves. The preamble of the constitution of Bangladesh commits to 
guaranteeing economic, political, social and legal aspects of citizenship rights to all citizens. In 
a similar manner, the Indian constitution promises seven fundamental rights to the citizen; such 
as right to equality, right to freedom of speech, right to freedom of religion, rights to property, 
right against exploitation, cultural and educational rights and right to constitutional remedies. 
Besides the general promise of rights to equality, the constitutions declare no discrimination on 
the grounds of religion, race, cast, gender and place of birth and commit to improve 
disadvantaged citizens’ situations. Like many other modern states, the Indian and Bangladeshi 
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constitutions, thus, attach formal rights to their citizens and promise egalitarian society. In 
practice, Bangladesh and Indian governments have taken special arrangements on education, 
employment, and social facilities targeting disadvantaged groups and women. As a symbol of 
political belonging, both India and Bangladesh introduced national ID cards; and all the 
constitutional rights and special facilities to marginalised groups are conditioned with this card 
holding. Crucially, however, the ID card based citizenship construct the condition of 
(non)citizenship, which will be illustrated in the section. This is for the reason that the 
constitution and the citizenship policies are designed and evolved in a fashion of contiguous 
nation-state disregarding the existence of the enclaves. Therefore, every attempt that India or 
Bangladesh takes to unite their citizens yields a new form of exclusion to the enclaves and 
enclave dwellers.  
Contrary to the Indian and Bangladeshi constitutional promise of non-discrimination on 
citizen’s geographic belonging in any part of the state’s territory, citizenship has not been 
extended to these enclaves for more than six decades. The institutional dimension of making and 
doing of citizenship practices is missing in the enclaves since the home country is not governing 
these scattered territories. All these enclaves are administratively tied up with the district of 
Cooch Behar in India and the districts of Panchargh, Lalmonirhat and Kurigram in Bangladesh. 
A look on the official district maps of both the governments neither provides any clear and 
comprehensive identification of their own enclaves nor clarifies the territories out of their 
jurisdictions. Commonly, they are just omitted from the map (maps 4.1a-c). If any one comes to 
the local administrative authority on enclave matters, they open up their antique file of the 
enclaves and only recite the number and name of the enclaves under their jurisdictions along 
with few newspaper reports if any major incident has occurred so far. I was told there were 
administrative difficulties to ensure governance inside their enclaves because of the 
international border. However, there was an impression that all of their citizens (enclave 
residents) have already been converted to host countries citizen. This is not only a 
cartographical omission of the enclaves; this is the abandonment of the tens of thousands 
citizens citizenship status. 
There are inequalities in citizenship practices in India and Bangladesh. In reality, the 
constitutional declaration of equality is not adequate to bring equality in practice. As Rajan 
(2003) argues Indian constitutional equality provides the language for political demand, but the 
Indian state does discrimination by keeping various laws in place. On the other hand, there are 
examples of invisible citizens in Mumbai when urban slum-dwellers are victim of the politics of 
citizenship (Appadurai, 2002). Thus, the government discriminates against citizens with dubious 
commitments and controversial positions. In the context of Bangladesh, the constitution ensures 
equality only in public life, thus a gendered inequality exists in private life (Pereira, 2002) and 
the government violates the constitutional rights as the legal system provides uncertain recourse 
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to justice (Kabir, 2005). While these are examples of unequal citizenship and dual tendency of 
law, the enclaves suggest abandonment of citizenship for residents, on the grounds of their 
‘place of birth’ that is surprisingly unacknowledged in the citizenship literatures on India and 
Bangladesh. 
 
Map 4.1a: Map showing enclaves in India and Bangladesh (Source: Whyte, 2004) 
 
 
Map 4.1b: Official maps of the districts where enclaves are located in Bangladesh without any clear 
indication of the enclaves (Source:  http://www.dclalmonirhat.gov.bd/) 
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Map 4.1c: Official map of Cooch Behar and no indication of the enclaves except the Dahagram and 
Angorpota enclaves (Source: http://coochbehar.nic.in/htmfiles/nic_cob.html) 
4.4 Day-to-day Abandonment in the Enclaves 
This section focuses on the everyday construction of abandonment in the enclaves. In practice, 
national identity cards or passports legally construct the formal proof of belonging to the 
political community in India and Bangladesh. Almost none of the enclave residents have such 
documented belonging to the nation-state; thus they become the undocumented people of India 
and Bangladesh. Ali Hossain (aged 65), resident in Lotamari enclave, is completely 
disconnected from India despite his official status as an Indian citizen. The fenced international 
boundary and armed border forces restrict his mobility to India since he lacks proof of 
nationality. Every Indian is entitled to a ration card from his nearest administrative office upon 
completion of an application form accompanied by their birth certificate. This ration card is a 
prerequisite for a voter card, possession of a passport and all citizenship rights. The absence of 
formal administration in the enclaves deprives Ali Hussain of a birth certificate. Thereby, he is 
ineligible for an Indian ration and voter cards. He only holds land registration papers showing 
the land he owns is Indian but is inadequate to prove his membership in India and claiming his 
formal citizenship rights. Given this fact, Ali Hossain has never had the chance to cast his vote 
and he does not know when the election runs in West Bengal. Similar procedures exist in 
Bangladesh, the national identity card is the basic document confirming political belonging to 
the state. Ali Hussain’s story tells that the enclave residents are deprived from the basic 
principle of citizenship, i.e. the formulation of the political belonging to a nation-state. The 
interplay between citizenship technologies, geographic isolation, and the politics of turning a 
blind eye to enclave realities anonymised Ali Hussain from his rights to citizenship. Thus, the 
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home country abandons the enclave dwellers from any formal citizenship rights through the 
vicious circle of the bureaucratic processes.  
There are debates that substantive citizenship rights might be achievable without a formal status 
as citizen (Holston, 1999; Holston & Appadurai, 1996). On the contrary, the absence of formal 
citizenship endangers the possibilities of achieving any substantive rights to citizenship in the 
enclaves. Here, substantive citizenship means the enjoyment of the rights and obligations 
associated with the membership such as civil, social and economic rights. Civil rights include 
basic elements of the rule of law, equality before the law, freedom of speech, right to own 
property and right to justice. However, these civil rights are foreign to the enclave folks when 
there is no law-enforcing agency in the enclaves; as such reflected in Utpal Mandal’s 
provocative assertion when I asked him about the situation of rule of law in the enclaves,  
If any enclave resident kills another fellow, Indian police will not 
interfere in foreign affairs and Bangladesh police cannot or will not 
continue investigation across international border. If any Indian kills 
an enclave resident in the enclave or vice versa, Indian police have no 
authority to conduct a homicide investigation in this foreign territory. 
None from this enclave can cross the border to file a murder case in 
Bangladesh. Even if someone does, Bangladesh police cannot run a 
case against Indian citizen. By law, it is a law-free zone!   
Utpal Mandal’s (male enclave resident, aged 35, interviewed in a 
Bangladeshi enclave on 25 March 2010) 
Utpal Mandal’s insight about exteriority to the laws is a manifestation of a complex zone of 
legal decision-making leading to a (il) legal decision of abandoning enclavepeople’s civil rights. 
The situation precisely reflects Agamben’s (1998) conceptualisation of abandonment and 
lawlessness. Two legal regimes are entangled in the enclaves’ spaces and produce a ‘law-free’ 
or lawless zone. There were incidents of killing inside the enclave without making any police 
case. A former Member of Parliament explains such lawlessness as ‘rule of jungle’ while he 
tried to get the Indian government’s attention on enclave issue (Roy Pradhan, 1995). The 
absence of the rule of law for the enclaves creates risk to life, exposure to extortion and 
vulnerability to all kinds of exploitations. This contradicts article 31 and 32 of the Bangladesh 
constitution, which promises to protect citizens by the rule of law. In addition, this is the 
violation of the basic human rights. In such circumstances, freedom of speech is unimaginable 
and enclave residents generally grieve in silence. Unlike Dahrendorf’s (1988:37) 
acknowledgment that the most obvious weakness of civil rights is its serious inequalities of 
entitlement, Utpal Mondal’s assertion clearly indicate nonexistence of any entitlement to civil 
rights and vulnerability of lawlessness. 
The enclave dwellers are also deprived of social citizenship. Although the concept of social 
citizenship is materialised in welfare states, Bangladesh and India provide provisions for social 
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rights as mentioned in the last section. There are nationalised schools, public health services to 
all, benefits for people below the poverty line, free education, stipend to the poor elderly people, 
land to the landless people and so on. These are not available to enclave residents. Needless to 
mention, inequality among the social classes is highly noticeable in India and Bangladesh 
despite their constitutional assurances (Rajan, 2003; Kabir, 2005). Social rights are crucially 
resource dependent and the range and level of social rights are, in part, dependent upon the 
country’s economic growth; hence Both India and Bangladesh are far away from ensuring social 
equity. However, there are measures in place and marginal people have benefited from these 
measures. None of the enclaves are part of these measures to overcome their severe economic 
deprivation. Generally, enclave dwellers are well below the poverty line and a majority people 
are landless; thus they are eligible to have land under both the governments’ schemes. However, 
they are excluded from these policies and plans, as reflected in the below conversation with a 
Government official, who was involved with such scheme in Bangladesh,  
Q: Who receives the landless grant? 
A: We conduct household surveys in the second tier of administrative 
unit, Upazila, and select the landless people who are eligible for the 
scheme.  
Q: Do you consider enclave dwellers living in the Indian enclaves in 
Bangladesh? 
A: No. Why should we count the foreigners? It is a national scheme 
and counts only Bangladeshi citizens. 
Q: Have you counted the people living in the Bangladeshi enclaves in 
India who belong to this Upazila? 
A: No. We know nothing about those enclaves and no administrative 
connection has so far been established to resume such survey. They 
are not included too.  
(Anonymous, Government official, interviewed in Bangladesh on 20 
January 2010), 
Indian/Bangladeshi enclave residents are not only excluded from this survey but also excluded 
from all national measures to ensure social equity run by both the governments. It is surprising 
that the involved government officials in ‘social equality schemes’ are strictly vigilant 
eliminating ‘alien poor’ from the national schemes while such nationalistic feeling excludes 
their fellow citizens in enclaves, who are cut off from the mainland. Here, the government 
official brings the legal framework of citizen/foreigner binary to exclude enclave-foreigner from 
social citizenship. While he recognises the enclave-citizen’s social citizenship rights, those 
rights are ignored on a ground of spatial and administrative remoteness. Thus, law, institutional 
practices and geo-administrative remoteness construct abandonment complicating the 
inside/outside logic of citizenship. Consequently, these underprivileged enclave residents pay 
higher prices (sometimes two/three times higher) to collect subsidised necessary items from the 
local market. With no other alternatives, they work hard to survive. The rhetorical inclusion of 
the enclave-citizen and material exclusion to their social citizenship maps onto the abandonment 
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of citizenship under legal and quasi-legal framework. In Bosniak’s (2006) terms external 
spheres of the border and internal spheres of belonging arbitrarily produce ambiguity and alien. 
 
Fig 4.1a: An ordinary enclave resident’s house 
 
Fig 4.1b: Preparation for a dark night in an enclave. 
 
Fig 4.1c: A typical enclave road (left image); minimum standard of rural earthen roads in 
Bangladesh which is similar to India (right image). 
90 
Enclave residents are not only excluded from special government measures but also excluded 
from education and other basic services. Most of the enclave dwellers are farmers and day 
labourers and did not get the opportunity of education since there is no school in the enclaves. 
Few people manage to finish primary school in the host country. None of the enclaves has any 
medical services from their own country. Besides, enclave dwellers are cut off from any 
development works including road constructions (see figures 4.1a-c).  
Enclave residents are not only deprived from their due citizenship rights, they are victims of the 
natural hazards like flood and river bank erosion (figures 4.2a and 4.2b). Participant observation 
during the fieldwork revealed that the enclaves close to the river become victims of riverbank 
erosion. Many enclave residents become environmental refugees and internally migrated to 
other nearest enclaves. For example, half of the enclave Kismat Batrigach in India has been 
washed away by the river Singimari (fig 4.2a). Many people of this enclave have lost all of their 
agricultural lands and houses in the river and became landless. The enclave dwellers were 
claiming that the embankment in other side of the river makes the enclave more prone to the 
riverbank erosion. Similar type of riverbank erosion exists in the Bashkata enclave in 
Bangladesh. Twenty years ago, Prodip Podar was one of the wealthy enclave dwellers, in 
comparison to other enclave residents in Bashkata enclave, but the river has eaten into all his 
properties. The only resource he has now is the house, which is also under the threat of erosion 
(fig 4.2b). Flood irregularly affects these places; however the cold wave during winter makes 
the poor enclave residents very vulnerable since they not entitled to have winter clothes supplied 
by the government or NGOs. Enclave dwellers, in the study areas in both sides of the borders, 
were complaining that they never received any support from either country during such natural 
hazards.  
 
  
Fig 4.2a: River bank erosion and a collapsed mosque in Kismat Batrigach enclave (top); some of 
the residents of this enclave could still identify their previous houses were somewhere in the middle 
of the present river (bottom). 
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Fig 4.2b: River bank erosion at Bashkata enclave: the sandy bar was the house and agricultural 
land for one family at Bashkata enclave in Bangladesh (bottom); the displaced family is victim 
again in river bank erosion (top). 
This section shows how the enclave dwellers are downgraded from the citizenship to 
abandonment by the spatio-juridical logic of the home country. In general terms, the enclave 
residents are declared as the home country’s citizens without documenting their membership. In 
the age of ID card based citizenship, the politics of citizenship that makes identity disqualifies 
enclave residents from claiming their formal and substantive citizenship in the home country. 
On the other hand, citizenship is inaccessible in the enclaves because the geography of 
citizenship is not extended to these places. These twin legal paradoxes abandon the enclave 
people from any citizenship rights through the construction of exclusive inclusion.  However, 
the abandonment of citizenship illustrated in this section is not synonymous to bare life, in 
Agamben’s (1998, 2005) terms, rather it is the construction of a human condition when they are 
kept outside the law and other rights to citizenship. Bare life is constructed when these rightless 
bodies are included in the host country’s sovereign power, as will be articulated in a later part of 
this thesis (see chapter 6). In the following section I will concentrate on the temporality of 
citizenship/noncitizenship dynamics fashioned by bilateral politics and ambiguous application 
of the law.   
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4.5 Bilateral Politics, Legality and Transient Emergency Citizenship  
The twists and turns of India/Pakistan/Bangladesh relations are vigorously reflected in the 
borderland in terms of flexible/strict border control and handling of the enclave residents’ 
citizenship. There are moments when bilateral politics directly or passively provide certain 
aspects of citizenship rights to individual enclave residents or to an enclave. I define such 
occasional state-citizen relations as transient citizenship, which manifests the changing nature of 
citizenship rights over time. The Mashaldanga enclave in India intermittently becomes victim 
and beneficiary of the fluctuating bilateral relations and is an interesting example of the 
transient nature of citizenship in the enclaves. Because of this enclave’s proximity to the Indo-
Bangladesh border and home country (only forty-eight yards away from Bangladesh) the 
enclave residents are connected with the home country through formal and informal connections 
with the border guards and local administration. Since partition, India-Pakistan hostile relations 
and communal victimisation severely affected Mashaldanga. The leftist political groups in India 
torched the whole enclave in 1965 and forced all enclave residents to flee from India. Enclave 
residents took emergency exit to East Pakistan (Whyte, 2002). On the brink of India-Pakistan 
war, these enclave residents were considered as repatriates and received emergency shelter in 
refugee camps until the independence of Bangladesh (field note, 04 March 2010). Immediately 
after Bangladesh’s independence, Bangladesh and India commenced friendly relations through a 
friendship treaty concerning peace and security, and two trade agreements. During such friendly 
relations Bangladesh sent the refugee enclave residents back to the enclave. Participant 
observation with the Mashaldanga residents, some of whom took emergency shelter in 
Bangladesh, revealed that the Indian government financially supported enclave residents 
rebuilding their houses.  
The friendly relations between India and Bangladesh after Bangladesh’s independence provided 
an opportunity for the borderland people to cross the border freely, as articulated by almost all 
respondents in the study areas (see Van Schendel, 2005; Cons, 2012; and also see Junayed ali’s 
quote in chapter 5, section 5.3).  This open border provided an opportunity for Mashaldanga 
enclave establishing formal administrative connection with the home state. However, such 
administrative connection with the home country did not occur for any other enclaves in my 
study sites.  Hussain Member (aged 65) was elected as chairman in a Bangladeshi Word
6
 
election in 1973. Besides the best bilateral relations, close proximity to the border and Hussain 
Member’s personal connection with Bangladesh created such a unique case. Hussain Member 
administered a Bangladeshi Word staying in the enclave and brought subsidised government 
                                                             
6 Word is the lowest administrative unit in Bangladesh and the representatives are elected through election. South Mashaldanga enclave is part of the ‘Word 1’ in 
Kurigram district Bangladesh. 
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items into the enclave, being a public representative (Hussain Member, aged, 65, interviewed on 
05 March 2010). Hussain Member achieved his political rights to citizenship and brought some 
forms of formal and social rights to some other enclave residents in Moshaldanga. It is a 
remarkable case of trans-territorial administrative activities defying the legal norms of 
international mobility across the border. Neither country’s border guards obstructed them to run 
cross-border election campaigns, casting vote in Bangladesh and Hussain Member’s activity as 
elected member of Bangladeshi Word.  
On 15 August 1975, the assassination of the then President of Bangladesh and the protagonist of 
the Awami League (AL), Shekh Mujibur Rahman, in a military coup created hostile India-
Bangladesh relations. These big developments in the bilateral relations have had several local 
ramifications. The border became more heavily guarded and informal cross border connections 
were discontinued (Van Schendel, 2005). Consequently, Hussain Member failed to continue his 
political career and all the Mashaldanga people lost connection with the homeland. Hussain 
Member re-established the old connection with Bangladesh later and became chairman again; 
however it was not successful, as the border has never been so open as it was immediately after 
Bangladesh’s birth. The dynamics of border’s function filtering legal and illegal international 
mobility becomes ambiguous and politically instrumental in this case.  
Mashaldanga was re-attacked in May 2000 and people fled to Bangladesh following an incident 
of an inter-religious love story in a neighbouring Indian village. One Hindu woman and Muslim 
man got married and ran away from home. The rumour of their shelter in Mashaldanga triggered 
violent attacks. 50 Bangladeshi women were molested, 50 houses were burnt to ashes, over a 
hundred cows and goats were stolen and 15 people were injured by bullets (The Independent, 23 
May, 2000). This time more than 500 people took emergency refugee shelter in Bangladesh and 
that received wide media coverage in Bangladesh. These people were forcefully sent back home 
within two weeks although security concerns in the enclave remained unchanged. Hussain 
Member claims that the then Bangladesh government did not want to embarrass India 
immediately before the national election and abandoned them for the sake of good relations with 
India. The temporalities of transient citizenship in Mashaldanga are shaped and reshaped by the 
local influence of Indian and Bangladeshi foreign policy in which the politics border has had a 
signifier affect.   
Transient citizenship is also an instrument to embarrass neighbours in a hostile environment. 
India-Bangladesh relations reached a nadir, and diplomatic ties were discontinued immediately 
after 9/11 when the right wing parties formed governments in both the countries (Singh, 2009). 
During such difficult relations a judicial trial of a murder in a Bangladeshi court caused political 
tensions surrounding the Lotamari enclave. Bangladeshi police filed a homicide case against six 
Indian enclave dwellers for murdering a Bangladeshi national, Mir Ahmed, despite the 
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murdered man also being an enclave dweller. Ali Akbar claimed that he and other five enclave 
residents repeatedly informed the police that they are Indian enclave residents but the police 
transferred the case to the court (Ali Akbar, aged 27, interviewed in an Indian enclave on 15 
November, 2009). Seemingly, the local police filed the case based on a political motive. Ali 
Akbar along with five other enclave residents fled to India when they were on bail. He, then, 
appealed to local Indian administration asking, ‘Whether a Bangladeshi court could try on 
Indian citizen?’ Indian newspapers highlighted the issue as the Bangladeshi ruling party filed 
the case to harass Indian citizens (Uttarbanga Sangbad, 29 July, 2004). The case was finally 
withdrawn after the Indian local administration’s legal challenge to this judicial trial. While the 
media and administration stressed the illegal actions of Bangladesh to prosecute Indian citizens, 
there was no attempt to resume a homicide investigation from the Indian side. It is ambiguous 
whether Akbar Ali’s release from any homicide trial through a political passage rather than a 
legal process provided him civil rights, but the killed man was denied justice. This suggests the 
political use of the story in hostile relations rather than considering the safety of life of citizens. 
The story resonates with Utpal Mandal’s remark - ‘by law, we are in a law-free zone’. Such 
glimpses of citizenship did not reduce the lawlessness of abandonment in the enclave rather re-
established it as a law-free zone. 
On the contrary to the everyday (non)citizenship, geographic isolation and legal exclusion, 
transient citizenship signify political attention, geographic connection and legal inclusion 
through quasi-legal methods. Therefore, it provides valuable insights into the processes, 
practices and relations of the involved states constructing the temporalities of citizenship in the 
enclaves. The stories presented here suggest that transient citizenship is demonstrated as a short-
lived product of state politics and the dualism of law. Both the states define their citizenry as an 
asset and property (Nyers, 2011). Transient citizenship demonstrates that citizenship not only 
changes geographically but also temporally. It also hints that the temporalities of the 
experiences of abandonment and transient citizenship are politically constructed. In addition, the 
multiple functioning of the border in separating and uniting enclave people with their due rights 
reveals complicated geographies of the border.  
4.6 Political Struggles, Law and Citizenship Aspirations 
This section concentrates on the counter-acts of some enclave residents to reserve the 
experiences of abandonment. Since 2010 a new space of political struggles emerges in the 
enclaves demanding the host country’s citizenship under the leadership of an Indian civil 
society organisation, the India-Bangladesh Enclave Exchange Co-ordination Committee 
(IBEECC). Non-violent activities such as symbolic merger with host country, peaceful rally, 
demonstration, hunger strike and tactical use of law are the methods of claiming citizenship in 
the host country. In this context, the enclave and the host country are the sites of becoming 
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political. These political acts are, in effect, subverting the host country’s mundane sovereign 
measures and ignoring the home country’s sovereign authority over the enclaves. Although 
Holston (1999) considers collective actions make people claimants, the enclave residents are 
aware of their powerlessness and agency is essential for such actions. IBEECC speaks on behalf 
of the enclave residents, organizes events, manages finance and mobilizes enclave residents.  
The first phase of this political struggle makes a symbolic merger with the host country by 
flying the Indian flag in some Bangladeshi enclaves on the Republic day of India (see fig 4.3a); 
and by flying Bangladeshi flag in some Indian enclaves on the ‘International Mother Language 
Day’on 21 February7 (see fig 4.3b). Imran Mia (aged 45, field note, 03 March, 2010) explained 
their excitement, ‘we flew the Indian flag, sang Indian national anthem and declared ourselves 
Indian!” This is the moment when Imran Mia and other enclave residents became political. In 
Isin’s (2002) words, this is the moment when enclave residents became publicly capable of 
judging ‘just’ and ‘unjust’ and claimed their rights and identity. However, the incident was not 
newsworthy in either country’s national dailies and disappointed enclave residents and the 
IBEECC. While the first phase failed to bring success, The IBEECC took the struggle to the 
Indian mainland giving a new site of political engagement. It brought thousands of enclave 
dwellers in Cooch Behar district to a political gathering of the State Minister, Budhdha Dev. For 
the first time they walked to the town without hiding their identity. Although, it embarrassed the 
State Minister in front of the oppositions, IBEECC achieved advertising success. BJP criticised 
the State Minister by claiming that, ‘the Minister created overwhelming crowd with the 
admittance of Bangladeshi people’ (Uttarbanga Sambad, February 13, 2010). The remark stands 
for the sensitivity of the issue in Indian politics. The participant observation of another rally to 
the to the District Magistrate office (fig 4.4), Cooch Behar reveals that the majority of Indians 
on the street felt that the Indian streets do not belong to the enclave dwellers as one man said, 
‘Bangladeshi people rallying on Indian streets that is unacceptable’ (field note, 18 March, 
2010). Such intolerance also provides another line of sight. Remarkably, the security forces did 
not barricade the enclave residents’ illegal mobility to the town and allowed the undocumented 
foreigners to enter India. Thus, enclave residents are to some extent involved in political 
participation in the host country. With this they imposed themselves upon the political scene. 
Seemingly, claimant enclave residents are powerful than any other time, as they were not 
obstructed on their way to the Cooch Behar. The success of the second phase in political 
participation, IBEECC goes further to claim rights to the newborn baby’s birth certificate. The 
                                                             
7 The date represents the day in 1952 when students demonstrating for recognition of their language, Bangla, as one of the two national languages of the then 
Pakistan, were shot and killed by police in Dhaka. The UN declared the day as the International Mother Language Day in February 2000 to promote linguistic and 
cultural diversity and multilingualism
. 
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success of IBEECC’s radical but peaceful movement is their successful mission of achieving 
newborn enclave baby’s birth certificate. It does not indicate that a birth certificate equatesto 
citizenship but it is one step betterthan living like invisible human being. This act stands for 
rupture, or break the given orders and practices (Isin, 2008: 36).  
Besides the occasional taking to the street as site of claiming citizenship, IBEECC tactically 
uses legal grounds to stay visible in the media. It cleverly picked up Maimana Khatun, an Indian 
woman who married to an enclave resident and living in the Poaturkuthi enclave for last thirteen 
years, to contest a West Bengal election. She was chosen as she has the full legal rights to 
contest Indian national election (see Indian Citizenship Act, 2003); however practically women 
married to the enclave resident lose their citizenship rights. Her candidature in the election 
caused anxiety in the local administration and there was tendency not to let her go forward. On 
the other hand, the IBEECC declared, ‘We will not allow the polling officials to travel to 14 
polling booths of Dinhata constituency which are accessible only through this enclave’ 
(Uttarbanga Sambad, 26 March 2011). The Times of India highlighted the issue as the fight of 
the non-citizens, as residents of the Bangladeshi enclave nominated their own candidate from 
Dinhata constituency (Mandal, 2011). The ultimate target was to be visible through media 
coverage; it is a success in this regard, which brought many hidden truths in the fore and 
ultimately an embarrassment for the government.  
 
 
Fig 4.3a: Celebration of Indian Republic day in Bangladeshi enclave 
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Fig 4.3b: Celebration of International Mother Language Day in Indian enclave - Dashiarchora. 
The most successful political action was a month long ‘hunger strike until death’ in March 2012 
in both Indian and Bangladeshi enclaves. This hunger strike happened to mark sixty-five years 
of non-citizenship by the enclave residents who were aged over sixty-five. The IBEECC wanted 
to draw media, public and government attentions for an early exchange of the enclaves 
(Uttarbanga Sambad, March, 20, 2012). This headline-grabbing event earned Bangladeshi and 
Indian popular support on the cause when some hunger strikers were hospitalised in critical 
conditions (Daily Prothom Alo, March, 28, 2012). The strike was called off in Bangladesh side 
when the local MP promised initiatives on early exchange of the enclaves. Although, IBEECC 
failed to secure any promise from Indian state government, they secured wider support network 
involving other civil society organizations and opposition political parties. The political action 
of the hunger strike opened a window into the broader politicizing consequences by providing 
new pressure and campaign groups (McGregor, 2011). 
 
Fig 4.4: IBEECC’s rally to the District Magistrate office   
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Political resistance literatures consider political agency (McGregor, 2011; Nyers, 2008), modes 
of actions (Isin, 2008; Singers, 2008; Nyers, 2011); however, the subsistence factors and 
affordability to become political is an important factor in the enclaves. Although not everyone 
participated, some felt pressure to join in but were unable to for financial reasons. Most of the 
enclave people are extremely poor; they need to work every day to arrange their next meal. A 
daylong protest is an unaffordable luxury to many of the enclave residents. As a result most of 
the participants in IBEECC’s actions are elderly people who are retired from work. 
IBEECC’s activity is a rupture to alter enclave dwellers’ citizenship. There is a tendency to 
bring some form of substantive rights to citizenship without formal citizenship rights. What are 
impacts of these acts of citizenship aspirations? The first principle of the acts of citizenship is to 
interpret them through their consequences (Isin, 2008). Although the IBEECC’s actions were 
unable to make any tangible change in enclave residences’ (non)citizenship status, it has had 
some success. These new gestures, speeches, practices of defiance in host country’s soil give the 
voiceless people a voice to contradict oppression peacefully. Although their non-citizenship 
status is unchanged, it dissolved some neighborhood dominance and exploitation in their daily 
life. The main success of their activities is making these individuals politically active by 
providing them the consciousness and strength to become political subjects. Six decades of non-
citizenship motivated some of them to contest their ascribed citizenship and demanding a new 
citizenship. As Nyers (2008: 177) asserts in the context of the non-status migrants that the key 
impact of the acts of citizenship is ‘we are witnessing an interruption and transformation of the 
political’. Similarly, the enclave residents are emerging as claim-making political beings. By 
breaching the etiquette of power relations and breaking the silence and tolerances to ill 
treatment, these people carry the force of a symbolic protest against dominance. Claiming the 
host country’s streets demanding citizenship make them more visible than the actions within the 
enclaves. Now, the enclave residents have become visible citizenship claimants from invisible 
non-citizens through their own politics, tactical use of geography and legal/illegal actions.     
The second principle considers that the acts produce actors. While the motive (s) are important 
for the acts of citizenship, they should not be the exclusive concern (Isin, 2008). In the last 
sixty-five years, enclave residents filed deputations to the High Commissioners and local 
administrations for their citizenship. While the motive remains the same all along, the enclave 
residents changed the methods to achieve their demand. The new acts such as claiming the 
street, hunger strike, demanding birth certificates and symbolic merger with the host country 
make them actors. And, the third principle is that the acts of citizenship can consider practices 
those are founded in law and beyond the law. The majority of the acts of citizenship aspirations 
are illegitimate in nature; however some of them are legal actions such as Maimana Khatun’s 
election candidature. Significantly, these illegitimate actions put the law and applications of the 
law as power into question. 
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4.7 Conclusion 
All the empirical examples collectively bring a rich picture of the lived experiences in a 
conflation of abandonment and citizenship. Engaging with Agamben’s (1998) concept of 
abandonment alongside the citizenship literatures, this chapter portrays moments of citizenship 
in the zone of abandonment constructed by multiple interactions of politics, geography and law. 
Considered together, they show a complex and problematic notion where citizenship and 
abandonment do not belong in opposition but rather they are connected by the geographic 
reality and politicised and instrumental use of the juridical. Locating transient emergency 
citizenship and the act of citizenship in the spaces of abandonment, this chapter shows life 
within and beyond the abandonment. While the examples of three empirical sections bring 
diversity, they are also connected in the conflation of citizenship and abandonment.  
Beyond a framework of understanding citizenship-abandonment relations, each section 
separately contributes in the wider literatures. Firstly, the day-to-day abandonment section 
profoundly challenges citizenship as a framework of understanding some citizens’ experiences 
of abandonment. On a daily basis, enclave dwellers like Ali Hussain are undocumented in the 
home country, the enclave’s spaces are ‘law-free’ zones and people are deprived from all 
citizenship rights including the emergency supports during environmental disaster. In this 
consideration, I echo Lee and Pratt, (2012: 892) and Agamben (2005) who stand for ‘new 
political possibilities beyond citizenship’.  
Secondly, the transient citizenship section suggests the temporalities of locating and 
incorporating enclaves in the politics affecting their citizenship rights. Hence, differences of 
citizenship rights are not only made politically and geographically but also temporally. The 
changing nature of the Mashaldanga’s connections and disconnections with the home country in 
different times and in different political situations shows the importance of time in citizenship. 
It reflects how enclave life is shaped by the fluctuations of the involved states’ political 
relationship over time. Therefore, the politico-spatial-temporal aspect of citizenship needs to be 
explored for a deep understanding of citizenship. Thirdly, the citizenship aspirations in the 
enclaves not only show acts of citizenship by the non-citizens but also provide an example of 
resistance in a zone of abandonment. Refusing the home country’s citizenship, some enclave 
residents exhibit counter-abandonment strategies. Such resistance is neither widespread nor 
everyday individual phenomena; but they have some impact in their social life. And, finally I 
argue citizenship debates could be more diversified. As Hindess (2004: 305) warns, ‘academic 
writings on citizenship focus on developments in a small number of Western states given the 
weight of academic resources gathered together in these state’. Everyday lived experiences of 
non-citizenship in the complex terrain of the enclaves suggest that we need to widen the 
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consideration of the empirical study on everyday citizenship practices and experiences around 
the globe to extend and intensify the citizenship literatures.  
This chapter aimed to explore the lived experiences of citizenship in the enclaves to articulate 
the essential connections between the enclaves and home country. In addition to the everyday 
experiences of abandonment and (non)citizenship in the enclaves, this chapter shows the home 
country’s approach towards the enclaves. It reveals that the home country has a general 
disinterest governing some scattered parts of the country; the enclaves are only important when 
these enclaves have potential in bilateral politics; and the home country does not worry even if 
the enclave dwellers disputed the home country’s sovereignty over the enclaves. The enduring 
effects of (non)citizenship will be examined in the next chapter. It will explore the enclave 
residents’ everyday encounter with the host country through different layers of border.  
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5 
The Where of Border:   
Meanings of Borders in Everyday life: Enforcement and Encounter 
5.1 Introduction     
We live in a world of lines and compartments. We may not 
necessarily see the lines, but they order our daily life practices, 
strengthening our belonging to, and identity with, places and groups, 
while – at one and the same time- perpetuating and reperpetuating 
notions of difference and othering. (Newman, 2006: 143) 
The quote cited above sets out the scope of this chapter, along the lines of belonging and 
identity. David Newman (2006) stresses the powerful role of the border, a landscape which is 
constantly creating a sense of ‘inside’ and ‘outside’, ‘them’ and ‘us’. Newman’s (2006) quote is 
best reflected in the enclaves in India and Bangladesh where everyday life is fashioned by 
different geographies of border. The previous chapter articulated the roles of international 
border and politico-spatial-legality constructing non-citizenship and transient emergency 
citizenship in relation to the enclave-home country interactions. Non-citizenship forces them to 
enter into the host country’s territory for their everyday survival. However, different layers of 
surveillance measures, maintain the marked but unguarded physical border between an enclave 
and the host country, these enable the sharp distinctions between citizens and aliens. In addition, 
there is a continual production and reproduction of an imaginative boundary within which the 
social relations between enclave-host country people create a sense of exclusion. Donnan and 
Wilson (1999: 26) consider, ‘symbolic boundaries are no less ‘real’ for not being physically 
marked, since they are clearly real in their consequences’; they argue that cultural and symbolic 
boundaries do not necessarily connect with space. On the contrary, physical borders create a 
sense of aspatial boundary in the borderland community’s everyday practices in Bangladesh and 
India. In everyday social life, the enclave dwellers and the host country’s citizens construct a 
citizen/foreigner binary. Therefore, this aspatial border is linked to the spatial dimension of 
border and almost experienced at the micro scale such as at body level. 
The question of who does and who does not belong to a nation-state is filtered through the 
function of the border as a barrier. An enclave is the place where life is preoccupied with 
different forms of boundary, which involve physical, historical, legal and symbolic construction 
of boundary as barrier. For the enclave residents, the border is everywhere and, again, nowhere. 
Here, I am focusing on the where of border. And, how the border is created and maintained in 
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different processes either in a top-down or in bottom-up processes, as it requires considering the 
diverse factors that bring the border into being (Newman, 2003). This chapter aims to explore 
the production and reproduction of the border following the formation of the international 
border between India and Pakistan/Bangladesh. Here, I use the ‘boundaries as social processes 
of bordering’ approach introduced by Anssi Paasi (1996) and Salter’s (2008) performativity of 
border by the border guards. It enables seeing the border, in any form (spatial or aspatial), as 
enhancing or restricting the pursuit of a decent life in the enclaves. The meaning of boundary in 
the mundane activities of the state and enclave residents is a process through which border is 
constructed and the categories of difference or separation are created (Newman, 2006). In this 
study, the entire social, legal, spatial and political border have interconnected influences and 
have historical connections to the origin and actions on and around the border.  
 Only two adjoined enclaves, named Dahagram and Angorpota (D & A), remain within the orbit 
of their own home state through a passage named the Tin Bigha corridor (see chapter 1 and 
chapter 3). As part of the LBA-1974, Bangladesh retained permanent control of these two 
Berubari. Although the corridor gate is now open round-the-clock for Bangladeshi use from 9 
September 2012 (The Daily Star, 09 September 2011), this chapter highlights the period before 
2012 when the enclave dwellers were connected with Bangladesh through the Tin Bigha 
corridor. This connection was tied to the daylight. The corridor gate used to be open for 
Bangladeshis from 6 am-6pm (Indian time). It represents a shifting border between the enclave 
and mainland, but this is temporally experienced—twice a day while the passage functions as 
check point. As a result, enclave residents’ everyday life is intertwined with different forms of 
visible and invisible boundaries as they are ‘trapped by the lottery of their birth’ (Shachar, 2009: 
04), which precisely exemplifies Newman’s above quote. In this background, this chapter 
explores different geographies of boundaries encountered by the enclave residents in their day-
to-day survival; thus, it answers the third research question of the thesis. Different geographies 
of the border include different sites and spaces (India-Bangladesh border, enclave-host country 
border, corridor and shifting border, ID card check at different public places and borders in 
social life) where the borders are performed.   
This chapter is focused on how the legal matters between the host state-enclave through the lens 
of different layers of boundary affect enclave dwellers’ everyday lives (the third research 
question of the thesis). It seeks to understand how different types of border affect enclave 
people’s life and belongings. The question of legality and illegality for the enclave dwellers 
come up because of the presence of the international boundary, which ultimately contributes to 
the social construction of boundary amongst the enclave-mainland people. Everyday survival in 
the enclave involves crossing the international border to get into their home country. In contrast, 
both the states are trying to implement many securitisation measures to control cross border 
movements. Hence, I explore cross border movement (legal or illegal), social practices and state 
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policy. This research is unique in that it focuses on the lives within the enclaves. It contributes 
to the border literature by exploring the complicated, to some extent ambiguous and chaotic, 
bordering process in relation to the enclave residents’ everyday geography, which also 
illuminates the temporalities of the border. Other, contemporary studies on the border generally 
consider the process of constructing the border, which prioritises research on social construction 
of the border (see Van Houtum, 2000; Strüvera, 2002; Paasi & Prokkola, 2008). Such an 
approach has been rarely applied in enclave studies. This chapter begins with the literatures on 
the role of boundaries on frontier people, and then moves onto the impact of border security 
measures, both on the border and away from the border, in enclave residents’ life. The border is 
not only performed on the border or checkpoints; borders are encountered at different places 
through different government technologies such as citizenship ID cards, policing at stations and 
raids in public transport and so on. In the fourth part of the chapter, I will illustrate the role of 
the mental border between enclave residents and the host country’s people and construction of 
otherness. The fifth part will exclusively concentrate on the time border and corridor’s role in 
the D & A enclaves.  
Before I move onto the theoretical debates on boundaries, a very brief illustration of the history 
and geography of the ill-judged cartographic procedures to bisect Bengal would be useful in 
understanding the enduring role/consequences of partition in enclave life. In 1947, the end of 
British-Indian rule led to a division of India first and foremost on the basis of religion. The 
demand for Pakistan was the outcome of three factors such as continuing religious feuds, the 
uneven economic development providing some real basis for fears of ‘Hindu imperialism’, and 
disputes between the Congress and the Muslim League over power sharing in postcolonial India 
(Spate, 1948; Rashid, 1987; Roy, 1990; Gilmartin, 1998). The 3
rd
 June Plan, 1947 declared the 
dates of the hand over power to two separates states, and initiatives had been taken to determine 
their boundaries before the transfer of power to India and Pakistan. It provided an option for 
Bengal and Punjab to choose whether they wanted partition of their provinces. Almost all 
Hindus of the Bengal believed that only way to ensure the Hindu interest, culture, economy and 
glory was the creation of a separate homeland for the Bengal Hindus; and the representatives of 
the ‘Hindu majority districts’ had voted for religion-based segregation in Bengal (Tayeeb, 1966; 
Chatterji, 1999). Thus, the cultural boundary has a new consciousness of territorial nationalism 
based on religion. Although the materialization of such perception is strongly reflected in 
everyday social relations in the enclaves, the strongest manifestation of religion based territorial 
nationalism is evident in the D & A enclaves.  
The cartographic procedure to divide Bengal was an extraordinary venture or gamble for several 
reasons; firstly, it was an over ambitious plan to demarcate an almost 4000 km long border only 
within five weeks. Secondly, the criteria of the partition was decided as ‘religion and other 
factors’. Here, the ‘other factors’ criteria was vague and contributed to disputes over the 
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demand of territory within the members of the boundary commission leading to a boundary 
divided only by the chairman of the boundary commission (Johnson, 1951). Thirdly, Thana
8
 
was defined as the administrative unit on which the partition could be held but there was no 
consideration whether they had correct and clear Thana maps with the contemporary features. 
Finally, the most treacherous and inefficient method entailed that the whole demarcation of the 
Bengal border would be accomplished only on the basis of maps and without any verification 
on the ground. In addition, Radcliffe was ignorant about Bengal, and different studies of the 
partition show that Radcliffe did not have even any technical assistant who could help him with 
technical issues (see Spate, 1947; Chatterji, 1999; Chester, 2002; 2008). For example the 
technical issues required creating a border in an active delta where the river system is a vital 
factor (see Jones, 1945). As a result, disputes arose out of the interpretation and misinformation 
of the award, mapping errors, and leaving some places unmarked on the map (Ahmed, 1953; 
Chatterji, 1999; Van Schendel, 2005). The checkpoint section illuminates the political and 
social consequences of a dispute over Berubari as the Radcliffe award missed out determining 
the border at this point. The presence of political nominees came at the expense of the use of the 
necessary cartographic experts, but satisfied the demands of the Congress, the Muslim League 
and of course the British Government to have their own men on the commission. Indeed, it is 
not too much to say that technically the new boundary appears both curious and impracticable 
(Spate, 1948). 
5.2 The ‘Where’ of Border: Theoretical Considerations 
The study of the international boundary and their associated regions played a prominent role in 
political geography as it determines the spatial limit of the sovereignty of a nation-state—what 
Minghi (1963: 407) considered as ‘the most conspicuous political geographic phenomena’. 
Human factors are not only typically disregarded during the creation and demarcation of 
international borders but were also ignored in the early literatures on borders. Early political 
geography debates concentrated on either the binary of the ‘good’ or ‘bad’ border from a 
military perspective; natural vs. artificial borders performing the best barrier role in a peaceful 
manner; or border-related disputes and conflicts (Lyde, 1915; Holdich, 1916; Johnson, 1917; 
Boggs, 1941). This approach was more about the legal, political and historical developments of 
making and demarcating the border. Newman (2003) identified the classic approaches as static 
and deterministic as they limit the discussions only on the geographical and political 
construction of the border. Similarly, the functional approach to boundaries concentrates on the 
top down process of implementing political and cartographic decisions on borders but overlooks 
                                                             
8 The second lowest administrative unit, which were the smallest units defining criminal jurisdictions. 
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the borderlanders’ experiences. Notably, Prescott (1987) advanced the study of borders by 
providing a synopsis of the terminology of the boundary, border and frontier. Although Prescott 
advocates empirical work on individual borders, his work ignores the human experiences of 
living in the border zone like almost all other works at that time. The most significant 
development in this period is the consciousness for empirical studies of actual border questions 
and border landscapes. 
The contemporary post-modern turn to border studies introduced a focus on the local 
experiences of border. Anssi Passi’s (1996) Territories, Boundaries and Consciousness is a 
breakthrough in this consideration. He provides an excellent account of the changing nature of 
the Finnish-Russian border in combination with the elite construction and local experiences of 
the dynamics of border in multiple scales (regional, national and local). Paasi (1996) calls for 
significant attention to the meanings of boundaries in the construction, organisation and 
reproduction of social life. Paasi (1996: 24-25) argues that the idea of boundary cannot be 
comprehended by traditional political geography, rather it is a part of wider context of cultural 
geography as the meaning of boundary is also construction, organisation and production of 
social life. Thus, he argues that the study of international borders and nation-building processes 
is also the study of the construction of identity and nationalism. In this context, ‘borders are the 
very substance of nation-statehood’ (Sidaway, 2007: 170). ‘Borders were now seen as 
processes, practices, discourses, symbols institutions or networks through which power works’ 
(Passi, 2011: 62). In a similar fashion, Amante (2010) addresses the Portugese-Spanish border 
and defines that the border and cross-border relations persist as asymmetrical and cultural 
construction with the example of Portugese-Spanish border. While the state imposed a closed 
border, the local people created proximity and connections between themselves; local people 
constructed an imagined border while official discourse opted for an open border. This border 
brings a different bordering and reordering process from local consciousness and reflects that 
borders are a complicated social phenomenon related to the fundamental basis of the 
organisation of society and human psychology (Van Houtum & Struver, 2002; Kolossov, 2005). 
In Van Houtum & Struver’s (2002) words borders are both signifiers and signified. The socio-
territorial construction of the border approach considers that the boundary is the manifestation 
of physical control and social meaning; thus this approach considers border experiences in the 
local level connecting formal politics with the local socio-cultural politics. The importance of 
political boundaries in everyday life and role of the international border in the socio-territorial 
construction of identity and nationalism is a contemporary focus of boundary research in 
political geography. In this line of argument, Megoran (2012: 468) advances the ‘boundary as 
social processes’ by emphasising research on the biography of border in different scales and 
times as part of the nation-state formation. Megoran argues that a biography of border can be a 
valuable framework to understand how ‘international boundaries are both produced by and 
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produce social life’. Although the boundary as social process approach can offer an 
understanding of the complex process of border and bordering, it provides scant attention to 
everyday border-guards and border-crossers encounters at international borders. Therefore, it is 
imperative to consider the dynamic production and reproduction of boundaries through the lens 
of the performativity of the border alongside the consideration of bordering processes.  
A notion of border performativity can assist understanding everyday border guards’ and border 
crossers’ encounters. Nancy Wonders (2006) formulates her theoretical approach to ‘border 
performativity’. She argues that state attempts to choreograph the border only have an important 
effect when they are performed by the border force or encountered by the border crosser 
(Wonders, 2006). Thus, she considers the materiality of the border through actions on the 
border. Wonders’ (2006) formulation of the performativity of border has three characteristics; 
firstly border performances can take place anywhere in the nation-state’s territory such as the 
geographic line of the border, airport, stations, workplace raids and so on. With such a 
consideration, Wonders argues that the border is everywhere. Secondly, border performances 
are embodied given that the border crosser’s body is subject to border enforcement. Finally, 
border performance is connected to the identity of the border agent and border crosser that is 
shaped by gender, class and race relations. Wonders’ formulation takes border experience and 
enforcement to the smallest scale such of the body; and emphasises the importance of identity in 
relation to border performance. While Wonders ignores the moment of border performance and 
decision making procedure, Salter (2008) addresses that gap. Following Butler’s performativity 
of identity and Wonders’ performativity of the border, Salter (2008) adopts performativity of 
the border to argue that the border is the permanent space of exception.  
The border is preformed via various state actors’ activities to define citizen and alien and border 
agents have the irreducible power of the sovereign to ban the traveller during the time of border 
crossing. On sites of the border, sovereignty is performed through languages and documents. 
Drawing from Agamben, he argues that the exception occurs only when the power to 
admit/exclude is exercised. As he comments, in relation to ‘all who cross frontier pass through 
this biopolitical filter: the moment of decision’ (Salter, 2008: 371). Although Salter (2008) uses 
embodied performance of the border, he disagrees with the claim that the border is everywhere; 
rather he argues that border functions occur only at specific sites. I argue that border 
performativity can occur anywhere, and performativity of the border is also socially constructed 
and it does not always follow legal regulations. The border functions of any desired entry and 
undesired exclusion occur in any place for the enclave resident, which will be illustrated in the 
next section.  
Using Anssi Paasi’s (1996) conceptualisation of the border as a socio-cultural process and 
Salter’s (2008) performativity of the border, this chapter explores the where of the border in 
 107 
relation to the enclave residents daily experiences. In doing so, this chapter reveals complex 
relations between border securitisation, the socio-political-cultural manifestation of border, and 
ambiguity and illegality leading to a chaotic geography of the border. In this liminal zone the 
border is always performed, negotiated and constructed at the body level. I am interested to see 
how the international border is performed both physically and symbolically on the smallest of 
scales. Political decisions on the border shape spatial reality and social relations; therefore 
research on the temporalities of the border can contribute towards an understanding of the 
political geography of the border dynamics or socio-spatial mobility of border.  
5.3 Border Performativity on and Beyond the Bengal Border 
This section explores the performativity of the international border as a stumbling block 
restricting enclave residents’ movement across the host country’s territory. To understand the 
enclave-host country interactions, it is important to see how the border is performed by the host 
state. This discussion will include technologies and surveillance measures to curb enclave 
residents’ illegal entrance in the host country’s interior. Such measures, in effect, perform a 
mobile border through ID card technology to encounter unauthorised aliens who dodge the 
international border. As mentioned in the introductory chapter, the enclave residents enclaves 
did not realise their fate until they started working with the administrative procedures in post-
colonial India and Pakistan in 1950. Because of hostile India-Pakistan/Bangladesh relations, the 
India-Pakistan/Bangladesh border is experienced stringently, affecting everyday borderlanders’ 
communications. People living in the borderland had no sense of international borders as they 
had never experienced this phenomenon before; and they did not understand that visiting friends 
and neighbours and relatives were crossing the border (see Chatterji, 1999; Van Schendel, 
2002a; 2005; Roy, 2006). However, such guarding was not in place all through the border, and a 
large portion of the border was unguarded (Van Schendel, 2002a). Gradually the borderland 
folks, including the enclave dwellers, learned that the new border often meant miserable 
suffering such as imprisonment after introduction of the passport and visa in 1952. The policing 
activities of border guards to keep the illegal movement minimal are always challenged by local 
borderlanders (either mainland people or enclave residents) and cross border smugglers. On the 
other hand, the enclave-host country border does not work strictly as a functioning border as 
this is an unguarded border. 
As illustrated in the previous chapter, enclave residents are cut off from the home country 
because of the India-Bangladesh border and they live without citizenship rights. There is no 
legal procedure to cross the India-Bangladesh border for their everyday survival but they 
manage, informally, to cross the border in cases of emergency such as land registration. People 
in the enclaves have been dealing with this Indo-Bangladesh border for the last six decades in 
different circumstances. Junayed Ali mentions his experience of this border,  
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An incredibly erratic border- friendly and deadly! It was deadly 
when Pakistani forces never allowed us to enter Pakistan and 
always told us we were the foe’s spy. We were treated as caged 
enemy during the time of India-Pakistan war. After Bangladesh’s 
birth, it felt heavenly. The border was completely open and everyone 
could visit and shop Indian and Bangladeshi markets like our own 
village market. It was similar as our pre-partition time. Since the 
assassination of Sheikh Mujib in 1975, it depends on who is in the 
government and who is on the border (border guard). If you and the 
border guard are Bengali and belong to the same religious faith, you 
can manage a way to cross the border. Now, we the enclave 
residents do not try to cross the border as nobody is waiting for us in 
my home country; and such intention is considered as pro-
Bangladeshi/Indian in the host country. We try to show that we are 
loyal to the host country. 
 (male enclave resident, aged, 85, interviewed in an Indian enclave, 
20 December 2009) 
Junayed Ali’s long experience shows how the elite construction of the hostile bilateral relations 
was reflected on the border zone and portrays the temporalities of the performativity of this 
border as barrier and cooperation. Significantly, however, it is an illustration of how the border 
is performed based on cultural identity and negotiations between individual border guards and 
border crossers. On the other hand, Junayed reflects on the imaginative construction of the 
boundary between the home country and enclave residents because of distance and 
inaccessibility. As such, some enclave residents do not consider it valuable to risk their lives 
and cross the international border as nobody in the home country really cares about them. 
Enclave-dwellers’ only connection with the home country is land registration. They bring their 
land documents and sellers generally cross the border informally with the permission of the 
border guards.  
The example below also demonstrates the performativity of the border is based on cultural 
identity. Mustak Ahmed (male enclave resident, aged 40, interviewed in an Indian enclave on 
15 January 2009) went to seek the border guard’s permission to go to India but his attempt was 
unsuccessful because of Mustak’s Islamic appearance. He mentions, ‘Seeing my beard and 
Islamic hat, the border guard didn’t allow me to enter India and asked, “Are you Bin Laden’s 
brother?”’ Post–9/11 popular anxiety about Muslims is also reflected here on the Bengal 
borderland. Such a framing of identity reflects David Newman’s (2010: 775) view that ‘crossing 
physical borders may result in the constructions of a whole new series of borders’. The border 
agent’s imaginative construction of the Indian Muslim enclave dweller’s identity as a terrorist 
and refusal of Mushtak’s entrance to India demonstrates the border agent’s power to deny 
Mushtak’s rights to visit the home country. It hints at the border guard’s personal anxiety and 
prejudice over Muslims and shapes his border performativity by dividing ‘one of us’ and ‘alien 
other’.  
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The physical border often perform as an iron wall if enclave residents attempt to cross the land-
holding boundary and try to buy the host country’s national identity. Generally, the enclave-
mainland border is a passive border in Bangladesh; and enclave residents’ mobility is not 
restricted but they never receive any state facilities. However, the border is still performing if 
there is an endeavour to produce the host country’s national identity. Consider a story of one 
Indian enclave dweller in Bangladesh. His father was Bangladeshi but bought land in the 
enclave, as it was very cheap. Since 1953, they were living in the enclave. During 2007-8 the 
Bangladesh government introduced a national ID card and made a Bangladeshi address a 
reference to confirm nationality. This man bought a tiny piece of land and tried to build a house 
just by the enclave-Bangladesh border. His attempt was foiled by the BDR on the grounds that 
Indians cannot build houses in Bangladesh (see fig 5.1 below). Therefore, an original 
Bangladeshi citizen actually lost his citizenship as he settled down in an Indian enclave. Such 
landholding changed his original belonging to a nation and produced a new boundary line. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 5.1: An unsuccessful attempt of an Indian enclave dweller’s land holdings in Bangladesh to get 
Bangladeshi national card. 
 
The technologies of governmentalitiy such as national ID cards, police verification prior to 
employment confirmation and other measures, practically perform the role of physical border 
across the country. Such new technologies provide a sense of mobile borders. In this context, 
the citizenship ID card is a technology to segregate and identify the ‘foreigner other’. As Agnew 
(2008) points out those bordering practices are much more widely diffused geographically. The 
Latamari enclave 
Bangladesh 
Indian enclave dweller’s 
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whole national territory is turning into a border zone through enhanced ID-checks. Although 
Bangladesh has introduced similar ID card citizenship, the surveillance mechanism is much 
more effective in India this captures illegal immigrants. Such surveillance mechanisms make 
the Bangladeshi enclave residents life miserable in India—the story below clearly elucidate this 
claim. Nurul Huda, a Bangladeshi enclave dweller, uses a metaphor of football to state his status 
quo with which both Bangladesh and India are playing a match. He explains his sufferings as 
below: 
Police caught me in an Indian bazzar (local market) at Cooch Behar 
and asked to show my voter card. I said I don’t have voter card 
because I live in a Bangladeshi enclave. So you are a Bangladeshi? 
He replied. Yes, but this place is inside India. The police replied, 
‘Are you joking with me? There is no such place. You are from 
Bangladesh’. I was, then, taken to the police station where I tried to 
explain the matter but none did listen to me. I was sentenced for six 
months imprisonment under the foreigner’s act. Once I finished my 
term in jail, the BSF took me to the border and handed over to the 
BDR. Then, the BDR suspected me an Indian and put me in their jail 
while I was unable to show any proof of my Bangladeshi identity. By 
this time, my brother requested to a BSF officer to let him cross the 
border to release me. It was granted after a while. My brother 
brought the land registration documents to Bangladesh police upon 
which I was released. Then, we came home with the support of a 
broker who knows the safe time and route to avoid border force’s 
scrutiny. I was lucky that BSF could not catch me again.  
(male enclave resident, aged 45, interviewed in a Bangladeshi 
enclave on 20 March 2010). 
This powerful story illuminates several themes such as technical nationality barrier and 
construction of identity as illegal immigrant, statelessness, legality-illegality and strong border 
control. Indian law to the foreigners clearly draws incisive boundaries between citizen and 
foreigner. The Foreigners Act 1946 defines a foreigner as a person who is not a citizen of India. 
Thus, Bangladeshi enclave dwellers are unauthorised foreigners when they trespass into India 
from their enclave and get imprisoned under the above-mentioned act. This Act is 
unsympathetic to Bangadeshi enclave dwellers who are unable to survive without entering India 
for everyday needs. Nurul’s imprisonment in both of the countries unfolds the fact that he is 
stateless and vulnerable. While his imprisonment in India was done under legal grounds, his 
push back to Bangladesh was illegal. He should have the right to go back to his home inside the 
enclave. Indian border guards’ permission and BDR’s no objection to his brother’s informal 
border crossing was also illegal. Thus, the story illustrates the framing or political construction 
of the enclave residents’ identity as illegal immigrants. Furthermore, it explains how ignorant 
border guards can be about the political landscape in frontier zone. The incident tells how a 
border can be ever-present in a state’s territory and also reflects Van Schendel’s (2005: 194) 
characterisation of the border security in India-Bangladesh as ‘haphazard control over 
movement across the border’. Therefore, the border performed as a line beyond accountability 
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from macro to micro level. Such construction of the border as being beyond accountability 
connects to Said’s (1978: 27) quote that, the life of an Arab Palestinian in the West, particularly 
in America, is considered as politically nonexistent, and when it is allowed that he does, it is 
either as nuisance or as an Oriental. Similarly, Nurul was not qualified as rightful political being 
on either side of the border as a citizen; however he was recognised and represented as a 
dangerous political body. He is subject to law but not entitled to be a claimant for legal aid; 
therefore he is reduced to a different dimension of a political being who is exposed to violence. 
Location of some of the enclaves interrupts India’s border fencing project at some segments of 
the border. Some enclaves are very close to the zero line of the border, they create legal 
compulsion not to erect fence in those segments of the border. According to the boundary 
guideline, a border fence should not be built within 150 yards of the zero line or in no man’s 
land (Joint India-Bangladesh Guidelines for Border Authorities, 1975). India constructed the 
fence leaving 150 yards clearance in most places. However, the existence of a Bangladeshi 
enclave close to 150 yards of zero line means India cannot build a fence at that point on a legal 
ground. Bangladesh oppose fencing in no man’s land which create tensions at the local level, 
where both border guards sometimes exchange fire on the erection of fences in the NML (see 
Van Schendel, 2005). In my study sites, three enclaves created unfenced segments of the border. 
Such unfenced parts of the border cause trouble for the enclave residents and other borderland 
people as the border guards shoot at the unauthorised intruders. The security alert is very high in 
these spots and borderland people generally do not go out at night. Specifically the enclave 
dwellers come back home early to avoid ID checks. During my fieldwork in one of these three 
enclaves, one Bangladeshi was killed in the photographed area (see fig 5.2 below). The border 
guards have the power to kill people defying international law. As Jones (2009: 887) mentions, 
‘because the border guards are able to act without substantial oversight from other government 
officials or police, the borderlands become a zone where their decisions are the only things that 
matter’.  The border guards are more powerful in these segments and can decide life and death 
of the individual body that tries to cross it, reflecting Salter’s (2008) argument that the border is 
the permanent space of exception.   
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Fig 5.2: Bangladeshi enclave and Indian border fencing project: All of these images were taken from the same place facing towards India from the main border pillar. The left image shows the pause of border fence because of Bangladeshi 
enclave’s existence very close to 150 yards of the zero line. The middle image shows the border pillar and the closeness of the same enclave to the border. The dotted line shows the enclave-India border. 
Border fence 
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This section has shown diverse dimensions of the performativity of the border. The 
performative character of the border is exemplified through control strategies which are not 
fixed, illegal in some cases, negotiable and vary on a case-by-case basis. This section strongly 
articulates that the borders are performed as embodied activities shaped by status, religion, 
relationships, negotiation, power and corruption. Thus, performativity of border by the border 
guards is also linked to the socio-cultural process of border and bordering. Similar to Salter’s 
(2008) argument, it is the border agent who decides the life or death at some points of this 
border. Thus, border guards are the ‘agents of exception’ (Jones, 2009: 887) who have power 
over the border-crossers’ bodies and this border is the space of exception. The examples suggest 
that the border is not only performed in certain sites but also that it is everywhere.  
5.4 Social construction of Borders between the Enclave and Host Country 
A physical boundary not only marks people’s political identity and national belonging but also 
is intrinsically linked with the social construction of border in the frontier area. Such a boundary 
always encloses tensions, exclusions and exploitations in everyday negotiations between the 
enclave dwellers and the host country’s citizens. The abstract boundaries between enclave 
residents and mainland people are linked to the previous historical communal tensions, religion 
based partition, the social construction of otherness and nationalist media attentions. Politically 
tailored, ‘religion based division’, pushed many borderland people to move out from the state 
where they would be a minority, thus indirectly forcing them to become refugees. The riots that 
followed 1947–48 left more than a million people dead in six months and displaced more than 
15 million people (Kumar, 1997). Sporadic communal violence, the loss of socio-economic 
status by the upper-cast Hindus and the anticipation of a better economic situation (West Bengal 
was the industrial centre for undivided Bengal) were the central reasons for those massive 
displacements (Haque, 1995; Chatterji, 2007). The religious based partition in 1947 is still alive 
in people’s minds in the study sites on both sides of the border. There is a tendency amongst the 
borderlanders in the field sites, irrespective citizens or enclave dwellers, to think that India is for 
Hindus and Pakistan/Bangladesh is the place for Muslims. In addition, the old uneasy relations 
between Hindus and Muslims are still in people’s memory and actions. The majority of the 
current Indian enclave residents in Bangladesh are from Cooch Behar who came here by 
exchanging their Indian land with the Hindus in the enclaves. Such exchange started soon after 
the partition and still continues irregularly. All these events created hatred and strained relations 
between these two religious groups significantly contribute constructing the imagined boundary 
in social relations.  
Kamrul Islam was born in an Indian village Panishala twenty miles away from the enclave 
Bashkata. There were indiscriminate communal killings in his neighbourhood and many 
Muslims fled from Cooch Behar with the fear of being killed. Kamrul found the Hindu 
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refugees, who were uprooted from Bangladesh, were more aggressive than the rest of his Hindu 
neighbours. Finally, Kamrul Islam left Cooch Behar and settled down in Bashkata enclave as a 
Muslim country surrounds it. Using his religious identity, Kamrul managed good relations with 
the host country’s neighbours. Now, he is one of the leading men who assist the host country’s 
political leaders to cause troubles to the Hindu enclave fellows such as complaining about their 
fake ID cards or stealing cattle or intimidating the Hindus to leave the enclave. The Hindu 
respondents in the study sites in Bangladesh and two respondents who fled from Indian enclaves 
to India describe that many Hindu enclave residents moved to India abandoning their property 
and some others sold their land at low prices to the host country’s political leaders. Intimidation 
by the Muslims and fear of being killed in a riot are two factors for the Hindus to leave the 
enclaves. Such religious hatred and political advantage reduce enclave-host country ‘otherness’ 
for some enclave dwellers like Kamrul Islam what Van Schendel (2002) aptly defines as ‘proxy 
citizenship’. It is a general practice in both sides of the border. Muslim enclave residents in 
India and Hindu enclave residents in Bangladesh are victims of old religious hostility that is 
now linked with politics and financial benefits. Such construction of otherness begins in the 
enclave and experienced in everyday movements in the host country. The role of the history of 
communal clashes plays an important role in this context. This construction of an abstract or 
mental boundary, to some extent, is the impact of the political border and institutional practice 
of border to keep enclave residents as people beyond accountability. 
Another important reason to leave the enclaves was to think that ‘India is for the Hindus and 
Bangla (Bangladesh) for the Muslims’. This is not a quote from an individual rather a 
summation of what was repeatedly stated during my participant observations and interviews 
(enclave dwellers and citizens) in the field sites. For example, Shirish Bormon was preparing to 
leave the enclave Bashkata when he heard that the governments are keen to exchange the 
enclaves by 2011. Kanti Bormon reflects, ‘it is not always the violent intimidation that forces us 
to move to India. India is the tirthovumi (sacred place) for the Hindus – this is why the partition 
occurred. This is why the Hindus move to India and Muslims to Bangla. We all want to find our 
true place’ (aged 45, interviewed on 05 February 2010) This signifies how important religious 
identity is for the construction of nation-ness and boundaries in these places, as Paasi (1996: 
192) reminds us that religion is a significant factor constructing socio-spatial distinctions and 
boundaries.   
Social construction of the enclave-host country border is also visible in the context of religious 
sameness. For example, all residents in Gobrachora enclave in India are Hindus; however 
informal group discussions with the enclave residents during the pilot study reveal that these 
enclave’s residents are extremely vulnerable to robbery and exploitative behaviours of the 
neighbours such as taking pets away, threats to kill and so on. Anthony Cohen (1985) argues 
that the symbolisation of boundary is a particular kind of awareness or consciousness that the 
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groups have for them in relation to the other groups. After partition, self-identification became a 
strategic dilemma. The more enclave people identified as citizens, the more they distanced 
themselves from their neighbours and relatives outside the enclave (Van Schendel, 2002). The 
following example illustrates how the host country’s citizens identify the enclave dwellers. I 
was looking for my gatekeeper’s house and he informed me that it was by a primary school. He 
never mentioned whether he lived inside or outside the enclave. I saw a small tea stall and asked 
the man (field note, 05 January 2010), 
Q: ‘Do you know Mr. Golum Mustafa? He teaches in the nearby 
college. 
A: Yamm..No, I cannot recognise Mustafa in my neighbourhood. Do 
you know his father’s name? 
Q: Yes, Naosher Munshi is his father. 
A: O... yes....Mustafa. I know him but he does not live here, he lives in 
the chhit (enclave)!’ 
 
The tea stall was less than 100 meters from Gulam Mustafa’s house; such distance is obviously 
part of a para (neighbourhood) in rural Bangladesh. Generally, the host country’s citizens do 
not consider enclave dwellers as neighbours rather they call them as ‘chhiter lok’ (enclave 
people) as the quote notes. The political boundary line between the enclave-host country also 
produces social boundaries and construct enclave dwellers’ identities as an ‘alien other’. This is 
an example of the ‘social construction of reality’ (Paasi, 1991: 240). Such mental borders oblige 
them to belong in a precarious space as ‘enclave people’. In this disjuncture, it was not 
surprising that they developed a different way of thinking about themselves as enclave people. 
The border does not only refer to the politico-geographical line but it is widely experienced and 
practised in everyday social practices. If borders are not natural, they become what people want 
them to make; some make more borders and others less. It is a matter of making other, creating 
distance (Hannrez, 1997).  
Now I will move onto how the enclaves are represented in some published work from border 
guards (see Chowdhury, 2003; Jamwal, 2004) and local researchers (Das, 1992; Chaki, 2007; 
2009). This will include border officials views on enclaves reflected in the interviews during my 
field research. There are some inaccurate and negative representations of the enclaves 
specifically from the border guards’ views. For example, the official view is that the border 
guards never enter the enclaves, as it is foreign sovereign, and the enclaves are the breeding 
grounds for criminals and terrorists (Kar, 1997; Chowdhury, 2003; Jamwal, 2004). In addition, 
Jamwal (2004), as quoted earlier in chapter 2 (see section 2.3), claims that Bangladeshi 
smugglers occupy Indian enclaves, and all Indian enclave dwellers have moved to India. Both 
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are incorrect claims, as the empirical chapters of this thesis reveal, and other research (Van 
Schendel, 2002; Whyte, 2002; Jones, 2009; 2010) findings demonstrate in the literature. Local 
research work on the enclaves only considers the difficulties of their citizens on the other side of 
the border: Chaki (2007; 2009) extensively writes about the attacks on Indian enclave dwellers 
in India while he is silent about the vulnerabilities of Bangladeshi enclave dwellers. While 
asking Chaki about his opinion about the Bangladeshi enclave dwellers situation, he replied, 
‘they are in much better situation in India than our citizens in Bangladesh’(field note, 11 
October, 2010). It is a nationalistic feeling about their own enclave residents that is also very 
visible in the local media.  
There is a tendency within the border officials to describe that the enclave dwellers are 
troublemakers in the host country. The BDR officials describe that the Indian enclave dwellers 
are living like Bangladeshi citizens while the enclave dwellers bring law and order problems in 
the local areas. One border official describes, 
 The enclaves are the places where all illegal activities occur. The BSF 
know that smugglers are in the enclaves but the border guards are 
helpless because they cannot enter into the enclaves. The enclave 
dwellers do not want any the exchange of the enclaves because they are 
now in an advantageous position being ‘free people’ without any state 
interventions. 
(Anonymous, interviewed in India, 04 November 2009) 
This is, in fact, a very negative and oriental representation of enclaves and enclave dwellers. 
Another border official claimed that no road has been constructed inside the enclave and no 
BSF vehicle has entered into the enclaves. On the contrary, the ethnography reveals that the 
host country exercises illegitimate sovereignty over the enclaves by constructing roads, electric 
poles, water pipe lines and so on which I will describe as the construction of enclaves spaces of 
exception in the following chapter (see section 6. 3, and figures 6.1a–d). 
This section shows how people consciously and unconsciously draw the boundary line through 
social relations, cultural identities and ‘oriental’ representation. As Passi (1996: 215) mentions, 
‘for the borderlanders the locality and its topography—both physical and social—are the central 
constituencies of their world’. However, the local manifestation of social and cultural 
boundaries is the part of the nation building based on religion-based nationalism and ascribed or 
self-decided territorial identity. In addition, there is a discursive negative representation of the 
enclaves as a danger or threat to the host country which I believe is nothing but an oriental 
representation.    
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5.5 The Tin-Bigha Corridor and the Everyday Mobile Border 
This section focuses on the role of this border as a corridor for the folks in the D&A enclaves. 
The corridor operates as a bridge and barrier in the everyday life of these enclaves while all the 
movements and decisions are made by the BSF. This time-corridor is an example of the 
manifestation/movement and materialisation of this border twice a day. Such a manifestation of 
the border constitutes a time consciousness shaping everyday life actions and mobilities across 
the enclave-home country as Crang (2001:187) asserts ‘the combination of time-space routines 
serves to link the everyday to the reproduction of social regularities’. The corridor opening time, 
the closing time, and night time in the D & A enclaves have different sets of actions; however 
these everyday actions of life are spatio-temporally determined. In Glennie and Thrift’s words 
(1996: 280) there is always‘geography of time, timing and time consciousness’.  
For the purpose of the better understanding of the current situation and background of the 
special arrangement for two enclaves, I will briefly touch upon the state-level decisions and 
implementing procedures of this access corridor as well as the contesting local struggles over 
transferring part of mother land to an antagonistic Muslim country. Dahagram and Angorpota 
(D & A), two Bangladeshi enclaves in India, are connected with mainland Bangladesh by a 
178x85 m access corridor. Although, the access corridor has been leased out to Bangladesh for 
99 years since 26 June 1992, the sovereignty of this tiny passage lies with India. All the 
movements across the corridor and changes of law are controlled and decided unilaterally by the 
Indian border security forces. It is their sovereign power to deal with anything inside this fenced 
space. The time-corridor opens for Bangladeshi movement from 6am–6pm Indian times. Thus, 
it is an example of the shifting border twice a day.  
 5.5.1 Tin Bigha Corridor Facts  
As part of Radcliffe’s  partition legacy, The Nehru-Noon Agreement of 1958 tried to resolve the 
confusion of the Radcliffe line over the Berubari Union as explained in the introductory chapter. 
It was the success of Berubari residents along with the opposition political parties who halted 
the transfer of Tin Bigha for years despite state level agreements. Like the Radcliffe award, this 
agreement also ignored the human aspects of the border problem. Although the 1974-LBA 
decided the fate of Berubari and D & A enclaves, it took two decades to reach a negotiation on 
the proposed access corridor. Like Berubari issue, the transfer of the access corridor to 
Bangladesh became a sensitive political issue followed by bloodshed in the corridor area. Since 
the agreement signed in 1974, people adjoining areas near Tin Bigha Corridor started protesting 
about the transfer of this corridor.  
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Two basic stands were leading the protests over access corridor transfer; firstly, the locals were 
in fear that once the corridor is given to Bangladesh, Kuchlibari would be an enclave losing its 
only connection to mainland India. As Adit Barman, Kuchlibari resident and campaigner 
against corridor transfer, mentions,  
‘At that time, we did not realise that the territory will not be given to 
Bangladesh. Whatever it is, I cannot tolerate foreigners are using our 
soil for hours. Sometimes, the traffic keeps us waiting for those 
foreigners’ to use our land. I cannot accept this’  
                    (aged 30, interviewed on 28 March, 2010).  
Eighteen years since it was instituted, Adit Barman’s nationalistic feelings and frustration over 
sharing the corridor with foreign others is a broad-spectrum feeling in the whole Kuchlibari 
area. Secondly, the political leaders were more concerned with the loss of Indian ‘sacred 
motherland’ to a foreign country as a disgraceful activity; therefore they were bringing a 
nationalistic theme. Within the enclaves, there were fractions on religious lines. Muslim enclave 
residents were pro-Pakistani and later pro-Bangladeshi who always preferred to get married and 
study in mainland Bangladesh. On the other hand, Hindu enclave residents were almost 
connected with India for every aspect of their life and were also participating in agitations on 
non-transfer. Such communal claim of annexation with India or Bangladesh reflects contesting 
belonging and territory (Cons, 2012). D & A enclaves’ annexation with India or Bangladesh 
articulate the boundary survey work in the vicinity of Tin Bigha in 1986 that was hindered by 
the local protests in Angorpota as an opposition to transfer of the enclaves (Ministry of 
Information, India 1992). 
 
Map 5.1: Map showing the location of Dahagram, Angorpota and Tin Bigha corridor. (Source: 
High Commission of India, 1992.) 
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Local concerns created two committees: the Tin Bigha Resistance Committee and the more 
hardline Kuchlibari Resistance Committee with dissatisfied congressmen and state BJP leaders 
(Biswas, 1991). The controversy and rumours over the sovereignty of the corridor. There was a 
petition in a Kolkata court in 1982 on the validity of 1974 and 1982 agreements. In relation to 
petitions filed in 1987 on dilution of sovereignty, the main point of the Supreme Court’s 
judgement on sovereignty matter in 1990 is, 
It certified that, as stipulated in the 1982 Lease Agreement, sovereignty 
over the Tin Bigha corridor would continue to vest in India and that 
Bangladesh would merely have "undisturbed possession" and "use" for 
the express purpose of connecting Dahagram with Panbari Mouza of 
Bangladesh in order to exercise sovereignty over Dahagram and 
Angorpota and for no other purpose.’ To regulate the flow of traffic and 
to diminish the possibilities of avoidable friction or untoward incidents, 
appropriate measures will be adopted so as to avoid intermingling of the 
nationals or the traffic of the two countries. It has stated that no right to 
administer Tin Bigha has been given to Bangladesh nor had it been 
given the right to occupy permanently the area or to construct buildings 
and fortifications therein or to lay railway lines through the area. The 
Agreements gave Bangladesh only specific and limited rights. The 
Supreme Court concluded that the Agreements did not amount to the 
lease or surrender of Sovereignty as understood in international law. 
This view accords with the view of the Government of India, and it is in 
this light that the Tin Bigha lease is being put into effect.  
(High Commission of India, Dhaka, 1992). 
The verdict precisely mentions complete Indian control over all kinds of regulations and 
changes of any measures inside the corridor and flow through the corridor. It is only a 
permission for the Bangladeshi authority and people to cross over the corridor. The Court 
verdict did not convince the protesters and almost all key BJP figures entered to this flashpoint 
and the BJP pamphlets called for ‘all the Indians, all its valiant fighters for national integrity to 
stand up, face the situation squarely and remove the danger of 50,000 people of Kuchlibari 
becoming Refugees at some point of time in the future’ (BJP, 1992c). Two men, 25-year old 
Jiten Roy, a resident of Upon Chauki village in the Kuchlibari area, and Kiten Adhikary were 
killed by the firing in Kuchlibari ‘hundreds of people were injured and some of them losing 
their limbs’ (Roy Pradhan, 1995: 16).  
However, the transfer was successfully done on 26 June 1992 with intense security measures. 
Two of my respondents in Dahagram emotionally described the transfer, 
Bangladesh won her freedom in 1971 but it was the day of our 
independence. We struggled 45 years to get connected with Bangladesh 
where we the Muslims belong. It was only an hour for the first day but 
we all ran many times across the corridor with tears of joy; we entered 
Bangladesh without any fear. It was an incredible sense of freedom!  
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(Romij Ali, male enclave resident, aged 55, interviewed on 20 
November 2009). 
It was the black day; I lost my divine motherland, my relatives, 
friends, educational institutions and family. I did never have any 
connection with Dahagram, I just slept here in my house and rest of 
my activities were in nearby Indian villages. I had a terrible feeling 
that I lost everything of my life and I am kept in a prison. 
 (Prodip Roy, male enclave resident, aged 30, interviewed on 30 
November 2009)  
Both of them had a contrasting feeling about the transfer that shows a sense of imaginative 
boundary and a feeling of homeland and place making in a religious angle. Both the stories 
mirror connectedness and separation through the construction of a boundary. Such connection-
separation binary in both these enclaves creates new borderlines both in physical and 
imaginative spaces. Following the corridor transfer, the border is reconstructed socially, 
politically and spatially. The physical border between Dahagram-India was inactive before the 
transfer that has started strictly functioning since 1992 (see figures 5.3a and 5.3b below); 
however the international border between India and Bangladesh is non-functional for these 
enclave residents for the daytime while the corridor is open. Nevertheless, they are completely 
cut off from the whole world while the corridor is closed. On the other hand all the Hindu 
people moved to India except for three families. Therefore, the imaginative religious boundary 
line has been shifted to the international level. The corridor transfer has created another 
imaginative ‘other’ in the mind of the former Kuchlibari neighbours to Dahagram people, as the 
Kuchlibari respondents expressed their concern that their soil is frequently invaded by the 
Bangladeshis.  
 
Fig 5.3a: Indian watchtower from the edge of Angorpota 
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Fig 5.3b: Round-the-clock guarding around these enclaves 
5.5.2 Everyday Life and the Time-corridor  
On a trial basis, the Indian side provided an hour's access for the first day, then three hours for 
the next six months which was then expanded to six hours a day during the latter half of 1992. 
Since 1993 it has been every alternative hours. From 2001 it became 12 hours a day. The whole 
corridor area is completely fenced along side of the border pillar. Four corners of the corridor 
fly Indian flag showing full Indian sovereignty over this space. Each side of the corridor has 5 
flashlights that illuminate the whole area. Some beautification plants and benches are there for 
local Indian tourists. However, there is no permission for the Bangladeshis to slip aside the 
access road; no one can stay for a long time, in the corridor without two border forces 
permissions. Besides such restrictions, former neighbours, relatives and friends who are now 
citizens of two different countries still can meet up in the corridor with prior negotiations with 
respective border guards for short time. 
The previous discussions on the struggles and transfer of the corridor illustrate the production 
and reproduction of different levels of borders through political decisions in the state level. I am 
not limiting the analysis on time-border only to the temporalities of border constructions alone, 
rather broadening my discussion on the time-border with the idea of the shifting border through 
the daily opening and closing of the corridor. The corridor has two Bangladeshi checkpoints in 
two entry points between the end of main Bangladesh and beginning of the Dahagram; and two 
Indian checkpoints within the fenced corridor compound. Control and changes in regulation is 
central in this corridor without any unscheduled closure. Such as, since December 2009 only 
twenty cows can pass through the corridor in each week. Recently, news was published that 
BSF can check anybody inside the corridor if the operative BSF personnel think it necessary 
(Uttarbanga Shangbad, March 25, 2010). Thus, the BSF is practising on a case-by-case basis 
who would be checked and what intention of crossing the corridor. It is a power relation on the 
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corridor because the passage is in Indian territory. The corridor is working as a filter controlling 
cattle smuggling from Indian land and managing/regulating the Bangladeshi flow through 
Indian space. BSF’s visible control over the corridor and movement is evident from another 
border scholar, Jason Con’s experience on this corridor during his research work, 
One day, as my research assistant and I passed through the Tin Bigha 
Corridor, we spotted a BSF Jawan with whom we had chatted a few 
days earlier. He flagged us down and with a scowl and said, ‘Why did 
you lie to me’? Puzzled, we assured him that we had not. He  replied, 
‘You told me that you are here to do research, but our informants 
inside the enclave tell us that you are here to buy eight bighas of land’. 
We did our best to reassure him of our intentions, but he angrily 
continued, ‘What is there to research here? Living by the border there 
are only thieves, smugglers, and dacoits’. (Cons, 2007: 23) 
Cons’ (2007) experience suggests that everybody crossing in the passage is monitored and 
intentions of crossing the corridor are verified with the informant. There is an intention to know 
what is happening inside the enclaves. The BDR always keep a careful look to avoid any BSF 
complaint on Bangladeshis; however, the BSF examine every body crossing the corridor, count 
the movements and are vigilant about any new face crossing the corridor. I saw that picnic 
vehicles are loud all the way but keep quiet when they approach the corridor. BDR warn the 
local Bangladeshi tourists not to take photographs and even restrict people to keep their camera 
and cell phone inside their pockets or bags. The precise construction of ‘them’ and ‘us’ is 
performed in the Corridor as it is foreign land for Bangladeshis while it is their own territory for 
India. During the participant observation in and around the corridor, I have witnessed 
Bangladeshis in fear of assault and BSF scrutiny. Indians are in a relaxed mood to loiter around 
the whole corridor compound without any concern as it is their own territory. As Bangladeshis 
and Indians look similar, I, therefore, was considered as Bangladeshi while entering into the 
corridor from the Bangladesh side; and as Indian from the Indian side. Every time I crossed the 
corridor from the Bangladesh side, members of the BSF stared at me with an intimidating 
impression although they never stopped me. Four months later, I entered the corridor from the 
Indian side along with two Indian friends. The BSF were very friendly and allowed my friends 
to take photographs in the restricted access corridor but requested us not to take so many 
photographs on the access corridor as they never allow Bangladeshis to do so. I heard stories of 
defiant Bangladeshi photographers who were assaulted by the BSF if they were caught taking 
photographs. It is more like a place of social interaction for Indians while Bangladeshis are in a 
hurry to cross the corridor as early as possible. Above all, local Bangladeshis and Indians are 
critically apprehensive about each other. Presumably, ownership of the passage, previous 
enmity over accession and religious feuds contribute toward such contrasting uses of the 
corridor. It is a relaxed tourist spot for the Indians while there is pressure on Bangladeshis that 
anyone might be stopped on suspicion. 
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Map 5.2: The Tin Bigha Corridor  [Image reflection on Tin Bigha corridor on the sketch map Whyte (2002)] 
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The restrictions on twelve hours access to the Bangladeshi mainland create connectivity with 
the world tied to daylight. It is not only the twelve hour-long restrictions; it is the invisible 
control over everyday life in the enclaves. There was no permission to provide an electricity 
pipeline using the corridor, therefore the enclaves were dark until March 2010. Accordingly, 
these restrictions create a vacuum in the hospital and schools inside the enclaves and no external 
employees want to work there for fear of being cut off at night. All enclave residents manage 
their activities before the corridor’s closing time. They buy and sell agricultural products in 
early morning and come back home before the sunset. Thus, the time-corridor imposes a strict 
time discipline for the enclave dwellers (May & Thrift, 2001). Sometimes entertainment 
activities clash with the corridor closing time, ‘It was the district football tournament and 
Dahagram was facing another union (administrative unit in Bangladesh) in the final match. The 
game was over by 5.30 pm (Indian time) and more than five hundred people were rushing to get 
to the corridor but more than hundred people missed the closing time. The BDR and enclave 
residents requested that the corridor be opened for a while at 6.15 pm but the BSF did not allow 
them to enter (Baktiar Alam, aged 19, field note, 31 March 2010). Therefore, whatever the 
situation the corridor never closes before due time and never opens once it is closed. Therefore, 
what we see here are on ground control over the Dahagram activities.  
Only emergency patients are allowed cross the corridor at night if BSF personnel decide that the 
patient needs emergency treatment. The general procedure is that any patient needing access to 
emergency hospital care comes to the corridor gate and seeks permission with the BDR; the 
BDR then informs the operational BSF guard in the corridor. The BSF guard will then decide 
whether the patient should be designated as an emergency or not. Once he is satisfied he seeks 
permission to the next higher-level authority and gets the corridor gate key. However, no 
ambulance is allowed to enter corridor once the corridor gate is closed. It is imperative to note 
how the role of this corridor shifts over time. The initial agreement considered this corridor as a 
bridge to connect Bangladeshis; over time this bridge has turned into a soft checkpoint with 
rights to stop and check any Bangladeshis for security purposes. The stories and struggles over 
the corridor due to religious lines shows the examples of nationalism constituted by the religion. 
On the other hand, perrformativity of the time corridor demonstrates it functions a kind of check 
point with the power to check anybody crossing the corridor. It shows how the time border is 
experienced in the daily life the people including their emergency health needs.  
5.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter, my aim was to demonstrate the everyday performativity of borders and socio-
cultural processes involved in the border and bordering processes in the enclaves, which is a 
catalogue of diverse types of legal and illegal, physical and imagined, hard and negotiated 
boundaries on and beyond fixed and changed geographic borders. Thus, the above discussions 
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answer the question, where is the border? In other words, where is no border? These borders 
have no massive geopolitical implications but have ramifications in the mobility within this 
borderland and its local politics. It is a manifestation of the long implications of cartographic 
methods and cartographic procedures made by the political elites. For the enclave residents, it is 
a border between rightful citizens and illegal aliens; it is the border between powerful state 
agents and powerless enclave residents. This chapter reveals that the host country’s legal and 
illegal actions create serious vulnerabilities in their life and economic survival. The chapter also 
reveals that the enclave residents never receive support from the home country in extreme cases; 
for example, Nurul Huda was imprisoned in Bangladesh for being a suspected Indian trespasser. 
This epitomises the degrees of abandonment from the home country. When the home country 
abandons its citizens and the host country punishes them for crossing the border, what kind of 
vulnerability can result? The next chapter will explore this question. 
Considering all the discussions in this chapter, I consider this chapter has four main implications 
for political geography debates on borders. Firstly, border studies need to pay more attention to 
the embodied experiences of the border. They generally pay attention to national scales which 
has moved further, with the humanistic turn, to the local scale. In exploring such varied 
experiences of borders we need to consider the performativity of borders at individual levels. To 
understand those rich varieties of the border, complexity and ambiguities in border and the 
bordering process, we need to pay more attention to the embodied experiences of the border. 
The border performativity in this study explores that the performance of the border varies from 
site to site, with identities of the involved individuals and with other factors. It can provide 
illuminating implications of geopolitical decisions and border enforcement on individuals and 
the local scale. This chapter shows that the border is performed mostly based on individual 
border guards and border crossers’ negotiations along a variety of identity lines. Micro scale 
considerations of this border bring a diverse performativity to the border; such as the border as a 
space of exception, porous in nature, strict and haphazard in guarding. In this case the splintered 
‘other lands’ and ‘other aliens’ create different senses of the border on the smallest scale, i.e. on 
the body level. Thirdly, the border has its motion both physically and symbolically. The 
examples of the time-border make a case that geographic border shifts twice a day. On the other 
hand, the accession of both D & A with Bangladesh suggest that the border has a motion to it—
not physically but symbolically through different political processes, legal norms and illegal 
activities through power relations. The border is everywhere and border functions do not stick 
on the specific sites of the border. It is flexible and border inspection is everywhere. 
Finally, the word border takes on quite a differentiated historical and symbolic significance in 
the context of the Bengal border because of religion-led cartographic procedures and subsequent 
developments of nationalism based on religion. The astonishing role of religion plays out not 
only in the construction of imaginative border between enclave residents and mainland people; 
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it contributes with the psyche of the border agents as Mustak’s Islamic appearance and border 
experience reflects this fact. In this context, the international border does not, effectively, 
produce identity within the bounded space of nation-state, it is religion that decides nationalism 
and goes beyond given national identities. The conflicting demands between Hindus and 
Muslims in the D & A enclave on whether to annex with Bangladesh or India, and the views 
that Muslims should be in a Muslim majority country and vice versa, elucidate the centrality of 
religion. Academic studies on borders make a case where international borders create a bounded 
space and the construction of the unknown other is a result of the fence or wall. 
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6 
Abandonment and Construction of Bare life in the Enclaves 
6.1 Introduction 
As demonstrated in the previous chapters, the home country abandons the enclave residents’ in 
a process of unmaking citizenship; and the host country’s border security initiatives and internal 
surveillances frame these ‘non-citizens’ as illegal immigrants. Chapter 4 shows how 
systematically these enclave residents were excluded from any citizenship rights. And, chapter 5 
explicitly shows different layers of borders role to keep the enclave residents’ in a confinement. 
Non-citizenship reduces an enclave resident from a rightful political being to a ‘being without 
rights’; and punishable entrances into the host country’s territory further reduces his/her status 
to a rightless person but subject to laws. These systematic abusive treatments construct 
vulnerability, lawlessness and a state of hopelessness in the enclaves. In this chapter, I 
document the degrees of these vulnerabilities experienced in the complex terrain of the 
enclaves. If I put it differently, how the enclaves’ residents’ lives are victimised in a routine 
violence by different actors is the scope of this chapter. In the enclave territories, there are no 
mechanisms to regulate violence, let alone to monopolise them (Van Schendel, 2002: 136). 
Consequently, political processes affect the political fabric of life – reducing or delimiting the 
value of enclave residents to a ‘biological minimum’ (Agamben, 1998). Thus, the chapter 
contributes to the thesis by examining the third research question that seeks to spotlight the 
impact of non-citizenship and stringent border surveillances in enclave life.  
Building on Agamben (1998), I reflect on constructions of bare life in the enclaves’ spaces of 
exception. While Agamben (1998; 2005) limits his discussion to the politico-juridical 
construction of bare life, I extend this into the social and gendered realm. I argue that bare life is 
also produced through the everyday complex interactions between political, legal and social 
processes and that it is crucially linked to gender. The impacts of bare life on men and women 
are unequally constructed; certain physical vulnerabilities are greater and unique to women than 
men. This chapter aims at contributing to bare life debates by (i) providing an alternative insight 
where bare life is not produced by excessive sovereign power but rather by a state of 
abandonment, and (ii) modifying Agamben’s formulation for a deeper understanding of the 
multiple forms of bare life. In this context, the aim here is to work with Agamben’s (1998, 
2005) bare life formulation, draw attention to its limitations, and add two essential aspects of 
bare life for a nuanced understanding of this concept in light of the ethnographic material. 
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This chapter proceeds as follows. The section 6.2 concentrates on theoretical debates of bare 
life; and the section 6.3 focuses on the construction of the spatial extent of the state of exception 
upon which bare life is constructed. Then, the discussion moves onto the construction of the 
enclave residents’ life as bare life. Bare life will be explored through the vulnerability to 
abandonment by the concerned states, social vulnerability and gendered vulnerability. The 
‘vulnerability to abandonment’ provides an account of how the enclave life is profoundly 
implicated in the actions of host country’s law while the home country abandons the enclave 
dwellers. The vulnerability to abandonment encourages enormous socio-political exploitation, 
what I consider to be social vulnerability. Here, vulnerability to abandonment focuses on the 
construction of bare life by the state agencies and social vulnerability concentrates on the 
construction of bare life by the local political elites and neighbouring people. Section 6.6 
extends the discussion to the gendered aspect of the construction of bare life. Social 
vulnerability is experienced equally in both sides of the enclaves. However, the vulnerability to 
abandonment is felt severely in the enclaves in India because of India’s stronger border control 
mechanisms and specific laws to control illegal immigrants. Disregarding the agony of 
Bangladeshi citizens in India, Bangladesh equally contributes to the construction of bare life. 
6.2 Forms of Bare Life 
By now there has been wide-ranging use, critique and modification of the Agamben’s 
deployment of biopolitics, conceptualisation of spaces of exception, legal or extra-legal 
positions of sovereign power, and ban in different contexts and sites (Coleman & Grove, 2009; 
Bigo, 2006; Gregory, 2006; Johns, 2005; Yiftachel, 2009). In this chapter, I concentrate on the 
meaning of bare life (Agamben, 1998), contemporary scholarship on different forms of bare life, 
and reconceptualise this concept with the examples of Cooch Behar enclaves. Agamben’s 
(1998) theoretical enterprise is based upon the extraordinary capacity of sovereign power to 
position itself above the law, enabling full control over the suspension of the subject’s legal 
value and status; and the construction of a container or space to accomplish these activities. 
Thus, Agamben specifies, it is the sovereign power who decides a state of exception and takes 
hold over the life of the people and constructs bare life in certain spaces. The ban or state of 
exception is a suspension of general rule (Agamben, 1998:17). Agamben reminds us that 
‘sovereign is, at the same time, outside and inside the juridical order’ (1998:15). The sovereign 
has the legal power to suspend the law and place him superior to law; thus sovereign is/has the 
authority to switch over from inside to outside of the law. In this way, the process and actions of 
exception blur the borders between exclusion and inclusion, rights and facts, subject and object. 
To Agamben (1998; 2005) inspired by Schmitt’s reflections, the sovereign is he who has the 
potentiality to decide who is worth living, thus included in and protected by the juridical order, 
and who is not worth living, excluded from society, the sphere of law, and, for this reason, 
killable with impunity. Such a trivial rank of human being is the effect of the state of exception.  
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‘Bare life’ is the life of homo sacer, who is subject to the law but is unprotected by the law. 
Extremely inferior to a politically qualified life, it is, rather, a life exposed to violence in an 
extra-legal space and status. Stripping citizenship rights and banishing the basic human right to 
live, sovereign power exposes the homo sacer to ‘unconditional’ death and to violence and 
abuse. In the extreme form of bare life, anyone can kill him without committing homicide. In 
extreme form of bare life, anyone can kill him without committing homicide; he can save 
himself only in perpetual flight or a foreign land’ (Agamben, 1998:183). In effect, every 
moment of bare life is exposed to ‘unconditional’ death. Thus, bare life is not only the removing 
of the citizenship rights of a person but also banishing that person’s basic human right to live. It 
is a life exposed to all sorts of violence and abuse. The material abandonment from all rights of 
the camp inhabitants, in extreme cases, take them to a world beyond any consciousness of 
trepidation and dismay, what Agamben refers to as an ‘absolute apathetic’ and a world without 
memory and grief. Thus, bare life not only considers physical aspects of banishment but also 
takes into account the physiological impact of bare life on the exposed people’s mind. I do not 
dispute the characterisation of bare life. Instead, I argue for the importance of identifying how 
and where bare life is produced.  
Agamben specifies that sovereign power takes hold over the life of the people and constructs 
bare life in certain spaces. On this view, bare life is constructed by single power/force 
(sovereign power) using diverse violence. This indicates simple and straightforward 
construction of bare life. I echo Butler’s (2004: 68) critique that Agamben underwrites the 
actual political complexities in which we live, and homogenises the methods of producing bare 
life. Butler’s (2004) key concern is that Agamben overlooks how some people are more 
vulnerable than others because of the differentiated functions of power targeting specific race or 
ethnicity. Besides, Isin & Rygiel’s (2007) realistic assertion on the multiplicity of spaces of 
exception, and the diverse methods and functionalities of reducing people to abject inexistence, 
add new insights on the process of constructing expendable people. While many critical works 
limit their analysis on the production of subjectivity (Butler, 2004; Salter, 2008), Isin and Rygiel 
(2007: 182-183) assert the notion of the abject body, whereby through a process of people are 
neither treated as subjects (of discipline) nor objects (of elimination) but are rather considered 
‘inexistent beings’ by making them invisible and inaudible. On the other hand, I focus on life 
trapped in-between subject and object within the grip of two nation-states based on spatial 
location of certain population with the example of the Cooch Behar enclaves.  
Mbembe (2003) establishes a correlation between biopower, death and enmity, where race lies 
at the centre of this function. He argues that bare life is not a single production of biopower but 
rather a result of the combined effort of biopolitics, necropolitics and necropower. Thus, bare 
life is not only a sovereign construction, as Mbembe (2003) points out, it links other actors such 
as armed groups and suicide bombers. Beyond the political construction of bare life and a state 
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of emergency, Beihl (2001) leads us to a social construction of bare life in the space of Vita, a 
place of South Brazil, where socially unworthy people are left to die by social services, family 
members and security forces. Beihl (2001: 135) mentions, ‘Vita is the word for a life that is 
socially dead, a destiny of death that is collective’. In light of Vita, bare life is actively produced 
by society while politico-juridical plays a passive role. For all aspects, political or social, bare 
life literatures generally overlook the gendered dimension of bare life (Sanchez, 2004; Pratt, 
2005; Mills, 2004). Here, I am arguing for a case where bare life is constructed by the everyday 
political, legal and social abandonment, as well as by violence and exploitation. These complex 
violences and exploitations are not uniformly affecting male and female enclave residents rather 
construct a gendered bare life. 
Where is a bare life constructed? Agamben (2000: 40, 41) defines the camp as a space of 
exception, which is a piece of territory placed outside the normal juridical order where power 
confronts pure biological life. The spaces of the camp he identifies as non-place and container 
of bare life and enumerates that such a non-place is the product of civil war, extra-ordinary 
political event or war zone (Agamben, 1999, 2005). Agamben’s theorisation of space of 
exception and bare life is valuably used in the context of migrants, refugee camps and detention 
camps like Guantanamo (Diken & Laustsen, 2005; Diken, 2009; Hyndman, 2000; Perera, 2002; 
Rajaram & Grundy-Warr 2004). The ‘return of the camp’ (Minca, 2005) is ever more leading as 
we consider the proliferation of structures like Guantanamo or if we think about the whole 
network of secret prisons around the world. They become true biopolitical spaces that render 
inmates at the complete mercy of the police or state authorities that act as sovereign.  
Although, consideration of bare life from a camp’s perspective is a dominant approach in recent 
academic discourses, the border and borderland are also considered as the spaces of exception 
taking into account the securitisation practices and border guard’s decision-making power 
(Salter, 2008, Jones, 2009a, Vaughan-Williams, 2009). Bare life in the border widens the scale 
of the spatial extent of bare life; and considers the performativity of the border as a zone of 
exception to the border crossers. As border crossers do not necessarily belong to that border 
zone, spaces of exception in the border and camp involve displacement and transportation of 
people to sites of exception. These insights do not interrogate a condition of space where 
everyday life is exposed to the mundane production of bare life through violence, abandonment 
and social exploitation. In contrast, Cooch Behar enclaves are spaces of exception where people 
become homo sacer in their own niche. Finally, a cautious note about the bare life in enclaves; 
every life is not produced as bare life but everybody who is living in this space of exception is 
potentially reducible to bare life. Some people exist in bare life for the span of their life, some 
are killed and few others might have a less destroyed life. In this way, bare life is randomly 
constructed. 
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6.3 The Enclaves as Spaces of Exception 
Enclaves are spaces of exception for two reasons. Firstly and most importantly, these places are 
excluded from legitimate state law but are irregularly included in illegitimate sovereign power 
and control, blurring the distinction between licit and illicit. Secondly, these places are the 
container of homo sacer.  
Enclaves in India and Bangladesh come under the host country’s illicit and patchy sovereign 
power when these liminal spaces have the potential to cause harm (for instance through opium 
cultivation, the spread of diseases, or alleged criminals-hideout) or can provide better 
connectivity between two places for the host state. The host country is, though, constantly 
vigilant to prevent any ‘infection’ from the enclave to the mainland, in what Turner (2007: 298) 
defines as a ‘sequestration’ of the population. Although illegal in both states, Bangladeshi gangs 
have introduced and controlled lucrative opium cultivation in Dashiarchora (an Indian enclave 
in Bangladesh) for years, commonly destined for the Bangladeshi mainland. While things went 
out of control, Bangladeshi border security forces and local administration officers entered the 
enclave to burn the cultivated opium (Mustafa, 2010). Bangladesh as a host country had decided 
to secure her territory from illicit drugs and stepped into an area beyond her jurisdiction on the 
grounds of necessity. A similar invasion occurred in the Bangladeshi enclave Poaturkuthi during 
the bird flu epidemic in India in 2009. Concerned Indian government authorities destroyed all 
the chickens in the area, including those in the enclave, to avoid the possibility of the disease 
spreading. Indian poultry owners were compensated for the economic damage brought by these 
measures, but such provision was not extended to the foreign enclave land (Sengupta, 2009). In 
addition to these special measures, Indian and Bangladeshi border guards randomly enter the 
enclaves to catch smugglers or criminals if they use the enclave for hideouts, and sometimes 
beat enclave residents for information. Such practices signify illegitimate practices of sovereign 
power and control in the enclaves.  
In addition, the host country uses the enclave territory for different purposes; such connecting 
two mainland territories for electrification, water pipelines and road communication purposes. 
Most interestingly, BSF vehicles frequently use the road through the middle of Bangladeshi 
enclave, Mashaldanga, and it is the only road to connect five nearby BSF camps. While host the 
country is practising extra-territoriality (see figures 6.1a-d); they are imposing different 
restrictions and boundary lines for the same enclave residents. Such activities reflect the power 
relations. The administrative surveillance technologies and production of the boundary sites are 
to exclude the ‘foreigner other’ based on nationality boundary, and this boundary is performed 
only on the enclave residents’ body. On the contrary, the host state is crossing the sovereign 
boundary and practices extra-territoriality.  
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Fig 6.1a: Indian State Government authorised road by the middle of Bangladeshi enclave 
Mashaldanga 
 
Fig 6.1b: Public transport by the middle of Bangladeshi enclave Mashaldanga  
 
Fig 6.1c: Bangladesh government authorised roads inside Indian enclave Gaochulka 
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Fig 6.1d: Indian State Government authorised electric poles inside Bangladeshi enclave Korola. 
Neither India nor Bangladesh have institutionalised their legitimate sovereignty in these 
enclaves being the home country. Administrative absence in the enclaves deprives residents 
from their due citizenship rights. The areas lack paved roads, electricity, gas, water supply, 
hospitals and schools. Residents have constructed a few mosques and temples to continue 
religious activities. In extreme cases, there are incidents of murder inside the enclaves. The 
victims did not receive justice. The absence of state law in the enclaves constructs a ‘non-state 
space’ in the modern world (Van Schendel, 2002: 139). A space of exception is created through 
practical abandonment.  
Agamben argues that homo sacer cannot dwell in the polis (Minca, 2007); hence, the space of 
exception is the homo sacer’s container. I prefer to say that the extra-legal spaces are not only 
the container but also creator of the homo sacer. In this case, the home state has forgotten a few 
fragmented parts of her territorial pack. These enclaves are left outside of the legal frame 
because of their geographic reality and geopolitical insignificance (Whyte, 2002; Van Schendel, 
2002; Jones, 2009). There needs to be more emphasis on geography’s role in the construction of 
life beyond legal status. This space is created with the logic of detachment and non-contiguity, 
and insignificance through gradual abandonment. In light of this, a space of exception is created 
in geographical terms. It is the geography and cartographical construction of ‘abjected space’. 
In the camp, bare life is constructed only by the sovereign power through diverse forms of 
violence. On the other hand, multiple actors construct bare life in the enclaves through different 
layers of execution where all sorts of powers and violence are directed toward a community. 
Most significantly, both the camp and the enclave survive in the shadow of the power of 
sovereign authority, as Agamben (1998) explicitly asserts as judicially empty spaces. Similar to 
the image of camp are the bodies of victims (Lee, 2010); the enclave is the niche of a 
community exposed to death or violence. Thus, these enclaves, like the camp, are a zone of 
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indistinction where law and politics intersect providing sovereign power the leeway to play with 
fact and law.  
6.4 Construction of Bare Life by State Agencies: Vulnerability to 
Abandonment  
In this section, I focus on the legal and extra-legal actions by both the states’ apparatus to 
construct bare life. To do this, I will first consider how the home country constructs a rightless 
body by ignoring fatalities of its own citizens in the enclaves. Secondly, I explore how the host 
country uses its power and law to punish these rightless bodies. In the host country, they are 
considered as illegal infiltrators who are deprived of basic human rights. The enclave residents 
survive with only limited legal formal rights from the home country; thus their rights to seek the 
basic needs of a citizen are frozen (Roy Pradhan, 1995; Van Schendel, 2002). It is the 
suspension of the right to rights, constituting bare life, as illustrated in the story below: 
Moin a 20-year-old man was taken by the BSF from inside Korola, and 
charged as an illegal Bangladeshi infiltrator. His father arranged the 
documents to prove Moin’s true identity as a Bangladeshi enclave 
resident, not a ‘Bangladeshi infiltrator’. During the trial, the judge 
astonishingly learned, for the first time, about the existence of the 
enclaves and was sympathetic to Moin’s political ill treatment. The 
judge, then, admitted his powerlessness by saying, ‘the law is blind in 
this context and Moin is a Bangladeshi intruder by law’. The court 
announced the lowest allowable punishment for him, which was two 
years imprisonment.’  
(Minhaz Ali, aged 50, interviewed in a Bangladeshi enclave on 26 
October 2009) 
While I interviewed Moin’s father, Minhaz Ali, Moin was in the seventh month of his two-year-
long jail term. Like Moin, many other enclave residents were either in jail or had finished their 
incarceration during the time of my field research. During a crisis the enclave residents’ only 
option is to file an appeal with the home country’s High Commission by post or in person 
(Sengupta, 2009). The home country’s agencies have neither come forward to prevent such 
imprisonment, nor have they undertaken any bilateral initiative to grant the enclave residents a 
legal status in the host country to guarantee their basic needs. It signals the home country’s 
elimination of the very meaning of citizenship even in an emergency. Citizens are increasingly 
presented as homines sacri. In this way, the home country is not only denying enclave residents’ 
citizenship rights, but is also ignoring whatever fate they may suffer because of non-citizenship. 
This reflects Agamben’s criticism of law and justice: ‘The ultimate aim of law is the production 
of a res judicata, in which the sentence becomes the substitute for the true and the just, being 
held as true despite its felicity and injustice’ (Agamben, 1999: 18). In the case of Moin, law is 
not directed towards the establishment of justice but instead reveals its power by seizing two 
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years of someone’s life. Thus, bare life joins the juridico-institutional and biopolitical models of 
power (Butler, 2004).    
While the home country’s abandonment grants the condition of bare life, the host country uses 
its sovereign power over rightless people. In other words, the enclave resident’s body is given 
an extra-legal status by the home country upon which the host country exercises its sovereign 
power. The citizen/foreigner binary declared by the Indian Foreigner’s Act ignores the enclave 
residents’ reality. In effect, this binary constructs another immobile binary between the political 
being of citizen and the excluded body of bare life (Lee, 2010), although they are considered 
citizens of the home country which in practice is a quasi-citizenship. It is a quasi-citizenship 
because they are represented as citizens of the home country in the imaginative geography of 
the host country. The result of this representation is to eliminate them from any attempt to take 
part in anything in the host country. The biopolitical measures in the host country produce a 
form of life, which is still connected with law but in an inclusive form of exclusion (Vaughan-
Williams, 2008).  
Indian hospitals generally disapprove of admitting enclave dwellers:  
My former neighbour Kamrul Islam’s only son, Ripon (12), was 
suffering from a fever and the boy became unconscious. His father took 
him to nearby Dinhata hospital but the hospital administration denied 
him admission saying, ‘No enclave dweller can receive any medical 
treatment here’. The patient died at home within twenty-four hours. His 
father was terribly upset and left the enclave for good and moved to 
Kurigram, Bangladesh.  
(Kiron Barman, 30, interviewed in a Bangladeshi enclave on 29 October 
2009). 
The law forces enclave residents into lawlessness. This boy’s sad demise proves that enclave 
residents are commonly exposed to death. In Agamben’s (1998) words, such exposure to death 
occurs through a sovereign power declaring the non-value of life.  There are examples when the 
host state agencies’ activities portray that they are above the law. A state government authorised 
road passes inside Madhdha Moshaldanga enclave to connect three border security forces’ 
camps. Electric poles and a water pipeline went through this enclave to provide services to 
Indian citizens. Significantly, every BSF official’s journey to the camp, along the Indian 
government authorised paved road into the enclave, is an illegal intrusion into foreign space. 
Five young men were caught in Cooch Behar in 2008 and they are serving two years 
punishment for illegal intrusion; the BSF even caught one enclave resident and then imprisoned 
him or her as an illegal Bangladeshi (Ali, 2010). The changing and contingent enforcement of 
legal and illegal intrusion reflects the fact that the host country’s acts are above the law as the 
sovereign power. 
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State agencies work as the agent of the exception and take the decision on the exception of 
sovereign power (Jones, 2009a). The individual is deprived of his or her prior conditions as a 
citizen. In relation to Moin’s case, the term foreigner is used to restrict the enclave residents’ 
acts of survival, which is sometimes glorified as ensuring security by keeping illegal immigrants 
away. Therefore, the victim is considered as the punishable criminal causing insecurity and 
vulnerability for the enclave residents (Cons, 2007). In brief, the home country excludes their 
legal rights or citizenship rights and the host country includes them as a subject to law. The state 
policy and politico-legal machinery, thus, construct politico-legal form of bare life, at times 
responsible for killing the enclave residents.  
6.5 Vulnerabilities to Wider Violence: Social Exploitation 
The previous section illuminates the construction of unworthy and unwanted life by the host and 
home states’ legal machineries. Such abandonment exposes the enclave residents to other forms 
of exploitation, which dehumanises these people broadly and deeply. Ikram Mia (60) mentions 
that life without judicial rights make them only living beings, without any respect and dignity 
and it is beyond their imagination to resist any social repression. This section focuses on 
different, but interlinking, threads that make a socially constructed bare life, including political 
elites, gangs and mainland neighbours. Collectively these social acts make a life not profitable 
to live as Bimol Barman (aged 60, field note, 12 January 2010) says, ‘I do not know what is the 
joy of living, and it is all about humiliation, insecurity, frustration and then wait for a death to 
end everything. Only death can provide a rest from constant run from insecurity’.  
Besides the instrumental use of the legal norm, political use of laws by local political elites adds 
to vulnerabilities of the enclave residents. In highly corrupt, politically biased developing 
nations like India and Bangladesh, ordinary people are always victims of the political elites’ 
power. Such acts are highly visible in the enclave, as the ability of enclave dwellers to resist is 
curtailed. After Cooch Behar joined India in 1949, many enclave residents’ properties had fallen 
into two separate countries as the enclave-mainland border became legally and administratively 
active (Chatterji, 1999; Van Schendel, 2002). Soon after the 1965 war, India declared the 
Enemy’s Property Act, which specified state control over the properties left behind by those 
who migrated to Pakistan renouncing Indian citizenship (Enemy’s Property Act, 1968). Under 
this act, 900 bighas of land owned by the Batrigach enclave residents’ were vested because of 
the enclave residents’ legal status as Pakistani. Few people wanted to be present while the 
Indian government provided them with options to seek compensation, but it was the then local 
political elites who threatened enclave residents not to do so (Sengupta, 2009). Once these lands 
are vested, the political elites use their holds to reallocate those properties to their political 
followers. Similar actions were taken in Gobrachora enclave, which is now owned by a very 
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influential local lawyer (Habib, 2010). This is an opportunity to make an estate without falling 
foul of the Indian land ceiling limit.  
The political elites not only grab enclave residents land illegally; they control the enclave space, 
such as in Dashiarchora, an Indian enclave. Since the early 1990s people in Dasharchora 
became a victim of a kind of ‘jatra’ (local opera) arranged by the local political elites, with 
invisible support from the local administration, police and musclemen. It comprised of basically 
‘unsocial’ activities under the cover of ‘jatra’, including prostitution, gambling, drug dealing 
and other activities, all of which are illegal in Bangladesh. So they have chosen the enclave as a 
safe place. Although ‘jatra’ was moved out in 2005 after the local administration’s intervention, 
the enclave is a big business place for drug trading. During a month long ethnographic 
participant observation in this enclave, I observed rallies of motorbikes dropping and collecting 
drugs from evening to early morning. Such open business is only possible because of the 
enclave’s existence beyond the law. Criminals and gangsters are so aware of the ‘status’ of this 
place, they either bring people to be killed (host country citizens) or leave bodies inside the 
enclaves (The Times of India, 2001; Mustafa, 2010). Enclave residents are beaten and 
threatened by the smugglers and musclemen if any illegal activities are disputed. Additionally, 
cattle smugglers take enclave dweller’s cattle on the way, sending their cattle to the other end of 
the smuggling route. During the time of festivals, enclave residents provide ‘tolls’ otherwise 
mainland people make their life harder to live. The mainland neighbours are, generally, very 
brutal and take advantage of the enclave residents’ powerlessness. Topon Sarkar mentions, 
 “Mainland people happen to be our friendly neighbours but now they 
take advantage of our stateless situation. They take our pets away 
without our concern, forcefully hold our land without any fear and 
take our fish from lakes inside the enclaves. If we protest they threaten 
to barricade our endeavour to enter mainland. We never go for any 
conflict with them even after they humiliate us saying ‘man without 
country should not have any voice’. They are right. What can we do 
other than relying on their mercy?”  
Topon Sarkar (male enclave resident, aged 40, interviewed in a 
Bangladeshi enclave, India on 19 March 2010) 
Such neighbourhood experience is very common in all the enclaves on my study areas in both 
sides of the border. Besides the individual construction of bare life, there are examples of 
constructing bare community. Before the independence of Bangladesh, two enclaves, 
Moshaldanga and Batrigach were set ablaze by political activists and people fled as refugees 
(Whyte, 2002, Van Schendel, 2002; Hussain, 2010). People living in the enclaves fled to 
different places, mainly in Pakistan. However, they had to go back to the enclaves after a flag 
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meeting between Indian and Bangladeshi border guards (Haq, 2001). Such extreme actions 
against a whole enclave have not changed over time. Recently, Bangladeshi gangs torched the 
Garoti, Indian enclave, once the enclave people killed a robber while robbing inside the enclave 
(The Times of India, 2010). This time they had no shelter from home country and they remain 
exposed to the mercy of the gangs. Socio-political violence is not only directed to individuals 
but also against the whole enclave. All enclave residents flee for security, leaving the enclave 
almost empty. Such attacks against any enclave construct a bare community as well as bare 
body. An attack on whole enclave can at least get media attention and generate border guard 
level discussions. However, individual vulnerability or an incident that even involves killing 
does not make any difference.  
A climate of fear exists amongst enclave dwellers’ psyche to stand against social exploitation. 
During my participant observations, I was told two versions of their neighbourhood relations. 
The ‘negotiated version’ of their story tells of the good relations with the mainland people. On 
the other hand, the ‘real version’ is unveiled only at night during one to one discussions and 
with the promise to keep respondent and the enclave anonymous. Such contrasted assertions of 
enclave life reflect the grounded reality of fear, vulnerability and power relations. In this 
context, fear is politically constructed and diffused from national to local levels. The history of 
fear in this place works as an organising principle of social life and exploitation by the local 
political elites, criminals and neighbours adds fuel to the state built bare life. However, it is 
important to note that while some people experience vulnerability of abandonment, others might 
be more prone to social vulnerability, and many experience both. The exposure to bare life is 
same for all, but experiences of bare life might not be similar being individually constructed.  
6.6 Bare Life in a Gendered Dimension 
Throughout this chapter I have so far only mentioned the gender dimension as compounding the 
experience of women, whilst I have aimed to portray a clear picture of the political, legal and 
social construction of bare life in the enclaves’ spaces of exception. Such an attempt cannot 
bring a lucid picture of bare life without reflection on the gendered sufferings of extra-legal 
womanhood. As an expression of gender inequality women experience a unique threat of sexual 
violence (Valentine, 1992; Pain, 1997), and different forms of patriarchy (McEwan, 2000, 
Walby, 1990) in their day-to-day life. While sexual violence and patriarchy are the generic 
gendered vulnerability, my empirical data reveals that rightless enclave women are awfully 
exposed to, and victim of male violence and different forms of patriarchy because of their extra-
legal status in a zone of abandonment. With this gendered vulnerability, I am arguing that bare 
life in the enclaves’ spaces is not gender-neutral.  
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Agamben’s theorisation of bare life solely considers the construction of bare life in a man’s 
world, yet bare life is also a gendered phenomenon. In this context, my intention is neither to 
criticise Agamben for not considering the gendered aspect of bare life (Mills, 2004; Mitchell, 
2006; Lentin, 2006; Sanchez, 2004) nor I am focusing on the private-public debates of political 
life (McEwan, 2005; Landes, 1998; Pateman, 1988). Rather, I am echoing Pratt’s (2005: 1057) 
take on the danger of generalising across the experience of men and women in bare life as the 
‘gender hierarchies support and relay the split between biological and political life, which is 
both cause and effect of abandonment’. The law of elimination targets gendered bodies most 
constantly enfolding of geographies of private and public one onto the other. Here, I am arguing 
that theorisation of bare life cannot bring the full essence of this concept excluding gendered 
subjectivity in the zone of exception. We need to consider the gendering of legal and social 
abandonment alongside discussions on general vulnerabilities.   
In the enclaves’ spaces, man and women are equally rightless. However women enclave 
residents are victim of certain gender-specific traumatic experiences besides the general 
experience of bare life. These include connected processes, such as abandonment from any 
citizenship/human rights and specific health needs in maternity. Secondly, legal abandonment 
and lawlessness not only situate life unworthy in a nation-state but also enhance the sexual 
violence and private patriarchy. Thirdly, public forms of patriarchy involve degradation from 
citizenship when host country women get married inside the enclaves. Host country’s women’s 
citizenship rights are compromised by the fact that they become part of the enclaves, which 
maps onto the impact of the spaces of exception in the production of bare life. This is not legal 
abandonment but socially constructed discrimination of women as they move to a space outside 
the rule of law. The aforementioned processes of the construction of bare life vary with the 
geography of origin of the women involved with the enclave; such as women born and married 
inside the enclaves generally spend their whole life in an extra-legal space in non-citizenship 
status. Mainland women married in the enclaves suffer loss of citizenship in everyday practice; 
and enclave women married in the mainland either are tortured or achieve a new citizenship in 
the host country. All these experiences of women, connected to the enclaves imply an array of 
public and private forms of patriarchy rather than rigid dichotomy (Walby, 1990). To explore 
gendered bare life, I am using three examples.  
The institutionalised process of constructing gendered bare life expose woman to maternal 
mortality and stillbirth. Amina Banu recounted her daughter’s severe health hazard during her 
pregnancy:  
‘My daughter’s baby was due and she became very ill. We took her to 
the local Indian hospital. While we were unable to provide any Indian 
document, the hospital administration declined to attend her. We 
requested so much to consider the humanitarian ground and emergency 
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services to save my daughter and grandchild’s life but our requests 
have fallen on deaf ears! They left her in the hospital corridor while she 
was screaming with pain; this negligence forced a stillbirth. Allah 
saved my daughter but the doctors killed my grandchild! 
(Amina Banu, aged 40, interviewed in a Bangladeshi enclave on 09 
March 2010) 
Female enclave residents are not allowed to receive emergency health care even on 
humanitarian grounds, which exposes both mother and child to death. The process of 
abandonment systematically reduces enclave woman to bare life. This suggests the construction 
of femina sacra at the mercy of sovereign power signifying the zone of indistinction between 
violence and law (lentin, 2006: 471). These nationalised deaths happen silently and go 
uncounted in the enclaves’ spaces of exception. This example epitomizes the lack of worthy life 
attached to female enclave residents and their motherhood! It is an extreme example of the 
construction of a baby’s bare life even when the baby was in mother’s womb. Literally, a female 
enclave resident’s womb has become the container of a bare life. 
Since enclave people are living in a space of exception and abandoned by the judicial 
procedures of any state, female enclave residents are the most vulnerable to sexual assault. The 
vignette below illustrates a tragic story of a 10-year-old enclave girl, Rubina. Rubina’s 
grandmother explains:  
‘On that day, my grand-daughter was home alone. When I was back, I 
saw a man raping my grand-daughter and she was crying and 
screaming (tears in grandmother’s eyes). I was spell bound for a minute 
and grabbed a stick and started beating the man. He escaped the place. 
After a while, the man came back along with his gang and forcefully 
took us with them. I was tied up to a tree at the premise of the 
Panchayat’s (local elected political representative) office and was 
beaten severely. The Panchayet fined me 2000 rupees for beating that 
rapist! I was tied up there until I paid that fine. Irony! No punishment 
for raping a kid but a fine for chasing the rapist!’   
(Amina Banu, aged 50, interviewed in a Bangladeshi enclave on 05 
November 2009). 
The incident occurred inside an enclave. It reminds that they are the people of the space of 
exception thus they do not qualify to live, complain and resist. Rubina could not claim any legal 
protection against sexual harassment because of her non-status citizenship. Thus, she was 
reduced to a status where she did not have rights over her own body against such brutality. In 
the same incident, Amina’s logical response to the rapist is represented as a violent and 
punishable act. Both Rubina and her grandmother are excluded from the judicial systems, their 
human rights are abandoned. Similar to de Vries’ (2003, cited in Pratt, 2005) recognition that 
sex workers are excluded from ‘person’s category’; Rubina and her grandmother are also 
downgraded from ‘person’s category’. In addition, the rapist’s exoneration from his heinous 
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crime patronise localised violence, which actively and passively constructing gendered bare life. 
This suggests that enclave women and girls are a target of specific violence because of their 
gender and extra-legal status. 
The third example provides an extreme case of bare life. Mahima Khatun (aged 18) was married 
to an Indian man and was living with her husband’s family in an Indian village. For not having 
citizenship ID, she was vulnerable to domestic violence. She was sent home (in the enclaves) 
several times to fulfil the commitment of the dowry. When her poor father failed to provide the 
promised money within three months, Mahima came back home as a dead body. Her husband 
said she committed suicide but Mahima’s father and neighbours claimed it was murder as there 
was evidence of torture and bruises to her body. Mahima’s father wanted justice for his 
daughter’s killing but who could provide the justice? Almost all of the female enclave residents 
are at similar risk from domestic violence because of their inability to seek justice, even if they 
are killed. This powerlessness makes enclave women uniquely prone to private patriarchy that 
links rightless women and powerful citizen man. There are several examples of such patriarchy 
evident in the enclaves. This includes abandoning an enclave wife whenever enclave man 
wishes to do so, or depriving women from inherited family properties when distributed amongst 
heirs. Gender hierarchy and bare life experiences suggests enclave women are more vulnerable 
than enclave men in certain aspects of everyday life.   
Every story reminds one of Butler’s (2004) proposition that social vulnerability of the body is 
politically constituted. All the empirical evidence of the gendered dimension of bare life 
elucidates women in extra-legal status. They are victim of certain forms of violence which are 
neither comparable to general vulnerability of citizen women, nor possible to explicate through 
gender-neutral theorisation of bare life. Male violence to enclave woman is predominantly from 
the citizen man but also involves enclave man. Therefore, bare life is hierarchically produced, 
leaving women relatively powerless in comparison to man. These silent tolerances and, hidden 
gendered traumatic experiences of violence require adequate attentions in bare life theorisation.       
6.7 Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter is unpacking whole sets of interconnected actions to construct bare life 
in the enclaves. In addition to the sovereign creation of bare life, social and gendered 
dimensions are essential for a nuanced approach to bare life. However dominant academic 
discourses overlook the vast array of processes that construct bare life. Rejecting the strict 
consideration of the state of emergency, abrupt suspension of law, total authority and control 
over the spaces of exception and camp based construction of bare life, I argue that the length of 
bare life, characteristics of the spaces of exception and geographic reality might vary case-by-
case, and can play a complex role in the construction of bare life.  
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The enclaves’ context provides opportunities to consider ‘bare life’ from few different aspects. 
Firstly, bare life is constructed not just through the presence of sovereign power, but through its 
absence. Schmitt formulates that the state of exception ensures the monopoly of violence, which 
in turn guarantees the monopoly of the sovereign power over that space (Schmitt, 1996: 46). 
Thus, it is considered that excessive power over that space by a single sovereign power, in an 
unbroken bounded territorial limit, constructs bare life (Agamben, 1998; 2005). In addition, this 
excessive power is justified with the argument that this power orders the space. The existence of 
these enclaves challenges these concepts and connects two sovereign powers’ overlapping roles 
to craft a space of exception. The home country contains authority but no control, while the host 
country exercises patchy control over the enclaves without any authority. In practice, the de jure 
sovereign power is absent in the enclaves while the de facto sovereign power occasionally 
controls enclaves’ spaces.  
Secondly, it is important to explore social relations of everyday life in the zone of legal 
exclusion and abandonment. When bare life is constructed through the absence of sovereign 
power, people become victim of social exploitation. Both the states offer only cheap 
mystification (Agamben, 1999). The complex strategies and technologies of social otherness 
embedded in the enclave life suggest the importance of counting the social construction of bare 
life. And, thirdly, the experiences of bare life are not uniform for men and women. Gendered 
dimensions of bare life are essential to understand the full essence of the bare life experience. 
While exposure to institutional violence is unique in the enclaves, some other gendered 
vulnerabilities articulated in this chapter are not unique in the enclaves. However, the danger 
and intensity of the exposure to male violence in an extra-legal status, and trauma of double 
victimisation (victim of violence and then inability to seek justice), make gendered vulnerability 
in the enclaves’ spaces of exception unique to those of citizen-women’s vulnerability. 
Finally, there are no violent contestations against sovereign power in the enclaves. However, the 
citizenship aspiration and the acts such as rally, hunger strike for an early exchange of these 
enclaves demonstrated in chapter 4 suggest bare life is not the end of a political life. On the 
contrary to the general construction of bare life as limit case, the enclave residents resist state 
initiatives through their everyday survival measures and recent political actions for citizenship 
aspirations. Some people are successful, some go through miserable experiences and some lose 
the battle and die. Thus, every life in the enclaves is not bare life, but everybody is exposed to 
such vulnerability. The detail of everyday survival in the enclaves will be explored in next 
chapter. 
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7 
 
The Rhythms of Everyday Survival: The Art of Living in the Enclaves  
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
In a desperate financial crisis, I decided to sell my land. To do this, I 
needed to go to Indian land registration office. My Indian relatives 
bribed a Cooch Behar land registration office employee for a smooth 
registration including a fake buyer (on the name of the potential 
buyer). Then, a border broker was paid to supply a ladder and to 
signal (missed call) the safe moment to cross the fenced border at 
night. If spotted by the border guards I could be shot dead. I finished 
my work during the day, waited until it is dark, crossed the fence 
again and came back home alive. I was so close to death!  
(Monir Mittir, male enclave resident, aged 35, interviewed in an 
Indian enclave on 30 January 2010) 
 
‘I always wanted to marry an Indian woman that can provide a 
gateway to Indian voter card. Luckily, my marriage dream came true 
but failed to obtain voter card although I spent several thousand 
rupees on political leaders, Panchayat Prodhan, brokers, and local 
administrative officials since I got married. Unexpectedly, I found an 
amazing opportunity when my brother in law died last year. Officially, 
my brother in law did not die but got a different look with my photo on 
it’.  
(Amol Paul, male enclave resident, aged 27, interviewed in a 
Bangladeshi enclave on 16 October 2009) 
Both the stories delineate the scope of this chapter - how do the enclave dwellers maintain their 
everyday life in a zone of abandonment? Monir Mittir and Amol Paul’s acts were small in 
relation to a state but crucial for their own survival. Thousands of enclave dwellers like Monir 
and Amol depend on similar types of actions for their everyday living. To avoid ‘bare life’, 
these people construct spaces of survival using legal and illegal tactics, local politics and the 
geography of the enclaves that flow together and sometimes reinforce each other. As indicated 
in the last chapter, enclave dwellers adopt diverse innovative methods to escape from bare life. 
144 
 
Unlike the coexistence of bare life and resistance (Gregory, 2006), enclave dwellers try to evade 
such vulnerability through their survival routines.     
How should we conceptualise these survival methods? Do these acts of living explain a form of 
resistance? Resistance is characteristically understood to be expressed through the visual 
politics of rejection such as protest, public statement or sometimes destruction (Amoore, 2005). 
Based on the Foucauldian concept of the power/resistance binary (Foucault 1979), resistance 
theorists conceptualise different forms of resistance. Sharp et al (2000: 3) define it as ‘any 
activity that resists the impositions of domination power’. On the other hand, resistance can be 
‘infrapolitics’, as James Scott (1990) proposes, that include poaching, squatting, desertion, 
evasion, and so on. Although Scott mentions individual action, he, like other resistance 
theorists, also considers a specific group or movement (Scholte, 2000; Amoore, 2005). Neither 
Monir Mittir nor Amol Paul’s actions opposed the involved states’ measures nor did their 
actions attempt to change domination against the enclaves rather they individually and 
temporarily managed to get by. A conceptualisation of resistance has no space for these actions. 
Alternative frameworks for activities that do not fall into the dominance/ resistance binary are 
also inadequate to capture the complexity of enclave life.  
Jones (2012) conceptualises spaces of refusal as intentional individual actions that violate the 
rule of state in everyday practices without any political mandate. He mentions, ‘These other 
ways of seeing, knowing, and being are important acts that refuse the sovereign power’s claim 
to define subjects and activities in those spaces’ (Jones, 2012: 695). Jones (2012) describes 
choice-driven or voluntary movements across the border outside the purview of the state and 
border guard. However, Monir’s story of border crossing is a necessity-driven act of refusal but 
exhibits a complex situation. For Monir it was the legal action of land registration involving 
illegal border crossings. And, Amol’s story goes beyond the scope of ‘spaces of refusal’ rather it 
is a quiet encroachment. Bayat (2010) proposes encroachment and activism that contribute 
social change. Both Monir and Alok’s stories surely link silent encroachment to the host 
country. However, such encroachment is not part of a social nonmovement as Bayat (2010) 
proposes in the context of Middle East. Social nonmovement, as Bayat (2010: 14) proposes, is 
‘collective actions of the noncollective actors; they embody shared practices of large numbers of 
ordinary people whose fragmented but similar activities trigger much social change’. On the 
other hand, spaces of survival in the enclaves involve short-term, necessity and choice driven, 
diverse, tireless but less ambitious, and at times risky and non-confrontational acts. Therefore, 
everyday survival in the enclaves presents a more complex situation, where people constantly 
negotiate for survival in a non-citizenship status, rather than refusal of the state imposed order 
or encroachment.  
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With this background, this chapter shows the innovative and diverse ways of survival methods 
applied by the enclave residents. They are conscious about their powerlessness and they portray 
adaptation to different types of domination such as social, political, institutional, and their 
responses vary with the type of domination. Crucially however, chosen survival tactics might 
expose them to an increased vulnerability as Monir Mittir’s story demonstrates. His economic 
survival gesture through a perilous border crossing could cost his life, constituting an extreme 
form of bare life. With this consideration, it is important to examine (i) what enclave dwellers 
do to make life work and (ii) how do these ‘what’ factors affect their life in dynamic ways? To 
understand what people do, I will use the concept of tactic in everyday practice (De Certeau, 
1984). Using the anthropological concept of temporal rhythm (Harris, 2000), I will then explore 
the second proposition. Neither approach individually adequately paints a clear picture of the 
diverse motives and methods of constructing everyday survival in the enclaves. Rather they 
supplement each other. How people choose between tactics, become innovative, improvise their 
methods and learn from errors is the key focus of this conceptualisation. Therefore an approach 
looking into the rhythms of everyday survival tactics can bring a fuller picture of the 
complexities of enclave life. 
This chapter begins with the theoretical consideration of the rhythm of everyday survival tactics. 
Then the discussion moves onto the rhythm of everyday individual survival techniques to 
encroach in the host country that includes personal connection, opportunity, and corruption and 
so on. Survival techniques vary depending on the geographic location of the enclave and 
mobility across the border. Geographic location, tactic and permanent settlement will be 
discussed in fourth section, and the advancement of life through cross border (India-
Bangladesh) mobility will be explored in the fifth section. The cross border mobility activities 
are not desperate methods to live but these are the ways to advance and develop life 
economically and culturally. Then, I will move onto the community formation and alternative 
approach to address non-citizenship circumstances in Dashiarchora enclave. Collectively, 
Dashiarchora residents form a self-governed enclave. Thus, the chapter answers the final 
research question of the thesis by exploring diverse, interconnected and discrete methods of 
survival. This can provide an understanding of the functional process, agency, economy and 
hierarchy involved in the whole process of making life feasible in the enclave.  
7.2 The Rhythms of Everyday Survival Practices: Conceptual Matters  
To explain the rhythms of everyday survival tactics, I will first define tactic and rhythm; and 
then, I will move onto the connections between these two concepts in the context of these 
enclaves. De Certeau, (1984: 29) proposes that there are countless ways of ‘making do’ in 
everyday practices and the modes of ‘making do’ vary with the necessity, opportunity, fortitude, 
circumstance, and the nature of the dominance people encounter. The weak choose tactics as the 
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weapon to survive (De Certeau,1984: 37). Tactics, he conceptualises, are isolated actions that 
take advantage of the opportunity of the ambiguity of law. De Certeau (1984: 40) mentions 
daily practices of consumers, dwelling, moving about, speaking, shopping and cooking are 
linked with ‘tactical ruses and surprises: clever tricks of the “weak” within the order established 
by the “strong”’. However, He reminds us that these tactical achievements are short-lived. In a 
different analytical aspect and conceptualisation, Bayat (2010) formulates a similar notion under 
a different name - quiet encroachment. Asef Bayat’s (2010) formulation of quiet encroachment 
of the ordinary refers to noncollective but prolonged direct actions of dispersed individuals and 
families to acquire the necessities of their lives in a quiet and unassuming illegal fashion. Thus, 
quiet encroachment is a form of tactic. However, the impacts of tactics and encroachment vary 
significantly. Tactics bring temporary success for the individual and encroachment is linked to 
big numbers and societal change through social nonmovement. Bayat (2010: 17) mentions that 
individual actions of the millions of urban poor, youth, Muslim women are involved in ordinary 
practices of nonmovement but ‘they are bound to lead significant social, ideological and legal 
imperatives’. Everyday life is not merely what people achieve through tactics; it is also 
disappointment, learning and moving forward. De Certeau was more concerned with what the 
weak/poor do but paid less attention on how they use tactics. How do they constitute the spaces 
of survival? What drives them to make a decision between necessity and choices? What happens 
when a tactic fails? 
The temporal rhythms in everyday tactical measures and adaptation can answer the above-
mentioned questions and can bring a rich account of the politics of survival. There has been a 
lot of work on rhythms influenced by Henri Lefebvre’s (2004) book Rhythmanalysis: Space, 
Time and Everyday Life. Geographers have been interested in rhythm’s influence in everyday 
human experience in timespace (Edensor, 2010); comparative study between Indian road users 
and British road users and variations on rhythms of roads (Edensor, 2000); rhythms of the city 
(Crang, 2001); extra-everyday practices in the city of Varanasi (Tiwari, 2008); resistance and 
the rhythms of consumerism (Conlon, 2010); human understandings of place and tidal shifts 
(Jones, 2010); rhythms of climate change (Evans, 2010). Here I will use Harris’s (2000) 
formulation of rhythms. Harris (2000) develops the rhythms of life in the Amazon floodplain 
and explores how people shape their life with seasonality. He mentions that the rhythm of life 
on the floodplain is organised by the people’s perception of the seasonality of the environment, 
adaptation with the changes and strength to face new challenges. Thus, people shape and 
reshape their social and economic aspects of life during seasonal variations year after year. 
Harris (2000: 18) highlights key aspects of man-environment relations; such as, people do not 
know in advance what will happen. Prediction is useful in this context; however, it might be 
proven wrong. Therefore, people rely on their perpetual abilities to know the changes in the 
environment. ‘Their knowledge of change arises primarily from their active engagement and 
movement in the landscape’ (Harris, 2000: 18). With these, people and environment 
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relationships temporally continue with constant innovation and lessons from errors. Thus, 
rhythm describes a constant process of making life with success, failure, experience and 
improvisation.  
Lori Allen’s (2008) concept of the everyday as getting by also tells survival under domination. 
He provides emphasis on the political and social significance of the cultural practices of 
adaptation during violence and Israeli colonialism in Palestine. It involves three aspects. 
Adaptation or getting used to it, managing to function or getting by, and it can be equally 
influential to the movement of politics. Despite dangers and obstacles to life, people go to work, 
get their kids to schools, visit relatives; they ask the rhetorical question, ‘Shu bidna nsawy? 
(what else can we do?)’ (Allen, 2008: 459). They try to collect all information regarding 
occupation, violent attacks, and road closure before they travel. All these interconnected actions 
create the ordinary nature of making things do under domination. This is a form of individual 
actions and embodied social practice against violent oppression without massive impact.  
The limitation of Allen’s (2008) formulation is that it does not address the complexities of 
‘getting by’ and is instead a mono-dimensional framework. His account overlooks the 
connectivity between survival methods and the interplay between different agencies during 
encroachment and its consequential impact on the methods of getting by. Like De Certeau 
(1984) and Bayat (2010), he explains the success of the methods people adopt in their everyday 
practices. While the weak adopt temporary survival methods, they are still vulnerable to 
domination and all tactics and everybody are not successful in their quest for getting by. These 
unsuccessful stories are also part of everyday practices. Therefore, I consider survival and 
progress under domination is multimodal, temporal and linked with continuous transformation. 
In this context, the strength of the conceptualisation of rhythm is its emphasis on the trajectory 
of everyday practices. Therefore, it shows the richness of the temporalities of the tactical 
changes. While tactics and rhythms belong to different analytical contexts, a combined approach 
to the enclaves can reveal ‘practical livedness’ along with their quotidian arrangements, 
vulnerabilities moving between survival methods, risks and learning. Enclave dwellers move 
out from enclaves, brave the ever-evolving uncertainty, exploitation and threats. This happens 
through the production of particular forms of social space where the resilience of one person 
inspires the other. All these aspects construct the trajectory of everyday practices through 
politics and shadow of law. Thus, this chapter explores how the enclave residents use the 
politico-spatial-legality for their everyday survival. 
In the enclaves’ context, I will show a series of rhythms produced by the enclave dwellers’ 
tactical engagement with the involved states. Following Harris (2000), the rhythms of the 
survival tactic in the enclaves will be examined from everyday individual daily-cycle and life-
cycles such as negotiation with the local politics and corrupt administration; and the 
temporalities of the rhythm of unity in the Dashiarchora enclave. In addition, the chapter will 
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show how the enclave dwellers tactically use the geography of the enclaves and international 
borders for their basic survival or advancement of life. The rhythms of everyday survival tactics 
in the enclaves, as will be illustrated in the following sections, involve silent tactical use of the 
weakness of the state system which clearly demonstrates different types of encroachment in 
both the countries’ systems. This also demonstrates multiple agencies’ involvement in the whole 
process such as the encroacher and their contacts in state-system. To understand the complex 
process of encroachment it is necessary to consider the function of the multiple agencies 
alongside the dynamics of the power relations between the encroachers and the authority. 
Encroachment tactics manifestly engage the condition developing the rhythm of everyday 
success and failure to survive and advancement of life as both Monir and Alok’s story tells. In 
addition, the complex internal bureaucracy of profit making can provide illuminating examples 
of hierarchy and different types of economic motive as happens through the cross-border broker, 
wealthy enclave residents, and political elites inside the enclave. As Mittelman & Chin (2000) 
mentions, infrapolitical resistance do not occur in a vacuum; these activities are the product of 
interactions between structure and agency.  
7.3 The Rhythm of Everyday Political Negotiations with the Host Country 
Here, I am exploring everyday tactical negotiations to access the host country’s services. These 
include individual and covert approaches by the enclave residents using whatever opportunities 
come in front of them to manage easy mobility in the host country, ownership of land, 
employment, education, enrolment in hospital and so on. Enclave residents’ mobility to the host 
country is obvious and frequent; however the destination varies with necessity and choice. 
Everyday life in the enclaves needs regular movement across enclave-host country borders. 
They go to the district headquarters for health, education or business purposes. To beat the 
status of ‘non-eligible’ to access any state services, these enclave residents formulate diverse 
innovative methods, which are generally illegal.  
In the context of Bangladeshi enclaves, securing a temporary fake voter ID is the most preferred 
tactic to ease the mobility barrier in the host country. Generally, enclave residents are 
apprehensive of travelling a long way from the enclave if they do not have fake national ID 
card, although some greatly disadvantaged or brave people try their luck to move to other parts 
of India. Almost thirty percent of the total enclave residents managed this ID in India (Sengupta, 
2010; Mandal, 2011). Such arrangements provide a win-win situation for the local political 
elites and the enclave residents; Korimon bibi’s story can elucidate this, 
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‘I am the only earning member for my two children since my 
husband’s demise. Like everybody else, I wanted to work in Delhi to 
earn better wage but it is too risky to do that without a voter card. My 
distant cousin, who is Indian and a Congress activist, managed me a 
voter card with fake address and fake name. I paid him 4000 Rupees 
along with the promise to vote for Congress. This voter card is 
unusable to claim subsidized goods as the authority might catch me 
but it save me from imprisonment under the foreigner’s act. In return, 
I vote Congress. There is always a risk to be caught as other party 
activists might inform the election commission. Then, I have nothing 
left again!  However, I am lucky to have a voter card for five years.’ 
 (Karimon Bibi, female enclave resident, aged 30, interviewed in a 
Bangladeshi enclave on 01 November 2009). 
False identities aid some enclave residents securing employment in other parts of India while 
they work for local political elite’s vote bank. As Karimon mentioned, the ID card temporarily 
resolves the mobility barrier and uncertainty prevails when local Indians officially complain. 
Once one door is closed then they knock on other doors; they bribe again for another fake voter 
ID as Alok Paul’s story, at the beginning of this chapter, describes in relation to the tireless 
efforts obtaining a voter card. Enclave dwellers’ mobility is not restricted in Bangladesh, but 
free state services are linked to national ID cards.  
Neighbourhood connections are effective, sometimes, but heavily rely on religious sameness. 
Generally, Muslims seek support to other Muslim neighbours and so do Hindus. It is relatively 
easy for the Hindu enclave dwellers, specifically for the upper cast Hindus, in India to manage 
Indian voter cards while only a few Muslims have that opportunity. Informal group discussions 
with Muslim and Hindu enclave dwellers in the mixed religion enclaves, Madhdha 
Mashaldanga, Mashaldanga, Korola and Poaturkuthi, reveal this fact. According to the enclave 
dwellers, approximately 30 percent of the South Mashaldanga residents are Hindus and a 
majority of them are upper cast Hindus. Muslim enclave dwellers, during my participant 
observation on 29 October 2009, complained, ‘only ten Muslim families managed voter cards 
while all Hindus have voter cards.’ The Hindu participants did not deny the claim but added, 
‘voter cards do not make us Indians. We only have free mobility but cannot claim subsidised 
goods like the Indians’. One Muslim participant then said, ‘we never get any help from you to 
secure voter cards’. The Hindus kept quite. In addition, the Hindu enclave dwellers report to the 
authority about the Muslims fake ID card. As Monirul Alam (aged 38, participant observation in 
Poaturuthi enclave on 15 March 2010) mentions that he wanted to get an ID card using his 
cousin’s address. While everything was almost ready, his Hindu enclave neighbour informed 
the authority about Monirul’s enclave identity. Monirul’s dream for an ID card remained 
unsuccessful.   
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Similarly, the majority of Muslim enclave residents in Bangladesh are in a better situation than 
the Hindus. The Hindu respondents in the Indian enclaves were complaining that many Hindus 
moved to India because of their Muslim neighbours’ hostile attitude. These hostile attitudes 
include treating and framing the Hindu enclave dwellers as Indian spy, attacking and robbing 
the Hindu houses and so on. Willem Van Schendal (2002) defines such religion-based act of 
kindness in these enclaves as proxy citizenship. In such cases, these religious-minorities 
develop good ties with the home country’s border guards through bribes or religious sameness; 
such as Hindus with the Indian border guards and Muslims with the Bangladeshi border guards. 
Thus, people are surviving in one way or another. As De Certeau (1984) mentions, the tactic is 
all about timely use of opportunity. Amol Paul’s, the opening story of this chapter, brother in 
law’s death and Amol’s opportunity to become Indian is the best example of the timely use of 
opportunity.   
Enclave residents’ economic survival depends on their everyday movement to the host country. 
The farmers sell their products in the mainland close to the enclaves, poor landless people work 
as day labourers either close to the enclaves or go as far as to the capitals on either side. Enclave 
life is consumed with fear but they learn from mistakes and improvise their tactics. As Harris 
(2000) mentions, rhythm is a continuous process of learning from experiences. There were 
incidents that mainland people took the crops from the enclave but never paid (field note, 
poaturkuthi enclave, 28 October 2010). Now, the agricultural products are sold inside the 
enclaves and they take money first and then allow the crop to be taken to the mainland. 
Fisherman, Korim Mia, always hires his Indian friend whenever he sells fish in an Indian haat. 
His friend, in fact, acts as a seller and Amol stands beside him. Korim cannot risk being there 
alone in case Indian gangsters take the whole bucket without paying him. Once everything is 
sold the proxy seller gets thirty percent of the total profit as he invested his national identity in 
fish selling.  
Some wealthy enclave residents in Bangladesh and India bought land inside the mainland for 
their children’s education and future employment until the national ID card was introduced. The 
Indian side introduced strict procedures to buy land and citizenship since the late 1980s. Those 
who moved before that time are Indian citizens now, but constitute less than 20 percent (Kiron 
Sarkar aged 50, local journalist, interviewed in Cooch Behar on 26 March 2010). People send 
their cell phone to the mainland to get the battery charged. If anyone does not have friends or 
family outside the enclave they pay for this. Some enclaves have iron contamination in their 
drinking water. Participant observation in Poaturkuthi enclave reveals that some people in those 
enclaves collect better quality drinking water from the mainland  at dawn to avoid bitter 
experiences such as harsh words from the Indians. Occasionally, illicit activities are also a 
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means of individual economic survival that involve opium plantations, generally 4/5 plants, in 
the backyard, which can temporarily offer financially improved life. Such plantation is not for 
commercial purposes. But it helps some landless and very poor enclave residents to feed the 
families as the house in the below image shows the sign of extreme poverty. Sometimes BSF 
officials enter into the enclaves to burn all opium plants. 
Access to education is also tough for the enclave dwellers and bribery is a useful investment for 
education; however education does not ensure a job. Absence of schools in most of the enclaves 
forces the enclave parents to manage a place for their children in the host country. Those who 
have relatives in India bribe the local Panchayet Pradhan to get an Indian birth certificate. The 
birth certificate is a prerequisite for an enrolment in an Indian school. Enclave parents use their 
Indian relative’s name and address as official parents in that birth certificate. A grandfather, 
uncle, cousin or well-wisher neighbour can become an official parent for life. However, those 
who have no had Indian relatives are deprived of education at the beginning. While enrolment in 
a school is hard, it is harder to continue study. Sometimes, enclave children are removed from 
the schools when citizen parents complain or the school’s authority realize that the birth 
certificate is fake (Van Schendel, 2002; Sengupta, 2010). Then, there will be more effort in 
different schools, more bribes to pay. If everything goes unsuccessfully, the child ends up 
working with his parents in the agricultural field. Enrolment in a Bangladeshi school is possible 
without a birth certificate but the enclave children are deprived from the stipend that the 
Bangladesh Government provides to encourage mass education. However, most of the educated 
enclave youths find education is unprofitable because of restricted employment opportunity. 
Every employment in India and Bangladesh is secured after completion of all the security 
verifications of birthplace and permanent address. Securing a job is almost impossible without 
any house in the host country and enclave residents are helpless as no tactic is applicable in this 
regard. The end, the result is the same for all, unless they have money or connections, 
irrespective of their location in Bangladesh or India.  
The survival methods are not discrete actions of enclave dwellers rather they link the complex 
web of acquaintances and stakeholders in the state machineries. For example, Hasan Alom was 
enrolled in a school with a fake birth certificate from the local government representative, 
Panchayet Pradhan, Once he finished school, his Indian school certificate allowed him to apply 
for a RMP certificate course. With this degree, he is eligible to run a dispensary and can see 
patients with minor health problems. To establish his dispensary business in India, he bribed all 
local political musclemen, who then arranged registration for Hasan’s dispensary in India. He 
separately bribed the Panchayet Pradhan to avoid administrative problems and the police to 
keep his uninterrupted mobility across India-enclave border. Every year, he pays more than 
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10,000 rupees to networks to run his business. It is a continuous process- if he decides to stop 
bribing these people; his business in India will end at that moment. Hasan’s education and work 
in India is a part of the corruption network in the local administration. Thus, the existence of 
enclaves provides financial advantage to many others. Like Hasan, most of the enclave residents 
find bribing to different people is the only way to make life easier. However, all people are not 
as lucky as Hasan; some of these acquaintances and stakeholders take money but do not work 
for the enclave dwellers as happened with Amol in the opening story.   
This section shows the rhythm of everyday individual negotiations with the host country 
through diverse connections, politics and institutional corruptions. It reveals constant individual 
efforts to access the host country’s state services; and demonstrates how they use their cultural 
identity, kinship and local politics to manage essential survival in the enclaves. The socio-
political use of the illegal method contributes to survival strategies. Since all the indispensable 
methods are fragile, all these survival tactics are temporary and fluid. New crises emerge in the 
flow of the everyday life, innovative methods work in people’s minds to win the predicament. 
Thus, Now I will move onto the relationships between tactics, geography and legality shaping 
some enclave residents’ life. 
7.4 Geographic Factors, Tactics and Legality 
In this section I am focusing on how the geographic location of enclaves and enclave dwellers’ 
property ownership tactically helps them to secure a legal status in the host country or at least 
some services from the host country illegally. Complicated and differentiated land ownership in 
two nation-states causes countless problems for many families; however people still explore 
prospects out of those complications. The enclave-India border separated Bimol Paul’s 
properties into two nation-states once Cooch Behar joined India. Kamol Paul and Notobor Paul, 
his two sons, received enclave properties and Indian properties respectively while his father died 
in 1950. Bimol Paul’s will decided both the sons’ nationality and fate although the difference of 
this split was inconceivable at that time. Bimol Paul died in a transitional time when Cooch 
Behar just merged with India. People in the Bangladeshi enclaves did not realize the difficulties 
of enclave life until the visa and border guarding systems were imposed in 1952. Over time, 
their prosperity varied because of the land holdings but kinship still exists; Notobor provides 
electricity support to his brother Kamol through a tiny electric wire (fig 7.1). They are vigilant 
of the authority’s actions in the neighbourhood and temporarily remove the connection if there 
is a chance to be caught. Such arrangement is rare in the enclaves’ however there are other 
forms of cooperation between friends, relatives and well-wishers.  
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Fig 7.1: Familial connection and encroachment to host country’s electricity facility. 
Similar to Bimol Paul’s situation, some other people found their house is in the enclave but their 
agricultural land is located in the host country. The location of the house determines people’s 
citizenship in both India and Bangladesh; therefore these people are considered as enclave 
dwellers in the host country. In these circumstances, people not only drag their original house to 
the agricultural land but also their citizenship. The owner of this property informed me that 
shifting a few yards of his house provided him complete citizenship in India during 1980s after 
twenty years. It is similar situation in Dashiarchora in Bangladesh where many people moved to 
their possessions to the mainland. These are examples of the fluidity of citizenship when people 
can choose the host country’s citizenship because of their strategic land-holdings; however Ali’s 
story presented in Chapter 4 explains that this method does not always bring success as 
Bangladeshi border guards foiled his attempts to build a house in Bangladesh territory.  
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Fig 7.2: Border marker showing enclave-India boundary (top); border pillar and newly built house 
less than a foot distance from the pillar to India to get Indian citizenship (middle); people are 
sitting on the old location of house which was inside the enclave and the new house (bottom). 
In a different example, Sam Poran covered the border pillar with the bamboo fences of his 
property’s boundary. He did not worry to build a house in-between two countries territories and 
declared, ‘no border between my inherited property’ (Sam Poran, aged 38, field note, 12 
October, 2009). Literally, one of his rooms sits on the fault line of the mainland and the enclave 
(fig 7.3); and his tube well pumps Indian ground water for Bangladeshi household work (fig 
7.3). He keeps the border pillar inside his house without any official predicament. His parents 
managed to get Indian ration cards for the whole family in early 1980s, which provided the 
power to keep the border pillar as interior artifact or private property.  
Old House  
New House 
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Fig: 7.4: Border pillar inside fenced boundary of a house (top left); border pillar (top right); both 
the man standing on both sides of the border. The tube well falls in Indian side and the house is in 
the enclave (bottom). 
The geographic location of an enclave close to the India-Bangladesh border brings a tough life 
because of the border guards’ scrutiny. BSF indiscriminately enter inside the enclave sometimes 
enter into houses; for example an anonymous respondent mentions his experiences in Korola 
enclave, ‘my house is two hundred yards away from the border fence. The BSF does not bother 
whether it is a day or night, they even enter into our houses and search for smuggled items, 
sometimes beat us unnecessarily’ (aged 23, field note, 11 October, 2009). Most of the bordering 
enclave residents provide free labour, bamboo, chicken, eggs and so on to the border guard’s 
camp to have easy mobility in the evening and especially during the time of gun battles between 
two border guards. Gun battles between the two border guards are frequent and can occur any 
segment of the border. Generally, gun battles occur when the border guards trespass into the 
neighbouring territory either by accident or in hot pursuit of smugglers or dispute over 
smuggling deals, or intent on committing rape (Van Schendel, 2005: 309; also see Jones, 2012). 
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Such escalations of violence affect the whole borderland including the enclaves. Specifically, 
the enclave dwellers’ mobility becomes restricted in such circumstances.  
People generally come home before dusk as BSF soldiers check every person walking or 
cycling back to home at night; and it is mandatory for the borderlanders to keep an ID card 
always with them. Besides, every bicycle and motorcycle owner needs to show the registration 
of ownership to the BSF in the borderland as part of the security measures to stop smuggling. 
To buy a bicycle or motorcycle or cow, every Indian needs authorization from the local 
Panchayet Pradhan (for detail about the ‘roles of Panchayat’ see Datta & Datta, 1995; Gazdar & 
Sengupta, 1997). None of the enclave residents is eligible for such authorization but they use an 
Indian friend’s name and address in the registration card. If the BSF chase them, they mention it 
is their brother’s vehicle and send the official owner to collect the bike from the BSF showing 
the registration card. Alternatively, some enclave residents buy second-hand cycles to avoid 
registration matters. All these are the wide-ranging measures people take to make life workable 
in the enclaves. This section shows how the geographic location of an enclave changes the 
pattern of vulnerability resulting in different innovative tactics to emerge. Tactics change with 
place, time and other factors.  Some lucky enclave residents managed to resolve their non-
citizenship problem permanently because of their strategic land holdings, however some others 
failed. Thus, it reiterates similar tactics cannot assure success in all enclaves.  
7.5 The Rhythm of Mobility and Advancement across the Indo-Bangladesh 
Border   
This section illustrates temporary and permanent mobility across the India-Bangladesh border 
and advancement of life. I consider the above described methods are necessities for the survival 
of life while cross-border mobility is generally for the purpose of economic and cultural 
advancement.   
7.5.1 Temporary Movement  
The short-term movement across the international border involves working in the host country, 
land registration and visiting relatives. A few enclave elites also have good connections with the 
local Indian journalists, local political elites and border guards. They sell their ‘India link’ to 
other ordinary enclave residents who desperately need to register their land. These enclave elites 
are allowed to cross the fenced border gate while many other ordinary enclave residents cannot. 
A similar business-like situation exists on the Indian side. A few enclave dwellers who managed 
Indian voter cards and have good connections with the Bangladeshi land registration office do 
the necessary works for land registration on behalf of the landowner. Necessary works involve 
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bribing land registration office employee, managing a fake buyer on the name of original buyer. 
They hand over their voter card to the Indian border guard, cross the fenced gate as if visiting a 
relative who lives in a village cut off by the border fence. They know when the Bangladeshi 
border guard patrol the border and cross the border accordingly. Such frequent movements of a 
few people indicate a porous border depending on the border guards’ choices; however such 
movement is tough for the ordinary enclave dwellers. These ordinary enclave dwellers either 
provide ‘free labour’ at the camp or temporarily manage some form of card for some days. 
When this card is invalid, they hire border brokers to cross the border as did Monir Mittir, the 
opening story of this chapter, and risk their life. While land registration is necessary for 
survival, the agents of land registration gain financially through these host country connections.  
The closeness of an Indian enclave to the border often provides opportunities to choose work on 
either side of the border. Sometimes, enclave residents find that the home country’s fellow 
citizens are much friendlier than the host country’s people and cross the international border 
very often. Mahima, Lotamari enclave resident, is one of those enclave dwellers who believe 
Indians are sympathetic to the Indian enclave residents. Mahima has disputes over property 
ownership with another enclave resident. As that enclave resident is relatively wealthy he could 
buy some Bangladeshi voices such as local political leaders, elected local government 
representative. The Bangladeshi representatives’ verdict was in favour of Mahima’s opponent. 
When Mahima disobeyed the verdict, a Bangladeshi gang attacked her house. Mahima and her 
family escaped to the nearby Indian village cut off by the border fence. They sheltered her for 
two weeks. Now Mahima works in that village and she knows that the BSF visit the zero line 
twice and the BDR once a day. Therefore, cross border mobility practices do not only provide 
economic benefit for an individual enclave resident but also generate informal economic 
agency. Some other enclave residents of this enclave also work in this village.  
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Fig: 7.4: Mahima’s every day movement across the India-Bangladesh border. The image is taken 
from the edge of Lotamari enclave and the dotted line shows the India-Bangladesh border.  
For economic advancement, some Indian enclave dwellers cross the fenced international border 
to work in Delhi. Delhi motivates some Indian enclave dwellers obtain temporary ID using 
different connections (fig 7.5). They obtain these cards from the Indian Panchayet Pradhans 
either by providing a bribe or by free labour in the BSF camps. According to some cardholders, 
these IDs are only acceptable to the BSF guard who was either involved in issuing those cards 
by the Panchayet or ‘very kind’ to the enclave residents.  Every border guard moves from one 
segment of border to another every three months, therefore those cards become obsolete very 
soon.  I consider these movements as the advancement of life rather than a desperate form of 
survival. We can consider Akbar Mia’s (aged 55, interviewed on 19 February 2010) story as an 
example. He is a resident of Dashiarchora enclave in Bangladesh and went to Delhi in 2003 for 
work. His formal outfit and confident approach helped him to work as a broker closely linked 
with the Indian passport office. He managed Indian passports for illegal Bangladeshis in Delhi 
for two years but did not worry to get one of his own as he belongs to the group who consider 
‘Hindustan (India) is for the Hindus and Bangla (Bangladesh) is for the Muslims’. Akbar came 
back home with a good amount of money and no one raised concern about his illegal stay and 
work without any ID card. The outfit and confidence compensated for his non-citizenship status.  
Border Pillar 
Bangladesh
h 
India 
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Fig 7.5:  Different types of ID cards that the Indian enclave residents managed over time. 
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7.5.2 Permanent Movement 
Permanent movement across the India-Bangladesh border mostly occurred after Cooch Behar’s 
merger with India in 1949. Soon after partition, Hindus from the Northern part of Bangladesh 
moved to Cooch Behar exchanging land with Indian Muslims. Therefore, almost 80% of 
enclave residents in Bangladesh side are originally from Cooch Behar. The second wave of 
movement occurred after the independence war of Bangladesh in 1971 and scattered movements 
are occurring till to date. Some people moved several times. For example, Abdul Aziz’s 
(Dashiarchora resident) grandfather was originally a resident of Tangail, Bangladesh who 
moved to Cooch Behar after partition but his father came back to Dashiarchora during the 1965 
India-Pakistan War. Hence, desire for citizenship and the feeling of nationality is not fixed and 
it is not also very tough to switch over in some cases. These scattered movements still occur 
through the connections of religion and relatives with the hope of enhanced prospect. Bishshwar 
Bormon from115-Bashkata enclave had a very good connection with the BSF and local Indian 
administration and vigorously demanded Indian facility inside the enclave. He was considered a 
BSF informant in Bangladesh and a criminal case was filed against him (Bishshwar Bormon, 
aged 45, interviewed in Cooch Behar on 15 March 2010). Then he moved to India in 2008 and 
the government allotted him a house with refugee status, and now he runs a pharmacy there. 
Bishshwar Bormon is one of the very few lucky enclave residents who managed a house 
allotment in India.  
Cultural factors work to influence the permanent movement between mainland and enclave. 
Bakalirchora enclave experienced a mass exchange of land with the minority-scheduled caste 
Hindus and indigenous group ‘Orao’ from the northern part of Bangladeshi mainland with the 
Muslims in the enclave in 1987. However, five Muslim families in that enclave failed to tag 
themselves in this exchange procedure because they are the landless people and did not have 
any land to exchange. These Hindu minority groups and the ‘Orao’ people used to live in the 
same village in Bangladesh and it was a collective migration of the whole village. They moved 
out from Bangladesh only because of the wedding dilemma. Because of their small numbers, 
sometimes, they had to marry relatives; however, they have the same indigenous group in the 
Indian side of north Bengal. Legally, it was an official exchange of land between two 
Bangladeshi groups authorised by the sub-registry office (Land Exchange Agreement, 1987). 
This amazing land exchange occurred at night to avoid border guards’ scrutiny and they took 
shelter in each other’s house with the hope of a better prospect. It is an internal migration but 
involves international border crossing and no official arrangement was done to decide the 
method of exchange. This whole matter definitely advanced the migrated Muslim peoples’ life 
as they could upgrade their status from everyday non-citizenship to citizenship. On the contrary, 
the ‘Orao’ people were downgraded from Bangladeshi citizens to the Bangladeshi enclave 
dwellers. On a daily basis, they are now living in a non-citizenship status like other enclave 
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dwellers in India and Bangladesh. In addition, their desire to eliminate minority status was 
unsuccessful in practical sense as their mobility is restricted in India. Like other Indians, the 
Indian ‘Orao’ people are not interested to establish marital relationship with the enclave ‘Orao’ 
considering the disadvantaged life in the enclave. The respondents in Bakalirchora mentions, 
‘we never knew the word chhit (enclave) until we came here. But the Indian Orao community 
knows that an enclave is nothing but a hell. Why should they marry us?’ (field note, 17 October 
2009). Therefore, not all efforts to advance life are successful in the enclaves.  
This section illustrates some enclave dwellers prosaic practices of diverse mobility across the 
India-Bangladesh border for their desired advancement of life. It develops a picture of how the 
border is practised in the rhythm of enclave life. It involves the individual life cycle, daily cycle 
as well as collective life cycle (enclave ‘Orao’ community). An enclave dweller is not only a 
victim of the international border and border securitisation procedures; they invent their own 
methods to counter those obstacles. In both the contexts, border guards play a conflicting role as 
an agent; and they decide different types of exceptions. The examples presented in this section 
are very diverse, mostly individual, temporary and permanent actions either for survival or for 
advancement of life. All these actions have certain legal and illegal aspects such as Indian 
enclave residents working in India is legal while the methods of border crossing are illegal. 
However, I believe the permanent movements across the border do not rank as tactics. Tactics 
bring temporary solutions to the weak or marginal people (De Certeau, 1980). Here, the 
limitation lies to conceptualise the ‘Orao’ movement or Bishshwar Bormon’s permanent 
settlement in India.  
7.6 The Rhythm of Everyday Unity: Construction of Self-governing Enclave 
Although individual efforts are the common means of survival in the enclaves, Dashiarchora 
provides a different pattern. It is a unique example of community cohesion and construction of 
the ‘autonomous enclave’ along with its own constitution, administration, security forces and 
judiciary system to run the enclave territory. This enclave is not unique only for its self-
governance; it has good connections with both the involved states; and is also known for illicit 
economic activities. Historically, Dashiarchora had a Hindu majority. However, immediately 
after Cooch Behar’s merger with India, Muslims in Cooch Behar and Hindus of this enclave 
exchanged their properties and took shelter in each other’s house with the hope of a better future 
in a country where they belong to majority. Soon after Muslims arrived here, they found 
themselves in a difficult situation. In Nawsher Munshi’s word, 
“This place was like a hell when we first came from Cooch Behar in 
1958. We found ourselves surrounded by most wanted Pakistani 
criminals’, scrutinized by the Pakistani border guards and victimized 
of burglary. The robbers not only targeted all the valuable items but 
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also took our ordinary clothes, shoes and so on. Then, we begun to 
guard our territory every night; each and every man worked by 
rotation along with bow and arrow. The success of the nighttime 
vigilance inspired us to think about self-governance and establishment 
of our own state-like territory. However, burglary and robbery were 
still unbearable even after Bangladesh’s independence. One night, few 
enclave residents’ killed a robber and hung him in a tree as an 
example of the obvious fate of robbery inside this country! 
Bangladeshi police came to find the killer but we never mentioned 
those people’s name. Then they charged fine and everyone in this 
enclave contributed to pay the fine. The robbers learned a lesson and 
did not dare to rob us again.’  
(Nawsher Munshi, Male enclave resident, aged 75, interviewed 15 
February 2010).    
Nawsher Munshi’s experience in this enclave demonstrates the ancient way of community 
formation and unity in need. They not only fought with robbers but also stood strong in front of 
the then Pakistani/Bangladeshi administration. These people closely controlled themselves to 
run the enclave territory as a state does. Almost every enclave resident considers this initiative 
was the best for them. Hariharn Mondol (aged 70, field note, 10 February 2010) says, ‘every 
place needs a rule of law, and otherwise it will be pandemonium’. When their home country 
kept them outside the modern state system it was the people who decided to establish the rule of 
law; thus it is a good example of the establishment of authority or governance from the bottom.  
Within community literatures, there are competing arguments on what the driving force for 
community is. Different studies focus on basic disagreements on three particular areas. These 
include community as a geographical area or as group of people in a particular place or as an 
area of common life (Delanty, 2003; Tonnies, 1887; Keller, 2003). Besides, Tonnies’ (1887) 
theory of community considers perfect unity of human wills is the basic foundation for 
community and he defines kinship, neighbourhood and friendship as three central aspect of 
community. Keller (2003) considers community as a union of many elements but views 
territorial community as an anchor of human existence and territorial connotation and as the 
most fundamental for community formation. In this case, a bounded site of territory is one of 
the essentials for community formation, which generates a ‘collective identity, a sense of 
closure, and safety’ (Keller, 2003: 267). In the context of Dashiarchora, the driving force is the 
necessity of survival, which can be considered, as the common will as Tonnies (1887) 
mentioned long ago. It signifies a kind of close-knit territorially bounded community, which 
involves kinship and social interaction within the locality. The point to emphasise here is that 
place structures social relations within the enclaves just as the social (and economic) relations 
determine the parameters of choice in relation to place.  
The gradual shift towards an autonomous enclave through the practice of democracy is quite 
innovative. During the late 1980s they moved for an elected chairman than a selected one. The 
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enclave community established their own population census and defined the number of voters 
and went for a free and fair election to elect a leader and members of the council (Masiur Ali, 
Election Commissioner Dashiarchora, aged 29, field note, 06 April 2010). This procedure is 
gender biased as female voters are abandoned from the voting rights because of their less 
efficient security net during the election (Ali, 2009). Interestingly, democracy was practised in 
this abandoned space years before their host country, Bangladesh, achieved democracy. Over 
time, they picked the interim government concept used in Bangladesh. An enclave president and 
twelve-member ministerial council run the enclave state every five years. Once the government 
is at the end of its tenure, it hands over power to the selected mosque clerics who work as 
interim government, run the election and hand over power to the next elected chairman. The 
chairman is the head of the security forces (120 members) and judiciary mechanisms of the 
enclave. So far, the court punished people for killing, robbery, and internal conflicts over 
property and other social disputes. They have a detention camp but no prison; hence, 
punishment is generally in the form of financial punishment.    
Running self-governance in an enclave is challenging. This invites conflict with local 
Bangladeshi power dynamics and occasional clashes with the BDR. Sometimes, internal 
disputes over property ownership challenge the power and verdict of the enclave council as the 
loser tries involving Bangladeshi people. Additionally, Bangladeshi political elites every time 
try to interfere in the enclave matters for their financial benefits. During the tenure of the second 
elected chairman, Bangladeshi police along with political leaders tried to meddle in the internal 
disputes. A death threat to the chairman strongly united the whole enclave community. Failing 
to get any support from Indian and Bangladeshi administrations, they stood together and 
declared that all Bangladeshi people’s land inside the enclave will be vested by the enclave 
council and article 81 of the constitution will be implemented for the enclave residents who 
sought Bangladeshi help.
9
 Such do or die decisions during the early 1990s mark an example of 
the strength of community and strong determination. In the second Chairman’s words, ‘that was 
the best decision so far and such strong and brave unity allowed us to stay in peace for many 
years’ (Hossain Chairman, aged 61, interviewed on 11 April 2010). They also resisted the BDR 
entrance into the enclave without permission of the enclave council chairman. Once two BDR 
soldiers entered inside enclave and tried catch enclave resident as smuggler but could not stand 
in front of huge encounter and lost his rifle in the mob. Besides the strong unity and brave 
resistance to some external invasions, this enclave is the transit or home for many illicit 
activities. The drugs come from India, are kept inside the enclave and then distributed to 
                                                             
9 Article 81 of the Dashiarchora Constitution says, ‘if any enclave resident outsider on internal dispute without the permission of the Council or any enclave 
resident make any anti-state comment he will face the maximum punishment’. 
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different parts of Bangladesh. Since this business involves cross-border gangs, nobody in the 
enclave dared to encounter this.  
Although administratively autonomous, economically this enclave is integrated with both India 
and Bangladesh. Everyday economic activities in the enclave are mostly connected with the host 
country; however the desire for economic advancement links them with the home country. They 
buy and sell agro products in the nearby Bangladeshi market. At times, they could compare 
prices in Indian side as some Indian border guards irregularly allowed them to visit India. For 
the last few years such movement is very limited, as BSF are not keen to count this Card 
anymore. Wages in the construction sites in Delhi and other rising cities in India are higher than 
the wage in Bangladesh; and the Indian currency is stronger than Bangladesh. Therefore, many 
enclave residents, especially the male residents, move to the home country for a better financial 
future. Working in Delhi involves a series of legal and illegal measures. It is illegal because of 
the method of crossing the border but it is not illegal for Indian residents to work in India. An 
illicit economy has flourished by the cross-border brokers who take the responsibility to cross 
the border, transport and work in Delhi. Bikrom Singh who just came home to see his parents in 
the enclave explained his story, 
‘I paid 4000 BD taka to the broker in Bangladesh side. He managed 
the BDR and his counterpart bribed a BSF man on duty. We crossed 
the barbed wire fence and Indian broker took ten of us to a nearby 
house. We stayed there for two days and more fifteen people came by 
then. They hired a bus to Delhi, which dropped us to our workplace. 
Illegal Bangladeshis wage is lower than the Indians but we get the 
same wage as Indians and we don’t have fear to be jailed under 
foreigner’s act since we have our land documents. This encouraged 
more enclave residents to work in Delhi.’  
(Bikrom Singh, aged 19, interviewed on February, 18, 2010).  
Bikrom Ali’s border crossing and employment opportunity tells of a strong network of cross- 
border business involving border guards, brokers and employers in Delhi. The story also maps 
onto the transitory emergency citizenship described in chapter 4 (section 4.5). In that section, I 
have shown that the enclave residents occasionally have a particular element or right of 
citizenship. Dashiarchora residents cannot have citizenship rights with their land documents but 
this land record can provide them a kind of legitimacy to work in the home country. Because of 
this legal advantage, a good number of Dashiarchora residents work in Delhi which let a phone 
call business grow and survive in the enclave (fig 7.6). There is a growing demand to stay in 
touch with the family in Dashiarchora and also to inform others if anyone is caught as illegal 
immigrant. A pharmacy introduced this side business and the banner demonstrates a variety of 
options to get connected with neighbours’ and relatives over the phone. This shop is close to the 
border and the owner has an Indian sim card; therefore every call to Delhi is local. Such 
connections not only help to know the whereabouts of the relatives and friends; it provides 
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guides for others to think about making money. The success of the election depends on the 
promise to make better connections with India at least for the land registration purpose. 
Sometimes, enclave residents are caught as illegal immigrants, but are released soon following 
negotiations between the enclave council and solicitor and local Indian Panchayat. This 
connection is another crucial issue during the enclave council election. The temporal rhythm of 
unity in Dashiachora provides an interesting insight into the everyday social relations in a zone 
of abandonment.  
 
Fig 7.6: Phone call shop’s banner in the middle of Dashiarchora. The original banner (top); 
translated banner (bottom)  
The rhythms of everyday unity and functionality of Dashiarchora help to develop the temporal 
understanding of place making - from a disordered place to the self-governing enclave. In 
addition to the rhythm of the enclave community, there are examples of placement and 
displacement of self. As this section shows individual rhythms of mobilities with the examples 
of cross-border employment and phone call business.  
 
150-Enclave Dashiarchora 
Delhi to Dashiarchora 
To make a call - 06 BD Taka/Minute 
To receive a call- 01 BD Taka/Minute 
Call from Mobile to Mobile - 02 BD Taka/Minute 
Innama Pharmacy  Proprietor: Dr. MD. Imdadul Haque 
01727561479/01937853169/09647726042 
Rashmela Bazaar, Azizar Rahman Tankar Moor, Dashiarchora, Dinhata, 
Cooch Behar 
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7.7 Conclusion 
Using two conceptual approaches - temporal rhythm (Harris, 2000) and tactic (De Certeau, 
1984), I have articulated temporalities of everyday social relations in the enclaves, enclave 
dwellers’ mobility across the border, and legal and illegal engagement with the concerned 
states. I have explored the rhythm of everyday life when people use diverse tactics for the basic 
survival and advancement throughout their life cycle. Rather than only looking at what they do 
for survival, I have focused on the temporalities of their rhythmic structure of social activities 
and politics of survival including what they do and how do they try to survive and what are the 
impacts of such methods in their life. This helped to reveal the everyday trajectory of enclave 
life, including a diversity of survival tactics, adaptation, and unity in need, and the uncertainty 
and vulnerability of enclave life. While the aim is to explore how the enclave dwellers respond 
to their non-citizenship, an approach based on a framework of either encroachment (Bayat, 
2010) or getting by (Allen, 2008) or tactics (De Certeau, 1984) could only bring one aspect of 
their life leaving other diverse actions unexplored. Therefore, I argue, the rhythms of everyday 
survival tactics show a holistic approach to understand everyday survival in a zone of 
abandonment concentrating on the temporalities of the enclave dwellers everyday cycle of 
mundane life. 
The force of necessity drives survival under domination and the necessity entails different 
methods in which geography has a key role. For these enclaves, it is their special setting that 
determines the type of tactical use ranging from citizenship change to community formation, 
employment and so on. All the empirical evidence suggests that many enclave residents are 
ultra-mobile for economic reasons and territorial because of their place-based identity. The 
movement across the border section signifies that these movements are not a local matter; it is 
regional and connects the entire territory of the both states. It demonstrates borderless 
encroachment while the encroachers can manage to cross the international border.  
All the examples in this chapter map onto the previous empirical chapters. It links the practice 
of legal norms with non-citizenship, border security and bare life in a complicated manner. The 
concerned states strictly restricted any legal status to the enclave residents in the host country. In 
contrast, the state agencies and border guards’ illicit profit making, and at times inefficient 
functioning, work as agencies to the enclave dwellers survival measures. In both ways, these are 
examples of ambiguities and functionalities of border security measures as well as state 
sovereignty practices. The legal and illegal roles of the state agencies construct vulnerability and 
precarious life in the enclaves. As Jones (2012: 02) puts it, sovereign power in the borderland is 
‘multifaceted, partial and conflicted’. I will develop this point further in the next chapter while 
summarising the whole thesis.  
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Conclusion and Summary of the Thesis 
 
 How do politico-spatial-legal factors shape citizenship in the enclaves? 
     What role(s) do boundaries perform in everyday life in the enclaves? 
What are the (il)legal-political vulnerabilities present in the enclaves? 
  What is the (il)legal survival methods adopted by the enclave residents? 
By investigating an everyday geography of the politico-spatial-legality in Indian and 
Bangladeshi enclaves, the aim of this thesis was to understand how the long existence of these 
enclaves shapes their residents’ everyday lives. To achieve this aim, the aforementioned 
research questions were employed. All these research questions examined the essential 
connections and barriers that the enclaves’ residents’ experience in their day-to-day interactions 
with the host and the home countries. Theoretically, all these negotiations, contradictions, 
vulnerabilities or survival methods explained how crucially everyday life is trapped in politico-
spatial-legality (PSL). In this context, the PSL interactions are drawn from the interplay 
between the host country, enclave and the home country. All the empirical chapters reveal the 
complexities, ambiguities and paradoxes in relation to the PSL’s multiple interactions. It is 
evident, considering all the empirical examples presented in this thesis, that these enclaves are 
excluded from the legal territorial sovereignty of the home country constituting a ‘law free 
zone’. And, the enclave dwellers live in terrible inhumane conditions as neither citizens nor 
refugees nor prisoners. They are the non-status people who are practically abandoned from a 
nation-state; in this context, the state can be seen as a ‘dissubjectification machine’ (Agamben, 
2005: 116). The thesis also investigated how enclave dwellers cope with such circumstances 
and survive and advance their life using the fissures, gaps and legal loopholes of the state-
system.  
Now, I revisit the research questions briefly. The first research question looked into the political 
processes and practices, spatial setting and the law’s role in the enclave residents’ citizenship 
rights. To answer this question, chapter 4, titled ‘From Citizenship to Abandonment: The 
Politics-Space-Law Nexus’, explored the lived experiences of (non)citizenship in the enclaves’ 
spaces considering their spatial setting/trans-territorial location. The actuality of citizenship in 
the enclaves is analysed with the written rights of the individuals in India and Bangladesh and 
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how those rights were violated by other sets of legal norms. It shows that enclave residents’ 
citizenry was enacted like many other Indian or Bangladeshi citizens disregarding these 
enclaves’ trans-territorial reality. It identifies how neither country actualised enclave residents’ 
citizenship through the ambiguous (il)legal exclusion of the legal rights of citizenship. The 
enclave dwellers do not live in the ‘citizenship gap’, the difference between rights and benefits 
of citizenship, (see Brysk & Shafir, 2004), rather they live in non-citizenship circumstances. 
Chapter 4 also reveals that while the enclave dwellers’ citizenship rights generally abandoned 
by the home state, there existed a temporary form of emergency citizenship that was mostly 
dependent on bilateral political relations. For example, Mashaldanga residents achieved a short 
lived political right to vote and participate in the local election in the home country of 
Bangladesh; or Ali Akbar achieved a recognition from the home country, India, that the host 
country, Bangladesh, could not continue a homicide investigation against Indian enclave 
resident, as happened with (see section 4.5). I consider these are examples of transient 
emergency citizenship that confirm moments of certain element of citizenship. In addition, there 
are examples of citizenship aspirations in the enclaves with the acts of rallying, hunger strikes 
and so on for an early exchange of the enclaves. 
The second research question sought to understand the enclave-host country interactions 
through the lens of the border. Chapter 5, ‘The Where of Border: Meanings of Border in 
Everyday Life: Enforcement and Encounter’, examined the second research question in relation 
to the enclave-host country interactions. This chapter dealt with the spatial and aspatial borders 
roles in enclave residents’ every life. It shows how the political border not only creates the legal 
construction of citizen and alien but also constructs borders in everyday social relations. This 
chapter illustrated the different geographies of the boundary’s roles in filtering enclave 
residents’ as foreigner and then abandoning them from host country’s services. The issue of 
borders also appeared in chapter 4 as a barrier to continuing the enclave-home country 
interaction. While chapter 4 focused on the enclave-home country’s legal tie through 
citizenship, chapter 5 highlighted the enclave-host country’s actions through lenses of a whole 
set of boundaries, power and agencies. 
Chapter 6, ‘Abandonment and Construction of Bare Life in the Enclaves’, looked at the 
vulnerability and despondency experienced in the enclaves because of the non-citizenship and 
strict border policy to answer the third research question. This chapter showed the methods 
constructing enclave spaces as the ‘spaces of exception’ by the both concerned states’ politico-
legal institutions. Using the Agambenian (1998, 2005) concept of sovereign power and bare life, 
this chapter showed that state-sponsored legal violence and the local exploitation and gendered 
violence constructed enclave residents’ body as bare life. This chapter argued that different 
forms of bare life are constituted in the enclaves’ spaces of exception with the examples of 
politico-juridical, social and gendered construction of bare life. Chapter 6 flagged up that every 
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life in the enclaves is exposed to bare life but not all experience such limit circumstances. The 
natural human instinct to explore every survival and improvement of life is visible in the 
enclaves. This was the focus of the last research question and chapter 7 aimed to answer this. 
There are innovative methods or tactics (De Certeau, 1984) to adapt and advance enclave life, 
the focus of chapter 7 entitled ‘The Rhythms of Everyday Survival: The Art of Living in the 
Enclaves’. This chapter accumulates a set of diverse survival tactics either by individual actions 
or the community acts and highlights advancement initiatives; such as individual tactics to get 
access to the host country’s health, education and other systems, or community acts in 
Dashiarchora enclave to form an autonomous enclave. These individual or collective actions of 
everyday survival in the enclaves provide an understanding of the rhythms of enclave life which 
are important to have a deeper understanding of the survival methods and their successes, 
disappointments and innovative methods to cope with life in a zone of abandonment. This 
chapter summarises the thesis, highlighted the research questions, illustrated the research 
implications, distinguished limitations in this study and indicated future research opportunities 
on the enclaves in the sub discipline of political geography. 
8.1 Research Findings 
8.1.1Transient Emergency Citizenship and Citizenship Aspirations in a Zone of 
Abandonment 
Any individual’s legal identity of citizenship in a polity is juridically codified by the nation-
state and citizenship is based on a territorial framework (Brubaker, 1992; Painter & Philo, 1995; 
Delanty, 1997; Ong, 2006). In a situation of territorially fragmented nation-state, both India and 
Bangladesh, as a home country, generally ignore the legal connections they have with the 
enclaves. Drawing on the literatures of citizenship and Agamben’s (1998) conceptualisation of 
abandonment, chapter 4 examined the enclave-home country interactions. This chapter 
demonstrated that people’s rights, obligations and identity as citizens are generally abandoned 
by both the concerned states. It reveals that the enclave dwellers’ citizenship is abandoned and 
they live in a non-citizenship status. This chapter showed that the existence of international 
border works as a barrier to their day-to-day citizenship experiences. The borders not only 
contributed to constituting (non)citizenship for the enclave residents but also pointed out the 
role of a host country’s surveillance and border management to further complicate and 
downgrades the embodiment of citizenship. In many instances, the emergency needs and 
vulnerability of enclave dwellers in the host country are ignored by the home country; for 
example, the enclave dwellers are caught as illegal immigrants in the host country and never 
receive any support from the home state (see chapter 6, section 6.4). In everyday practice, the 
political, spatial and legal identity of citizenship is compromised by other politico-spatial-legal 
factors.  
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However, there are occasional moments when some forms of state-citizen relation exist for 
some enclave dwellers. State politics and its impact on the border constructed the temporalities 
of transient emergency citizenship for some people. Depending on the involved states’ bilateral 
relations, international borders either obstruct or facilitate citizenship for some enclave dwellers, 
as I have shown in the case of the Mashaldanga enclave (see chapter 4, section 4.5). There are 
examples of transient emergency citizenship when enclave dwellers are caught as an illegal 
immigrant in the home country as happened for some Dashiarchora enclave dwellers illustrated 
in chapter 7 (section 7.6). However, this form of citizenship is not straightforward. The 
Dasharchora enclave dwellers had to prove their Indian enclave dweller’s identity in court to be 
free from the charge of illegal Bangladeshi immigration. In another case, Akbar Ali needed to 
establish connections and media attractions in India to escape from a homicide investigation in 
Bangladesh (see chapter 4, section 4.5). In addition to these experiences of non-citizenship and 
temporary forms of certain aspects of citizenship, the enclave residents are becoming political 
and aspiring to the host country’s citizenship—what Isin (2008) defines as the acts of 
citizenship. The enclave residents are now vocalising their citizenship demand in the host 
country by raising the host country’s flag, rallying in the host country’s streets and undertaking 
a hunger strike for an early exchange of the enclaves (see chapter 4, section 4.6). As Nyers 
(2008: 185) mentions for the non-status migrants in the US, ‘one does not have to be a formal 
citizen in order to be heard and seen in a political sense. Those who are denied the status of 
citizen can break into the “consensual” system, interrupt this order, and assert themselves as a 
visible and speaking being’. It is not evident whether the enclave residents demands have been 
heard but certainly they are seen in a political sense but usually without any significant 
consequences. The existence of abandonment, temporary form of citizenship and acts of 
citizenship in the enclave’s spaces bring a complex picture of ground reality.  
The examples of everyday abandonment, temporary form of citizenship and citizenship 
aspirations also reveal how the home country legally included the enclaves’ residents as its 
citizens but excluded them from any citizenship rights. It problematizes the assumed symmetry 
between citizenship and the territory of the nation-state. Instead of a straightforward relationship 
between citizenship and territory, we find a highly complex one in the enclaves that is rife with 
paradoxes. The non-citizenship experiences in these enclaves challenges the usefulness of 
citizenship as an universal framework of analysis for the people who are ranked as citizen but 
never have it. The general experiences of non-citizenship in the enclave suggest citizenship, as a 
framework of analysis, is ineffective to reflect some people’s lived experiences of abandonment. 
In this context, engaging with Agamben’s (1998) conceptualisation of abandonment alongside 
the citizenship debates is useful to understand everyday life in those places. For the enclaves 
abandonment and citizenship are connected by the PSL reality. A combination of the reverse 
conceptualisation such as citizenship and abandonment not only allowed for these dimensions 
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of lived experiences of non-citizenship, transient emergency citizenship and citizenship 
aspirations to be addressed and explored, it also focused on the temporal aspect of citizenship 
implicated in politics. 
8.1.2 Borders: Everywhere and Nowhere  
The border is faced and negotiated in a myriad of ways in the enclaves was articulated not only 
in chapter 5 but also linked to all the empirical chapters. The India-Bangladesh border not only 
obstructed enclave dwellers’ citizenship rights from the home country, the border appeared as a 
strict barrier to basic survival in the enclaves. This chapter explored the meaning, function and 
process of the boundary in the mundane activities of the host country and enclave residents in 
the light of the border as a social construction (see Passi, 1995, 1996; Newman & Paasi, 1998) 
and performativity of the border (Salter, 2008). The chapter shows the border is performed 
through power both legally and illegally. In the context of the enclave residents’, the border is 
performed everywhere in the host country’s territory and the performativity of the border is 
carried on the enclave residents’ bodies. For example, I have shown that religion and language 
work in a complex way when a border guard decides whether a person should be allowed to 
cross the border (see chapter 5; section 5.3). Overall, a very influential role of religion is evident 
in the process of border and bordering. This is not only part of the social construction of the 
border but also part of the border agents’ decisions on individual border crossers’ religious 
identity. The social border also reveals the everyday impact of religion-driven partition and the 
everyday construction of ‘otherness’. Thus, the body is the site for border materiality and the 
legal execution of border sometimes depend on the enclave residents’ and border agents’ 
cultural orientation. Besides these mundane practices of enforcing or defying the borders for 
diverse reasons, the time border brought interesting insights of everyday life tied up with time in 
the Dahagram and Angorpota enclaves; thus both the enclaves are examples of ‘temporalised 
space’ (Lefebvre, 1996: 230). In this context, everyday life is not only linked with local time but 
also to border opening and closing times and every movement follows the calendar of the 
movements of the border daily.  
Chapters 4 and 5 mapped the ‘spatial-legal’ aspect with the key legal-political right of 
individual i.e. citizenship; and key legal-spatial reality i.e. border. Both these chapters showed 
that a combined impact of home country’s abandonment and host country’s strict border 
surveillance construct vulnerability and unsecured life in the enclaves’ spaces. In this context, 
the roles of border agents are crucial as revealed specifically in chapters 5, 6 and 7. Border 
guards also create a state of exception in their performance to control entry/exit of the enclave 
residents. Here the state of exception does indicate, in Agamben’s (1998) terms, a situation 
beyond the rules. For example, the border decides to shoot the border crossers, judge the 
cultural background of the border crosser and take his decision on the basis of sameness, 
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illegally make financial benefits because of the existence of the enclaves and sometimes allow 
the enclave residents to cross the border on the basis of sympathy. A combination of these 
actions constructs a form of exception. All these roles of the border performed by border guards 
construct a chaotic geography of the border. The border guards’ varied (il)legal actions 
materially enact the border as they differently interpret and perform the boundary in the 
everyday.  
On the other hand, enclave residents’ everyday movement across the India-Bangladesh border 
and survival/advancemnt measures, bring multiple forms of border crossings and their reasons 
(see chapter 7, section 7.5). It reveals the desperate need (for example Monir Mitti’r story on 
page 141) to cross the border on the one hand, and the advancement of life in economic or in 
cultural terms on the other. Some permanent or temporary border crossings despite the border 
fence and heavy militarisation bring a sense that people are reluctant to follow the international 
border, a form of ignorance or lack of consciousness, taking chance or sense of bravery to some 
that they could make it. Jones (2012: 698) describes such kinds of ‘multiple strategies that 
transgress, reinterpret and ignore sovereign power’ on the India-Bangladesh border without any 
political mandate construct spaces of refusal.  
8.1.4 Political, social and Gendered Form of Bare Life 
Charting legal, quasi-legal and extra-legal activities of the state apparatus, political elites and 
mainland people, chapter 6 showed the process of constructing the enclaves as spaces of 
exception and bare life in the enclaves in Agamben’s (1998) terms. This chapter explores the 
legal violence by the state-institutions and in this context the main protagonists are both the 
home and host country. In doing so, this chapter showed that bare life is not only constructed 
because of some places being kept as an extra-legal spaces (Agamben, 1998; Gregory, 2004; 
Bigo, 2006; Minca, 2007; Coleman & Grove, 2009) but also because some places are being left 
abandoned. The absence of a home country’s rule of law and the irregular presence of the host 
country’s sovereign power and control construct, in Giorgio Agamben’s (1998) terms, a ‘space 
of exception’ where everyday life is characterised by exclusion from legal rights, but 
nonetheless subject to law, socio-political exploitation and gendered violence. 
Chapter 6 has shown that bare life in the enclaves’ spaces of exception are constructed by state 
agencies such as border guards, hospital authorities, polices and judicial processes; what I 
define as the vulnerability to abandonment. The enclave dwellers are practically abandoned by 
the home country what exposes them to the host country’s strict measures of surveillances. In 
addition to the vulnerability to abandonment, this chapter has illustrated the construction of bare 
life in everyday social relations with examples touching the entire enclave, taking enclave 
dwellers land illegally by the local political elites and so on. With these examples, chapter 6 
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argued that the politico-juridical construction of bare life and social construction of bare life are 
practically linked to each other. Highlighting gendered violence and the patriarchy’s role in 
making women more vulnerable to men, I am arguing that bare life is not gender neutral. We 
need to consider the gendered aspect of bare life in addition to the general construction of bare 
life.    
Unlike the conventional notion of limit case, bare life in the enclaves does not make an end of 
everything. Although, Gregory (2006) considers there is a coexistence of bare life and 
resistance, the enclaves’ examples suggest a coexistence of bare life and survival.  By situating 
Agamben’s ‘bare life’ in these enclaves, this thesis argues that the conceptualisation of bare life 
as solely a sovereign production paints an inadequate picture of the zone of abandonment. The 
chapter argues that in addition to the sovereign creation of bare life, social and gendered 
dimensions are essential for a nuanced approach to this concept. Thus, we need to count 
different forms of bare life rather than focusing only on the sovereign construction of bare life.  
8.1.5 The Rhythms of Everyday Survival Tactics 
While a significant part of the thesis deals with how the concerned states affect the enclave life, 
the last empirical chapter concentrates on how the enclave dwellers continue their everyday life 
in such precarious circumstances. Rather than only focusing on what they do for survival, I have 
focused on the temporalities of their rhythmic structure of social activities and politics of 
survival including what they do and how they try to survive and what the impact such methods 
have in their lives.  Such focus helped to understand the cycles of individual and collective 
survival method including their success, failure, lessons, preparation and predictions for tough 
life following (Harris, 2000) formulation of rhythm. To understand the survival methods, I used 
certain tactics (De Certeau, 1984). The chapter articulates enclave dwellers’ diverse individual 
negotiations with the host country through connections, politics and institutional corruptions. 
Many of the survival tactics involve the invisible entering into the host country’s system such as 
making fake IDs. On the other hand, geographic location of the enclaves and enclave dweller’s 
individual landholdings show they change tactics depending on the vulnerabilities and 
opportunities exist in those places (see chapter 7, section 7.4). All these initiatives connect legal 
and illegal actions under the shadow of legal norms. These contingent survival methods and 
cross border mobility across the enclaves, host and home country suggest small-scale, short-
term, small and less ambitious, un-bureaucratic activism makes life work in the enclaves.  
Conceptually, the survival-under-domination literatures are inadequate to articulate the diverse 
survival methods adopted in the enclaves. As I have shown in chapter 7 that the attempts to 
understand the collective mundane resistance (Scott, 1990), invisible encroachment on the 
system (Bayat, 2010), coping with the violent domination (Allen, 2008) or spaces of refusal 
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(Jones, 2012) either do not include such survival methods or are unable conceptualise the 
complex reality and actions in the enclaves. While these approaches consider a mono-
dimensional framework to understand the complex web of mundane survival under dominance, 
the examples from the enclaves suggest multimodal survival methods including everyday 
adaptation, quiet encroachment and spaces of refusal. Additionally, all these actions go parallel 
and are not relational in the enclaves’ spaces. This also demonstrates multiple agencies’ 
involvement in the whole process such as the enclave dweller and their contacts in state-system. 
With the examples of the everyday survival in the enclaves, the chapter argues that the complex 
process of survival initiatives can be better studied through an understanding of the functioning 
of multiple agencies alongside the dynamics of the power relations between the enclave dweller 
and the authority.  
8.2 Implications of the Research 
This thesis has sought to contribute to enclave research by providing a systematic approach to 
the study of enclaves as well as linking legal geography scholarship with borderland research. 
The thesis has argued and showed that the enclave is a distinctive geopolitical entity because of 
its politico-spatial-legal reality and can provide illuminating perspectives on citizenship and 
abandonment, border, vulnerability and survival tactics. Thus, enclaves are not only important 
for the sake of enclave study but rather can offer a new theoretical understanding of political 
geographical concepts. In addition to contributing towards an understanding of the everyday 
geography of enclaves in India and Bangladesh, I hope this thesis will be of particular interest in 
political geography. 
8.2.1Politico-Spatial-Legality: A Conceptual Framework to Study Enclaves  
The enclave is a neglected research agenda in social science and particularly in political 
geography. Vinokurov (2007) adopted the first systematic research on the world enclaves’ 
through a politico-economic approach. While politics and economic matters are very important 
aspect of an enclave matters, this PhD thesis demonstrates that space and law are two other key 
factors intrinsically linked with an enclave and concerned states relations. To supplement 
Vinokurov’s (2007) attempt at enclaves’ theorisation, I deem an approach connecting politics, 
space and law can work well.  
All the chapters of this thesis illustrated that the enclaves’ geographic location and 
administrative reality varies greatly and create a complex scenario where more than a single 
authority work. Gregory (2004) in a different context argued that ‘law is a site where political 
struggles not only in its suspension but also in its formulation, interpretation and application’. I 
find this argument useful for the enclave research in the application or practice of law. Law is 
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the centre of gravity of the everyday life in the Cooch Behar enclaves. In this context, it is not as 
a way of ordering place and people but as an instrumental tool of violence. Illegal, the antonym 
of legal also signifies some implication of the legal. All the empirical chapters demonstrate that 
a nuanced, broad and clear approach is required to explore and theorise such complex 
geopolitical curiosity. The empirical evidences reveal that the enclave means ‘in-between’ 
political, social and legal entity. Adopting a politico-spatial-legal approach, this thesis 
demonstrates that the legal meaning of space and spatial identity of the people are strongly 
visible when nation-state’s contiguity is fractured and cracked.  
8.2.2 Legal geography and Borderland Study 
With the empirical evidence collected during fieldwork, I argue that the enclaves’ example can 
contribute to legal geography in two ways; firstly, understanding law from an ‘out of legal 
space’. The legal geography scholarship focuses on the impact of the physical presence of law 
(Holder & Harrison, 2003). On the other hand, this study reveals a circumstance and space 
where law as institution and law as rights are physically absent. Therefore, there is an 
opportunity to reconceptualise ‘legal’ from the enclave’s perspective. This thesis argues that the 
materiality of law is more experiential in an abandoned space where legitimate legal authority of 
the home country is absent but irregular illegitimate sovereignty of the host country exists. I 
have illustrated throughout the thesis that enclave life is implicated in the law but they are not 
protected in the law, as enclave residents’ legal citizenship rights are abandoned but enclave life 
is shaped by the host country’s legal actions against illegal immigrants. As Delaney (2003: 80) 
states, ‘there is no aspect of social life that is beyond the reach of legal interpretation’.  
Another claim this thesis makes in relation to the scope of legal geography scholarship is that 
legal geography scholarship is more concerned with urban legalities than that of the border (see 
Blomley, 2003; Kedar, 2003; Blomley & Delaney, 2001). The thesis argues that legal 
geography’s scope can be much wider than limiting it to research on city. The subjectivity of 
law is forcefully experienced in the enclaves. The notion of boundary appeared in the discussion 
of the racial boundary (Delaney, 2003); however international boundary and borderland remains 
largely beyond the scope. I argue that legal geography can be a valuable conceptual approach to 
think about borderland studies. Law is not only applied and contested in the spaces of the city; it 
is more felt in the border zone where two legal authorities intersect. The enclaves’ 
circumstances lie at the intersection where and how law as regulator to ensure territorial 
sovereignty and law as rights (citizenship) are contested. This brings the maintenance of the 
physical border as part of politico-spatial-legal interplay. This work reveals that not only 
enclave study but also the borderland and border research can benefit from the legal-spatial 
approach considering body as the scale of study and the site of the performing border.  
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8.2.3 State, Sovereignty and the Enclaves 
This study exclusively focuses on the corporeal-experiential aspects of the reality of law, space 
and politics in the enclaves’ spaces. While the scale of analysis is on a micro level, we can study 
the nation-state and territorial sovereignty from these micro-scale discussions. The construction 
of the abandoned space and absence of de facto legal sovereignty in the enclaves’ spaces 
challenge the dominant theorisation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of a nation-state. 
The ideal notion of sovereignty has been challenged by the concepts of the flexible (Ong, 1999), 
sovereign excesses (Sidaway, 2003) or contingent (Elden, 2006) or tacit (McConnell, 2009) or 
sovereignty practices. On the other hand, Cooch Behar enclaves reveal a situation where legal 
territorial sovereignty is absent without exercising authority over the given territory of a nation-
state- what Jones (2009) describes as displaced sovereignty. Jones’ (2009) conceptualisation of 
displaced sovereignty counts the absence of sovereignty in the enclaves, and the enclave 
dwellers movement across the host country violating another sovereign territory. However, 
Jones (2009) ignored another important aspect of sovereignty practices in the enclaves in a form 
of extra-territoriality. As chapter 6 (see section 6.3) demonstrates that the host country 
irregularly exercises illegitimate sovereignty over the enclave. In fact, enclave life is shaped by 
the host country’s legal and illegal regulations and this can advance our understanding of 
mundane sovereignty practices. Here I echo Sidaway’s (2003: 174) emphasis, ‘beyond the issue 
of more or less sovereignty, beyond the presence or absence of undifferentiated sovereign 
power, towards a contextual understanding of different regimes, apparatus, expressions and 
representations of sovereignty'. 
Here, I consider the state a spatialised social practice (Painter, 1995) that is itself a set of daily 
practices (Mountz, 2003; Herbert, 1997; Painter, 2006). The daily work of the enclave-host-
home country interactions concerned states in relation to the enclaves brings two contradictory 
narratives. We can understand how the state-territory- citizen relation function, and how the 
state-foreign territory-foreigner relations work. The ethnographic examples shared throughout 
the thesis reveal that state-territory-citizen relations are non-existent, the enclave territory is 
ungoverned and citizens are abandoned. On the other hand, the state-foreign territory-foreigner 
narrative reveal a powerful state though its daily implementation of policy and strict measures 
to restrict foreign enclave dwellers’ illegal entrance into the territory. In this context, border 
guards, hospital authorities, educational institutes, employers enact state in daily practices and 
establish legal boundaries between citizen and enclave dwellers. As Mountz (2010: 152) argues, 
‘our enactments and encounters with the state occur everywhere in daily life, well beyond the 
sites where borders are established.’ This dualism enacting the state as both a home and host 
country demonstrates the power of the state to differentially treat certain spaces and some 
people. It also brings a troubled notion of the state when the state abandons its own enclave but 
irregularly and illegitimately uses foreign territory. The study shows that research on an enclave 
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is not only important for the sake of enclave study but also provides understanding of the 
nation-state. 
8.2.4 Importance of Ethnography and Everyday in Enclave Research 
In political geography, there is a dearth of work on the everyday and ethnographic approaches to 
enclave research (McConnel, 2009a; Megoran, 2006). Ethnography is useful to understand 
political geographical actions on the local level as this thesis has shown. As the empirical 
chapters demonstrate, we need to understand individual actions and experiences alongside the 
local, national and bilateral policies and agreements to understand the sheer complexities of 
everyday enclave life. In light of the empirical chapters of this thesis, we can highlight the 
importance of the everyday and ethnography in the following ways. 
Lived experiences of everyday abandonment, transient emergency citizenship, and citizenship 
aspirations tell the diversity in (non) citizenship experiences. And, it reveals the transient 
emergency citizenship is influenced by the enclave’s geographic location, bilateral politics and 
individual enclave dwellers connections. This highlights the necessity of doing multi-sited 
ethnography to understand how the PSL interacts differently in different sites. Such lived 
experiences of enclave life need to be studied from an everyday perspective, otherwise many 
important issues remain unaddressed. 
The performativity and the experiences of the border in this border zone reveal that the border is 
not only locally constructed but also constructed at the body level. I echo Mountz’s (2004: 325) 
argument, ‘the body reveals processes, relationships, and experiences otherwise obscured.’ 
Chapter 5 revealed that the performativity of border often depend on the individual enclave 
resident and border-guard’s cultural identity or personal prejudice/favour. Such important 
insights of the border would be obscured if the borders were not considered from the smallest 
scale of the body. Similarly, everyday survival in the enclaves strongly demonstrates that the 
enclave life is individually constituted and survival tactics vary depending on individual 
vulnerability, opportunity and necessity. The ethnography did not only explore what people do 
for a living but also concentrated on how enclave dwellers manage to do it. To understand such 
a reality, ethnographic participant observation is the unique method as it observes, participates 
and understands the study sites that are full of complexities, sensitivity, and hidden matrix of 
life; thus it counters the depoliticising abstractions of the host and home states (Nevins, 2002).        
Multi-sited ethnography in the enclaves’ significantly aided in articulating the everyday 
experiential aspect of bare life in these enclaves. Thus it is equally important to focus more on 
empirical work on bare life in addition to theoretical consideration. Empirical examples of bare 
life in a non-war like context have not travelled far in academic work; still bare life is an 
abstract construction. Research on expendable life, except in few cases, interrogates the role of 
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broad procedures or state policies in constructing bare life that are, to some extent, abstract. 
There are many places in this world which exist under the seizer of the law as Agamben argues, 
‘there is no doubt that ‘the small group of obscure people will continue to give historians work 
to do’ (Agamben, 1999:12). Such an obscure or invisible bare life should be under scrutiny in 
academic discourse.  
8.2.5 Abandonment and Statelessness 
The enclave dwellers non-citizenship and bare life experiences suggest that the people are 
stateless through abandonment from the home country and legal punishment by the host 
country. Statelessness in the Indian enclaves appeared in Jones’s (2010) account, however he 
did not locate enclave residents’ situation in the theorisation of statelessness. The Convention on 
the Reduction of Statelessness defines that ‘the nationality shall be granted by “operation of law 
to a person born in the states territory” to anyone who would otherwise be stateless’ (Blitz & 
Lynch, 2011b: 2). These enclaves are parts of their home country but there is no ‘operation of 
law’ in these enclaves. However, the enclave dwellers are not only taken out of the ‘operation of 
law’ but also enclave territory is kept out of the legal system as illustrated in the empirical 
chapters. There have been Hannah Arendt influenced works on statelessness based on the 
Origins of Totalitarianism in social and political theory. Arendt (1958: 295–296) argues,  
The calamity of the rightless is not that they are deprived of life, 
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, or of equality before the law and 
freedom of opinion… Their plight is not that they are not equal before 
the law, but that no law exists for them; not that they are oppressed 
but that nobody wants even to oppress them.  
Thus, Hannah Arendt argues rightlesness is statelessness. And, the thesis has shown that the 
enclave dwellers in India and Bangladesh are living exactly in the same situation Arendt (1958) 
articulates. Arendt’s conceptualisation of statelessness or rightlesness linked to displacement or 
loss of home; similarly other literature emphasise more on displacement, refugee/asylum seeker 
and statelessness (see Mountz, 2010; Blitz & Lynch, 2011) or lack of territory and statelessness 
(see McConnell, 2009a; Blitz, 2011). But statelessness is not always constructed through 
displacement rather it is constructed within the state’s territory when there are violent conflicts 
or war as happens for the Kurds and previously occurred in Sri Lanka (see Sivapragasam, 
2011). On the other hand, statelessness in the Indian and Bangladeshi enclaves is constructed 
because of territorial discontinuity and abandonment by the home country without any massive 
political instability or war. Therefore, these enclaves provide a different notion of statelessness.  
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8.2.6 Implications in Policy Making and Awareness Building 
This thesis sheds lights on the ground realities of the hard and uncertain enclave life. It uncovers 
that the enclave dwellers are not only living in non-citizenship but also living without human 
rights for sixty-five years. This thesis can contribute in policy making in relation to the enclaves 
and border management practices on ground. Considering the slow, complicated exchange 
processes, and lack of state level political will to resolve this enduring problem, I am not 
optimistic that this thesis can have any direct implication on enclave exchange matters; however 
it can help the policy makers to understand the ground vulnerabilities and difficult life in the 
enclaves. The fieldwork in both sides of the border and discussions with the Home Ministry 
officials reveal that they have very little knowledge of the hardship of enclave life. This thesis 
can fill that gap between policy makers and enclave reality.  
In addition, there is a misrepresentation of the enclave and enclave dwellers in some border 
officials published work and their general perception on the enclave life (see chapter 5, section 
5.4). If this misrepresentation is politically motivated to cover up the political liability for not 
resolving the disputes over enclave matters, the thesis cannot help them. In this context, I 
believe the major implication of this thesis can be to raise awareness to other people such as 
human rights activists or NGOs who works for the vulnerable people. So far, the enclave 
dwellers’ everyday vulnerability and non-citizenship only appear in the media when there is a 
major incident in the enclaves. Based on my fieldwork in Dhaka, Kolkata and Delhi, people 
living there do not even know what an enclave is. A similar view of these enclaves as forgotten 
or unknown to the majority of Indian and Bangladeshi citizens is also evident in the literatures 
on the India-Bangladesh enclaves (see Van Schendel, 2002, Whyte, 2002; Jones, 2010). 
Therefore, I believe this thesis can raise awareness in India and Bangladesh about the 
vulnerability and complicated life in the enclaves. 
8.3 Evaluations:  Conceptual and Methodological Framework 
I have taken a politico-spatial-legal approach to understand enclave residents’ everyday lives. 
An approach with specific consideration of the human aspect has its strengths and weaknesses. 
Enclave residents’ quotidian life through the interplay of space, politics and law nexus 
comprehensively sketches key components rights, regulations, vulnerability, and survival tactics 
connecting concerned states. This provides an inclusive picture of experiential aspect of life 
under legal closure. The weakness of dealing with the ‘human aspect’ of enclave life lays with 
less focus on territorial aspects such sovereignty or nation-state’s contiguity. In addition, less 
attention is provided to the cultural and economic attributes of life such as the construction of 
identity, nationalism and the economic aspect of enclave life. Considering the time allocation 
for a PhD, it was not possible to explicitly focus on identity, nationalism or an enclave 
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economy. There are opportunities to do future research, and some research have already been 
done on sovereignty (Jones, 2009), nationalism (Van Schendel, 2002) and enclave economy 
(Vnokurov, 2007). None of the previous work on Cooch-Behar enclaves exclusively focused on 
the enclave life considering the key politico-spatial-legal matters between the enclave-host-
home countries. In this consideration, citizenship, border, vulnerability and survival methods are 
indispensible aspects of enclave life. These connections and contradictions between the enclave-
host-home countries are, I consider, very important to understanding the complexities in enclave 
life and deserve more academic attention. This thesis aims at reducing this gap. 
Methodologically, I argue that ethnography is the best method to enunciate the everyday life in 
the enclaves. And it is necessary to conduct ethnography in both sides of the border for an in-
depth understanding of enclave life, otherwise many important characteristics of enclave will 
remain unstudied. If I had the opportunity to extend this project, I would go for a year-long 
fieldwork of intensive work in the all segments of the Bengal border where these enclaves are 
scattered. Considering the time and financial constraints, I chose two segments of the border 
(Patgram and Kurigram in Bangladesh and Dinhata in India) and worked on the enclaves 
located in those places which limited my ability to explore life in other segments (Panchagrah in 
Bangladesh and Mekhliganj in India) of the border. With this limitation, it is possible that I did 
not get a complete picture of the condition of the enclave life. 
8.5 Future Research Avenues 
I consider several opportunities for further enclave research. One is to test the politico-spatial-
legal approach in other enclaves’ contexts to lead a broad and comprehensive theory of enclave. 
Understanding enclave through the interrelations of three key term politics, space and law is 
crafted and directed to the Cooch Behar enclaves. Therefore, the specificity of this analysis 
needs to be applied to the contexts of other enclaves’. A broad theorisation of enclaves is not 
only important for the sake of enclaves but can also advance the concept of territory, nation-
state and sovereignty aspects. Future research on enclaves can contribute to a nation-state’s 
territorial strategy and existing linear knowledge on a nation-state’s territorial contiguity. This 
discontiguity can be illustrated and theorised from different political, social or cultural 
components. On the other hand, specific research on Cooch Behar enclaves can document 
identity formation and nationalism what is very important for these enclaves. Research could 
consider, for example, how enclave residents define their identities living in-between two 
nation-states and what roles religion and partition play in such identity formation can bring new 
theoretical understanding on identity and nationalism.    
There is an opportunity to document recent events of citizenship aspirations connected to a 
broad theorisation of resistance and becoming political. With recent actions of become claimant 
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than the invisible human being, people in the enclaves are becoming political. The enclaves and 
nearby mainland districts are the spaces where these political struggles are taking place. These 
recent events can lead to future research on claims to political space by non-citizens as well as 
the process, agents and state-responses in the roads to become political. This is a new formation 
of political horizon and insurgent acts to determine its own citizenship in their desired nation-
state. On the other hand, both the involved states are very close to the elimination of enclaves. 
In this context, very interesting future research is possible. If these enclaves are exchanged, 
research on the life changing phases of citizenship can add a new dimension to citizenship 
debates. Upon the successful implementation of the agreement, these enclaves’ future will 
reside with the host country. With the provision of the choice to deicide desired nation-state, it 
possible to think in what ways trans-territoriality and enclave environment construct nationalism 
and identity.  
8.6 Final Remarks 
Border disputes have formed bilateral antagonism; however, the neighbourhood policy or 
foreign policy of both the states has also framed the enduring nature of border disputes. In all 
instances, enclave residents’ remain the victim of all conflict. A history of the Bengal border 
disputes justifies Appadorai’s thoughtful quote, ‘the political forces, and not purely legal texts, 
ultimately shape political decisions’ (1981:197). The exclusion of the entire enclave exchange 
from the 1958 agreement and delay in ratification of 1974-LBA are related to bilateral and 
domestic politics and not to legal constraints. In fact, legal worked as an instrument. Recent 
agreement on enclave exchange and removal of all border disputes after thirty-five years long 
silence demonstrate political goodwill can only make border disputes resolved.Once both the 
Prime Ministers agreed on a border dispute resolution package, it took a year for the Joint 
Boundary Working Group (JBWG) to resolve all technical disagreements on borders and what 
they failed to do in decade long JBWG meetings. 
The signing of the agreement did not soften the Indian and Bangladeshi government’s attitude 
toward enclave residents. While the Bangladeshi enclave residents’ rallies on Cooch Behar are 
overlooked by law enforcing officials, an individual enclave resident’s attempt to work other 
parts of India can cause imprisonment, such as in the case of one Bangladeshi enclave dweller 
who was caught in Haryana in July under the Foreigner’s Act (Uttarbanga Sambad, 01 August, 
2012). On the other hand, the Bangladesh government recently announced that no Indian 
enclave resident would receive a Bangladeshi ID card until the agreement is implemented 
(Daily Prothom Alo, 20 August, 2012). Therefore, the signing of the agreement has not changed 
enclave life. 
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In the last sixty years, the agreement came and expired without full implementation and there is 
nothing to substantiate either country’s good will to resolve these matters. Optimistically, the 
new agreement envisioned an enclave and dispute free border but actual implementation is 
undecided. All the previous border agreements became topics of fierce domestic political 
contestation leading to legal battles; therefore the domestic political effects on boundary 
materialisation created the geologically slow border demarcation process. Any precise forecast 
about the Indo-Bangladesh agreement is impossible considering the unstable and unproductive 
methods and relationships. Since the signing of the Land Boundary Protocol (LBP) in 
September 2011, there was no progress on the Indian side to approve the LBP in parliament. As 
mentioned in the introduction, the West Bengal government and the main opposition party were 
opposed to this protocol from the beginning. They consider such territorial loss for India as 
unacceptable (see India Herald, August 03, 2012). The Indian Herald mentions that there is a 
move from the Indian government to raise the issue in the parliament for approval in the 
upcoming monsoon session. Apparently the BJP and the WB government will be in opposition 
and the ruling Congress party are in deficit of an absolute majority in the parliament. Therefore, 
if the government fails to convince the West Bengal ruling party, All India Trinomool Congress, 
then it is likely that the ratification will not take place in near future. However, the ratification 
of the agreement can only legitimise this Land Boundary Protocol in Indian Parliament. Any 
cession and accession of land needs a constitutional amendment in India. This agreement can 
only be implemented after constitutional amendment in India.  This all means that it will take 
time. Being so close to eliminating the enclaves, will they still fail to implement? The saga of 
the enclaves may be drawing to a close—but don’t hold your breath while you wait! 
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